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I. Introduction
Due to a growing awareness about limited natural resources caused in part by the deple-
tion of raw materials and the forecast put forward in The Limits to Growth, presented
by the Club of Rome in 1972 (Meadows et al., 1972), technological progress had become
an economic focus. The 1973 oil crisis led to a period of economic stagnation in many
industrialized Western countries, which strengthened public concern about the scarcity
of raw materials, such as crude oil. Given the prospect of a long-term worldwide eco-
nomic slowdown, technological development was found to be a promising opportunity
for further economic prosperity.
All this led to a remarkable change in economists’ thinking regarding technological
change. At that time Solow’s theory (1956) was the prevailing growth model, based
on capital accumulation and labor, interpreting technological progress as somewhat ex-
ogenous – like manna falling from heaven – which enables the labor force to become
continuously more efficient. An alternative model of economic growth was presented
by Romer (1989), in which the understanding of technological progress is considered
more endogenous, which can be influenced through a reduction of consumption and an
investment in research and development (R&D) activities. Thus, many social scien-
tists began searching for determinants of technological change, a task in which Joseph
Schumpeter was already engaged (Schumpeter, 1942). The interdependence between
R&D, innovations, and the economic performance of a country in conjunction with the
characterization of R&D as a public good, requires and legitimizes a certain degree of
governmental intervention (Arrow, 1962; Nelson, 1959).
At the end of the 1980s the idea of national innovation systems became popular
(Freeman, 1987; Lundvall, 1988; Freeman, 1991), introducing a systematic approach
that helps to explain the degree of innovation in an economy through the configuration
of institutions, relationships, and organizations inside the private and public sectors.
The approach stresses the dependency of a country’s innovative performance on inter-
organizational research collaborations between firms, universities, and research centers
carried out within formal and informal networks. Moreover, Powell et al. (1996) empha-
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sized that “when knowledge is broadly distributed and brings a competitive advantage,
the locus of innovation is found in a network of interorganizational relationships.” In ad-
dition, cost-economizing incentives also play a role, such as economies of scale, resource
pooling, risk sharing, and gaining access to new markets (Hagedoorn, 1993; Mowery
et al., 1998). The network-related approach implies the understanding of an innovation
as a non-linear process (Kline, 1985; Pyka, 1999), since the current configuration of the
network is affected by the previous stages of the innovation system. By this, the ac-
tual stage of the innovation system represents the outcome of experience-accumulation
and collective learning processes in the past (Ozman, 2009) triggered by stakeholders
from various institutional backgrounds. These ideas coincide with the pulse of the time,
as European firms were falling behind their competitors from the U.S. and Japan due
to low investment in R&D activities and a weak interface with research organizations.
Thus Europe, triggered by this shock, began facilitating its collaborative research efforts
through the implementation of a new innovation policy.
In the EU, this policy was realized via the initiation of the first Framework Programme
for Research and Technological Development (FP) in 1984. From the beginning of the
program, transnational research joint ventures between different organizations were cen-
tral to the FP in order to facilitate the emergence of a pan-European research network.
In 2000, the EU strengthened its ambitions with a revision of the actual policy and
proclaimed a way “Towards a European Research Area” (EU, 2000). Even though the
original perspective of the innovation system was a national one, this policy revision
justified a transnational interpretation of the same approach, centralized at the level
of the EU (Delanghe et al., 2009; Protogerou et al., 2013). To this day, researchers
largely confirmed the emergence of a continent-wide research network resulting from
research projects that have been supported by the EU (Breschi and Cusmano, 2004;
Roediger-Schluga and Barber, 2006; Protogerou et al., 2013).
Furthermore, in the national context, collaborative research joint ventures became key
instruments of governmental innovation policies. Even if the initial share was rather low
compared to the European FP, the German federal government started to support pre-
competitive joint projects during the 1980s (Fier and Harhoff, 2002). The breakthrough
for collaborative projects in Germany came in 1999, when the number of joint projects
exceeded the number of single-funded projects for the first time (Czarnitzki and Fier,
2003). As a consequence, Germany developed a national research network (Broekel and
Graf, 2012), strengthening the country’s innovative competitiveness.
Since a frequent number of possible market imperfections have been investigated, for
12
example, private underinvestment in R&D by private firms (Arrow, 1962), the unavail-
ability of adequate infrastructure (Smith, 2000) or due to connectivity problems between
the organizations within an innovation system (Woolthuis et al., 2005), the necessity for
government intervention is evident. However, it is important to address whether or not
the policy design implemented by the government is efficient, in order to prevent unin-
tended distortions to the market such as harming the incentive to innovate, rent-seeking
activities, or fostering market power.
One of the first observations concerning the pan-European research network was the
identification of a highly clustered core at the center of the network and, as a conse-
quence of this, a poorly connected periphery (Breschi and Cusmano, 2004). Another
finding was that to a large extent the network configuration tends to replicate itself
among subsequent FPs (Roediger-Schluga and Barber, 2006). Thus, central players in
the research network gradually become even more central, which implies several risks for
an economy’s innovative performance. A policy that focuses unilaterally on the emer-
gence of a dense network of organizations (Breschi and Cusmano, 2004) or that enables
too much clustering (Cowan and Jonard, 2004) has the potential of facing path depen-
dencies, technological lock-ins, institutional constraints, a consolidation of technological
paradigms, and coordination failures. Another pitfall would be the ineffectiveness of the
mechanisms used to facilitate knowledge flows. All of these would be detrimental to the
original aim of the policy, which is to strengthen innovative performance.
The rising importance of collaborative project grants in light of the possibility of gov-
ernment failure has addressed several questions, such as whether the revision of innova-
tion policies in industrialized countries fosters the emergence of the network structures
discussed above, encourages rent-seeking, or promotes market power. In order to analyze
the processes that shape these outcomes the next sections will investigate, theoretically
and empirically, what shapes the current implemented innovation policy in Germany
and the EU.
Therefore, this study has the following structure. Chapter II gives an overview con-
cerning the rising importance of networks for innovation processes and innovation sys-
tems in economic theory, and summarizes the historical implementation of network-
related instruments used in governmental innovation policies. According to the litera-
ture, collaborative project grants will soon become, or already are, the dominant policy
instrument of industrialized countries in the promotion of innovations, and thus a deeper
insight into the mechanism of funding is quite urgent. The literature overview lead ul-
timately to further research questions for the remaining empirical Chapters III through
13
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V.
Chapter III discusses the European innovation policy, since high-quality data are
available, including accepted as well as rejected collaborative projects for the European
FPs. Furthermore, because of the convergence mechanism and the political aim to
interconnect the national innovation systems of EU member states, the European policy
becomes highly relevant even to national innovation systems. The chapter explores the
case of the biotechnology sector and the allocation mechanism of project grants for the
7th Framework Programme. In that chapter, we investigate which mechanisms trigger
the evolution of a core periphery structure within the European R&D network. The
biotechnology is illustrative of future markets, as the sector is a rather new emerging
industry, with significant economic potential. Thus, inefficient policy implementation
could possibly jeopardize Europe’s position as a forerunner within this or other industries
in the coming years.
Chapter IV shifts the perspective to the innovation policy in Germany and focuses on
the dynamics of the funding system. To evaluate Germany’s funding strategy the empir-
ical investigation of the chapter reveals connection between the allocation mechanism of
project grants and the research network’s architecture. For this purpose, the manufac-
turing industry was selected since Germany’s economic success depends to a large extent
on its capabilities within the machinery sector. The analysis confirms the dependency of
the allocation process on the network structure, which ultimately causes a feedback cycle
between the formation of the network and the allocation process of project grants. This
finding led to the motivation to explore whether the promotion of collaborative project
grants is a suitable policy instrument for the promotion of collaborative innovations.
Chapter V analyzes the interrelationship between research joint ventures and innova-
tions for the automotive and chemical industries in Germany. The sectors chosen for
this investigation are highly relevant to Germany’s economy, underpinning the current
export surplus. Thus, innovations within these sectors help to sustain Germany’s com-
petitiveness in the global market. The investigation helped to understand that both
types of collaborative activities – research as well as innovation – are highly related to
each other, and that network links present in one are highly likely to transit. This ob-
servation raises the question as to which type of network formation evolves over time
within a policy-promoted research network, since it is highly likely that rather static
policy legislation tends to preserve once-established network patterns.
Chapter VI concludes the major findings of the study from a general perspective and
outlines research questions for further investigation.
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II. The rising importance of networks
for innovation policies
1. Theoretical background
By promoting R&D activities, governments aim to secure the economic, social, and
cultural development of their territories. Hence, the question often asked is, do collabo-
rative research grants or network-oriented funding strategies contribute to the innovative
performance and economic prosperity of a country or continent? Answering this the fol-
lowing sections provide a theoretical overview concerning the outstanding importance of
cooperative research activities for innovating.
As already mentioned, this perspective requires that technological change can be in-
fluenced, which is a point of view that was not accepted by all economists. Various
economic schools explained technological change differently. The understanding of tech-
nical progress as a residue between economic growth and other explaining factors was
supported, as well as the opinion that technical change is an endogenous factor. The
latter is shared across “Endogenous Growth Theory,” “New Institutional Economics”,
and “Evolutionary Economics” (Grupp, 1997).
1.1. Innovating and technological progress
Innovating is a general concept, thus various definitions can be found within the literature
and requires that the term be interpreted within its respective context. Occasionally,
innovating and technical progress are used as synonyms, which leads to some confusion
if there is no contextual definition as they are different expressions for related events.
Both refer to a process that explores something new. However, the terminus of innovat-
ing includes an economic, technological, political, cultural, and social perspective, and
is therefore broader than the meaning of technical progress, which has only a techno-
logical dimension (Grupp, 1997). Schumpeter’s (1942) understanding of an innovation
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includes all, which can lead to quasi-rents that result from entrepreneurial advantages.
As the following chapters focus on technological R&D activities, it is reasonable to define
innovating as a process to create new technologies.
Within the macroeconomic context, technical progress increases the competitiveness
of an economy (Solow, 1956; Freeman, 1987; Romer, 1989) in terms of productivity and
the ability to support new markets. This means that the same economic output can
be achieved with less input or that for a country’s given resource allocation, the output
becomes enlarged due to the availability of more efficient production processes and new
technological capabilities.
1.2. Innovation process
Linear approach
The microeconomic foundation of technical progress in the linear approach is grounded
on the organization’s decision to undertake an innovation activity. The organization
will invest its scarce resources for the exploration and development of a new technology,
process, or product if it can expect a net profit after deducting opportunity costs and
development expenditures derived from the innovation process (Dosi, 1988). The idea of
innovation as a sequential or a linear process mostly refers to Schumpeter (1912; 1942),
who divides the process into three consecutive steps: (1) the invention phase, (2) the
innovation phase, and (3) the diffusion and imitation phase. The invention phase dis-
covers a new product or technique by the application of basic or experimental research.
Within the innovation phase, the initial invention is processed to an economically uti-
lizable product, and thereafter introduced to the market. In the case of market success,
the innovation will reach the third stage. Other firms start to imitate the development
of the innovation, thus the innovation becomes diffused. This initiates technical progress
within the overall economy (Pyka, 1999; Grupp, 1997; Forrest, 1991).
Collective approach
The linear approach has been heavily criticized since the 1980s, as it does not take into
consideration the possibility of feedback links among different stages of the innovation
process. It also highlights unilateral in-house R&D activities without having interconnec-
tions to other organizations, and restricts contributions from the research and academic
sector to the first (invention) stage of the process (Kline, 1985; Kelly and Kranzberg,
1978). A major shift towards a renewal of the theoretical framework of the innovation
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process occurred the prevailing interests concerning the knowledge-based economy ap-
proach, which stresses the importance of knowledge as an additional production factor.
First thoughts were made by Marshall (1920), but it was Penrose’s (1959) resource-based
view of a firm that introduced knowledge as an essential part of a company’s collection
of productive resources. Hence, the productive capacity of a firm is not only determined
by its specific composition of human and physical capital, but also from its accumulated
knowledge over time (Pyka, 1999). The understanding of a company as a repository of
productive knowledge and routines (Nelson, 1982; Winter, 1988) widens the firm’s strate-
gic ability to compete by stimulating the internal production, and external acquisition,
of new knowledge.
The shortcomings of the linear approach led to the emergence of the collective ap-
proach, which emphasizes the complexity and interconnectivity of an innovation process
as well as the dependency of innovating on knowledge accumulation (Pyka, 1999). In the
collective approach, the process is no longer seen as a sequence of consecutive stages but
as a heavily intertwined procedure (Kline, 1985) that includes frequent feedback loops
between the stages and involves various actors from different institutional backgrounds.
The coordination of countless innovation processes taking place simultaneously within
a complex economy is carried out by a self-organizing network, following the principle
of Complementarity and reciprocity. Building upon the approach of a knowledge based
economy, this new innovation concept stresses knowledge as an additional production
factor, linking the success of an innovation process directly to the available accumulated
knowledge base of the involved organizations. With the rising complexity of innovations,
especially in high-tech sectors, it became more urgent than ever before to collaborate, as
the origin of innovations lies among firms, research centers, universities, consumers, and
suppliers rather than inside one particular entity (Graf, 2006; Powell, 1990). The recom-
bination of already-existing knowledge is a fertile source of technical progress (Boschma,
2005; Nooteboom, 2000), thus external information sources were of particular importance
since within a complex economy knowledge is dispersed among numerous organizations
(Brusoni et al., 2001).
Various types of arrangements regulate the transfer of knowledge between different
actors (Graf, 2006). In a market situation, contracts formalize the exchange between
involved organizations by defining clear property rights. In that case, most of the com-
munication is carried out by the price mechanism of the market. In a hierarchical rela-
tionship, for example between the head and the research staff of a department, personal
contracts formalize the flow of knowledge. Another constellation is inter-organizational
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cooperation, which constitutes a hybrid between markets and hierarchies which requires
trustworthy relationships and reciprocity (Granovetter, 1985; Powell, 1990; Uzzi, 1996).
This is required as most of the transferred knowledge is informal or tacit, which an orga-
nization will only share with reliable partners (Hippel, 1988; Kogut and Zander, 1992).
Moreover, an organization would not engage itself in a research joint venture if it could
not expect to learn from other organizations (Graf, 2006).
Furthermore, an organization needs the capability to absorb external knowledge. Ac-
cess alone is not a sufficient condition for learning, since the organization needs to trans-
late the external knowledge into in-house routines. Cohen and Levinthal (1990) shaped
the concept of the absorptive capacity, which describes an organization’s ability to iden-
tify, assimilate, and exploit knowledge. The absorptive capability of an organization can
be trained by internal R&D activities since a significant share of the skills are related to
learning-by-doing experiences and learning-by-using processes (Graf, 2006). Besides the
knowledge argument, cost-economizing incentives also play a role, such as economies of
scale, resources pooling, risk sharing, and gaining access to new markets (Hagedoorn,
1993; Mowery et al., 1998). Furthermore, an organization needs the capability to absorb
external knowledge. Access alone is not a sufficient condition for learning, since the
organization needs to translate the external knowledge into in-house routines. Cohen
and Levinthal (1990) shaped the concept of the absorptive capacity, which describes an
organization’s ability to identify, assimilate, and exploit knowledge. The absorptive ca-
pability of an organization can be trained by internal R&D activities since a significant
share of the skills are related to learning-by-doing experiences and learning-by-using
processes (Graf, 2006). Besides the knowledge argument, cost-economizing incentives
also play a role, such as economies of scale, resources pooling, risk sharing, and gaining
access to new markets (Hagedoorn, 1993; Mowery et al., 1998).
1.3. Innovation system
The collective innovation process entails an extremely complex actor-network, which
requires a systematic approach to analyze the multilateral relations and institutions en-
forcing the mechanism of innovation (Edquist, 1997). Innovations are no longer seen as
isolated or independent R&D activities, but as heavily intertwined learning processes of
different organizations (Edquist, 2004; McKelvey, 2002), such as firms, suppliers, cus-
tomers, competitors, research centers, and universities. The behavior of the actors inside
the innovation system (IS) is shaped by the institutional setting (laws, rules, norms, and
routines). The idea for a systematic approach originates from Freeman (1987; 1991) and
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Lundvall (1988). Both introduced the concept of a national innovation system, which
aims to explain the determinants affecting the innovation process. Their approach can be
seen as a reaction to the theoretical incapability to understand Japan’s economic catch-
up process during the 1980s. It attempts to explain the innovativeness of an economy
over the configuration of its institutions in the public and private sector. Freeman (1987)
described the national innovation system as a “network of institutions in the public and
private sectors whose activities and interactions initiate, import, modify and diffuse new
technologies,” and emphasized the role of politics, the R&D activity of private firms,
the available industrial infrastructure, and the educational system. It became apparent
that cooperation is a vital determinant for a country’s economic prosperity. Using these
premises, different countries form their individual national innovation systems, and each
evolves over time depending on its preexisting institutions, historical events, technical
maturity, key industries, and accumulated knowledge (McKelvey, 2002).
Since innovation processes are omnipresent but each location and sector has its own
pattern, other approaches of ISs were conceptualized so that regional (Cooke et al.,
1997; Braczyk et al., 1998), sectoral (Breschi and Franco, 1997; Malerba, 2002), tech-
nological (Carlsson, 1995), and transnational approaches of ISs (Coe and Bunnell, 2003;
Steg, 2005) can be distinguished. Notwithstanding their differences, all IS approaches
commonly place innovation and learning processes at the center of their attention.
Components of the innovation system
There is an overwhelming consensus that a system, as a set of “interrelated components
working toward a common objective” (Carlsson, Jacobsson, et al., 2002), consists of
components, relationships, and attributes whereby the elements mutually affect each
other, with the consequence that the whole system cooperates together.
Transferred into the context of the IS approach, the system is represented by its
organizations, institutions, and interactions (see Figure II.1). Although there is a broad
consensus regarding the main components of an IS (Carlsson, Jacobsson, et al., 2002;
Edquist, 1997; Edquist, 2004), there are discontinuities concerning their understanding.
The main components of the IS have to be clarified.
Organizations are the operators of the system, consisting of individuals in formal
structures are joined together to achieve a common goal. They can come from various
organizational backgrounds, such as private firms, banks, universities, research centers,
or public policy agencies (Carlsson, Jacobsson, et al., 2002; Edquist, 2004).
Institutions are a collection of common laws, norms, habits, routines, or established
23
II. The rising importance of networks in innovation policies
practices that are shared among the organizations inside the system, regulating the rela-
tions between them. They are the result of a long-term process constituted by collective
rather than individual actions. As a consequence, the institutions of different systems
can vary, which is particularly true for national innovation systems since laws or regu-
lations (such as patent laws, ethical guidelines, public funding) are mostly defined and
carried out by national legislative acts and governmental agencies. Unlike organizations,
institutions are unable to act by themselves (North, 1990; Edquist and Johnson, 1997;
Edquist, 2004).
o1
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Organizations
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Figure II.1.: Stylized components of the innovation system
Relationships link the components of the system; thus, the behavior of the organi-
zation is limited by its radius of action. This is defined by the number and strength
of channels found in the components of the IS, and the ability of the organization to
select and coordinate its relationships. The relationships bring a social aspect to the
system, since actions and characteristics of an organization become visible to others and
thus affect the behavior of these other organizations. At the end, the entire system is
more than the sum of its single components, because of bridging links that include both
market and non-market relationships. Each single relation as well as the activities of
a single organization contributes to the dynamic of the system, which would otherwise
be static (Carlsson, Jacobsson, et al., 2002). Interactions between organizations, labor
mobility, and informal networks are prerequisites for a knowledge-based economy and
the collective innovation process, in which networks are an irreplaceable stimulant for
technological progress. Through its direct and indirect relationships, the network en-
ables the exchange of information. Knowledge, thus, can diffuse through the channels
of the network, stimulating knowledge accumulation of other organizations and, by this,
the creation of new knowledge and innovations. Relations between organizations and
institutions are a vital source for the emergence of new institutions and vice versa. Or-
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ganizations are not restricted by their institutional environment, as they often play an
active role as incubators for new ones (Edquist and Johnson, 1997). This entails ad-
justments to the institutional environment, such as new standards for technical norms
or policy rules from the government. Several interactions among institutions compete
or complement each other. One example is illustrated by informal cartels competing
with formal antitrust laws and scientific publications, which is a complement to patent
publication.
Boundaries of the innovation system
The main levels of the IS approach are regional, national, transnational, and sectoral. As
it would be possible to identify more (for example an international IS), the boundaries of
the IS have to be addressed (McKelvey, 2002; Graf, 2006). Even for a national IS where
the geographical boundary is easy to identify, the globalization trend, transnational con-
vergence policies, and numerous dominating multinational enterprises raise the question
of which distinctive boundaries to analyze. Similar problems arise in the context of
sectoral innovation systems. Even if the sector is relatively clear, there are different
industry classifications that shape different boundaries of the system (Graf, 2006). If a
new industry emerges from preexisting branches the situation increases in complexity,
as classification schemes are useless to describe the new sector due to a lack of detail.
In the case of a regional IS, defining the boundaries of the system fails again as the
conceptualization of a region itself remains unclear (cities, public regional authorities,
labor markets). Edquist (2004) clarifies that there is no certain limit for the boundaries
of an IS from which interactions with the outer environment come to an end. Thus, the
appropriate choice of boundaries depend on the circumstances of the respective analysis
(Graf, 2006). Nonetheless, the national IS approach constitutes a meaningful and prac-
tical instrument to analyze the efficiency of a country’s innovation policy (McKelvey,
2002), since most of the regulations are carried out by institutions within the national
context.
Activities of the innovation system
Edquist (2011) summarized several key activities of an IS (see Table II.1). In his under-
standing, activities are the determinants of the overall system that shape an environment
for the countless innovation processes by supporting the development and diffusion of
innovations. The overview of the activities heavily relates to Edquist’s broad under-
standing of an IS, which includes “all important economic, social, political, organiza-
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(i) Provision of knowledge inputs to the innovation process
(1) Provision of R&D results and, thus, creation of new knowledge, pri-
marily in engineering, medicine and natural sciences.
(2) Competence building, for example, through individual learning (ed-
ucating and training the labor force for innovation and R&D activities)
and organizational learning. This includes formal learning as well as
informal learning.
(ii) Demand-side activities
(3) Formation of new product markets.
(4) Articulation of new product quality requirements emanating from
the demand side.
(iii) Provision of constituents for ISs
(5) Creating and changing organizations needed for developing new fields
of innovation. Examples include enhancing entrepreneurship to create
new firms and intrapreneurship to diversify existing firms; and creating
new research organizations, policy organizations, etc.
(6) Networking through markets and other mechanisms, including inter-
active learning among different organizations (potentially) involved in
the innovation processes. This implies integrating new knowledge ele-
ments developed in different spheres of the IS and coming from outside
with elements already available in the innovating firms.
(7) Creating and changing institutions-for example, patent laws, tax
laws, environment and safety regulations, R&D investment routines,
cultural norms, etc. – that influence innovating organizations and inno-
vation processes by providing incentives for and removing obstacles to
innovation.
(iv) Support services for innovating firms
(8) Incubation activities such as providing access to facilities and ad-
ministrative support for innovating efforts.
(9) Financing of innovation processes and other activities that may fa-
cilitate commercialization of knowledge and its adoption.
(10) Provision of consultancy services relevant for innovation processes,
for example, technology transfer, commercial information, and legal ad-
vice.
Adapted from Edquist (2011).
Table II.1.: Key activities in systems of innovation
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tional, institutional and other factors that influence the development, diffusion and use
of innovations” (Edquist, 1997). Edquist emphasized the relevance of an appropriate
innovation policy, since virtually every activity requires a certain public engagement,
such as governmental incentives or legislative acts.
A classical public engagement is the provision of knowledge inputs to stimulate innova-
tion processes (see Table II.1, i). These inputs are usually offered through the provision
of basic and experimental research conducted in public universities and research insti-
tutes financed in part by the government. In addition to this, the educational system
is also critical for individual and social competence accumulation. A well-trained labor
force is a basic prerequisite for high-tech industries and economic success in the long-
run. On the demand side, the government could support the emergence of new markets
by setting, for example, environmental standards or product quality requirements (see
Table II.1, ii).
The government could also support the setting-up of new constituents for a system of
innovation (see Table II.1, iii). To diversify organizations, the government could create
or enhance the foundation of new firms, political organizations, interest groups, and the
like. Moreover, a central element of the IS is organizational learning, which requires
cooperation among a number of different actors. Firms incubating innovation require
access to public science services, such as universities and research facilities, to acquire
new knowledge of the public sector that was gained from basic as well as experimental
research activities. Therefore, policy makers should avoid concentrating on a single orga-
nization and instead concentrate on the relationships among them. Even when product
and process innovations are largely carried out by private firms, Edquist (2011) stressed
that in long-term the success of a company depends on the intensity of cooperation with
other actors rather than private firms alone.
Another important activity of the government is to provide services for innovative
organizations (see Table II.1, iv). Financial incentives, for example, could encourage
organizations to innovate. By providing financial support, such as subsidies, tax credits,
tax rebates, or interest-free credits, the public sector could facilitate the utilization of
innovation. In the case of an inadequately developed finance sector, inventions could be
derailed at an early stage of the innovation process due to the limit of the organization’s
creditworthiness. Finally, the government could also provide consultancy services for
business start-ups or SMEs, which are unfamiliar with administrative as well as innova-
tion processes, by providing legal advice, innovation audits with experts, and access to
information generally.
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Policy implications of the innovation system
In a mature innovation system most of the activities are well-coordinated via the market
mechanism. However, under certain circumstances, the government plays a significant
role in canalizing market pressure in an orderly manner (Carlsson, 1992), for example,
in periods of rapid technological progress with several transitions. This is generally
institutionalized in a government’s innovation policy. In order to obtain a well-defined
innovation policy, the problems of the actual system have to be identified. Edquist
(2011) stated that all the activities an IS are carried out by both private and public
organizations, thus public innovation policies partly come into contact with each activity
that triggers the innovation process.
Generally speaking, governmental intervention becomes legitimized with the intention
to solve distortions to the market economy caused by imperfections. For example, in
the case of a suboptimal provision of private R&D investments (Arrow, 1962), inter-
vention could be the provision of public R&D expenditures until the economy’s overall
R&D activities reach the socially desired level. Another pitfall would be strong or weak
network failures, evolving from too few or excessive linkages between the organizations
an IS (Carlsson and Jacobsson, 1997). Other risks potentially might arise because of
infrastructural failures or even more important institutional failures, which can reduce
economic activity and interaction, and thus hinder innovation (Woolthuis et al., 2005).
However, since government interference into a market brings the potential risk of state
failure (Krueger, 1990), even worse systematic malfunctions can arise if the intervention
introduces further unintended distortions. To avoid this, a government has two stan-
dard conditions that must be achieved before an intervention into a market economy is
legitimized (Edquist, 2001):
1. Private organizations were unable to achieve the objectives that were desired by the
public. Otherwise, there would be no reason for the government to intervene. The
innovation policy should neither duplicate nor replace well-functioning mechanisms
of the free market. There must be a market imperfection that cannot be solved by
the self-healing power of market forces.
2. The government must be able to eliminate or alleviate the systematic problem.
Otherwise there shall be no action, as the outcome would be an additional distor-
tion to the market.
Therefore, neither the first nor the second condition alone is sufficient for governmental
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intervention, but the combination of both legitimizes government action on the respective
policy level, be it transnational, national, sectoral, regional, or local.
The formulation of political agendas is usually couched in weak statements (Edquist,
2011), such as stimulating economic growth, ensuring sustained development, or the
protection of the natural environment. In regards to the IS, the formulation of defined
objectives is also a difficult task, since the problems of IS, are simply too diverse to
completely anticipate. There is an abundant literature concerning the various system
imperfections (Carlsson and Jacobsson, 1997; Edquist, Hommen, et al., 1998; Smith,
2000; Woolthuis et al., 2005; Graf, 2006; Johnson and Gregersen, 2007). Woolthuis et
al. (2005) provided a categorization which enables one to differentiate four main problems
that could potentially affect the functionality of an IS.
Infrastructure failures might arise since organizations within an IS require reliable
infrastructure for both their everyday business and a long-term perspective for their
investment decisions (Woolthuis et al., 2005). This includes, most importantly, a high-
performance transportation infrastructure (information, goods, and energy) as well as a
developed educational infrastructure (Woolthuis et al., 2005; Edquist, Hommen, et al.,
1998; Smith, 2000).
Institutional failures can be distinguished into hard and soft (Woolthuis et al., 2005).
Hard institutional failures relate to formal or written institutions, such as laws, ethical
guidelines, technical standards, public funding, and legal contracts. Institutional failures
might crystallize if a government tries to regulate every detail or prohibits excessively.
Thus, a strict public-policy regime might hinder interactions between actors and thereby
the diffusion of knowledge. Even worse the mechanism that works towards the creation
of new institutions and could also lead to the emergence of more efficient ones would
be dismissing or ignoring. Soft institutional failures affecting the broader environment
of the political and social culture. They shape the way in which daily business is done
(Smith, 2000). Moreover, they affect society’s collective willingness to share resources,
spirit to seek new business opportunities, ability to trust in their own strengths, and so
on (Woolthuis et al., 2005).
Interaction failures may occur if organizations of the IS are hindered in their communi-
cation. Therefore, it should be questioned whether bridging relationships are present or
too strong for an efficient flow of knowledge between organizations (Graf, 2006; Woolthuis
et al., 2005). Depending on the strength of the interaction it is possible to distinguish
between weak and strong network failures. Although strong networks can be produc-
tive, they have various inherent risks. Organizations might be forced into less efficient
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technological paths due to existing social pressure within their peer-group (Carlsson
and Jacobsson, 1997). Problems also arise if weak ties are missing (Granovetter, 1973),
since they provide access to subgroups within the network with more diverse skills and
knowledge, fleshing out a knowledge pool that was previously inadequate. Moreover,
the dependency on an important actor could cause an organization to be inextricably
linked to specific singular technologies due to prior investments, switching cost, or the
unavailability of alternative partners (Woolthuis et al., 2005). In cases of inadequate con-
nectivity within the network, actors are unable to get in contact with each other. This
potentially causes a weak network failure, when knowledge is not transmitted because
of missing links. In this case, the possibility of interactive learning and innovating are
reduced. The problem of reciprocity could emerge when potential partners fear hazards
from bilateral or multilateral cooperations, due to opportunistic behavior (Graf, 2006).
The exchange of information, in particular tacit knowledge, is disrupted as mutual trust
and credibility are basic prerequisites for a smooth transfer of knowledge inside the IS
network. Too much reciprocity can lead to path dependence and technological lock-
in, as this reduces the diversity of knowledge and thus reduces the promotion of new
innovations.
Capability failures might arise when organizations are able to contact each other but
lack sufficient communication (Woolthuis et al., 2005). For some businesses, the research
branches only play a tangential role, whether in the form of basic, experimental, or ap-
plied research. Thus, in these sectors investments in R&D are scarce and the businesses
may prefer to purchase technology from other branches (Graf, 2006). Organizations
are unable to “leap from an old to a new technology or paradigm” (Woolthuis et al.,
2005). Businesses subsequently lose their self-renewal potential and cannot implement
new technologies by themselves, since R&D activities are a basic requirement for the
assimilation of external knowledge. When it comes to radical innovation or to a phase of
rapid transitions, the organizations inside the same IS begin to diverge in different tech-
nological directions. If cognitive gaps arise, knowledge exchanges become problematic,
and companies within the IS are no longer able to compete against other companies. If
the problem is confirmed, politicians should utilize their problem-solving abilities and
identify a comprehensive strategy.
Weaknesses of the innovation system
One major weakness of the IS was highlighted by Edquist (2004), who emphasized that
the IS is not a formal theory as it does not supply clear causal links between the deter-
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minants and the performance of the system. The approach does provide presumptions
for empirical investigations, but due to the scarcity of these empirical studies the IS
approach should be treated as a conceptual framework rather than a formal theory.
2. Policies promoting research joint ventures
In retrospect, dependencies can be identified worldwide between the theoretical view on
innovation and the implementation of governmental innovation policies. Interestingly,
the direction of influence is two-sided. Economic theory affects policy practices and pol-
icy practices influence the development of economic theory, even if sometimes with long
delays. Historically, it was Arrow (1962) who provided groundbreaking contributions to
the economic literature that explained the necessity of supporting private R&D efforts
with public subsidies. This was because of the intrinsic uncertainty of innovation activi-
ties that leads to a non-optimal allocation of resources, as the output of the undertaking
is unpredictable. However, economists’ awareness of the critical importance of collabo-
rative research activities heightened following Japan’s phenomenal economic success by
stimulating cooperative research joint ventures rather than economic theory alone.
This implies that innovation policies in different countries vary substantially, partic-
ularly in view of the government’s degree of engagement, since policy implementation
depends significantly on a country’s history, cultural background, stage of industrial
development, capabilities, and needs (Caloghirou et al., 2002).
As already mentioned, Japan has been a forerunner in subsidizing cooperative research
activities in the period after the Second World War in order to catch up with the devel-
opment of Western countries. Japanese firms performed so well that at the beginning
of the 1980s, the national champions of the Western countries were falling behind their
Japan competitors. This spurred a strong discussion about Japan’s fundamental success
factors (Freeman, 1987).
The United States and the United Kingdom were the first adopters of Japan’s strategy
(Caloghirou et al., 2002). Interestingly, it was therefore demanded that the American
legislation renew its antitrust regulation, which was restricting cooperation among firms
to case-by-case allowances from the government. The United Kingdom was the first
European country, implement a funding program in 1983 by supporting collaborative
research projects in information technologies. Their early experiences within this field
motivated them to later participate in the European Framework Programme for Research
and Technological Development (FP).
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In Germany, cooperative project grants became popular during the 1980s. The pre-
dominant idea that the results of basic and experimental research become automatically
transferred into marketable products was replaced by a policy that supports knowledge
transfer among enterprises, universities, and research centers (Fier and Harhoff, 2002;
Czarnitzki and Fier, 2003). The implementation of the new policy was rather smooth.
Prior to this revolutionary approach, a major proportion of the government’s R&D
spending was focused on contributions to single organizations. However, in terms of the
financial budget it takes more than 20 years for cooperative R&D projects to reach the
level of individual projects (see Figure II.2).
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Figure II.2.: Governmental spending for R&D projects in Germany
Source: Fo¨rderkatalog of the German federal government
The first cooperation between organizations within the EU dates back to the founda-
tion of the European Nuclear Community (EURATOM) in 1957. As the name suggests,
the program was initiated to bring forward competitiveness in the field of energy provi-
sioning as Europe feared falling into a technological dependence on the U.S. However,
the absolute impact (800 million euros) of the treaty was rather low in comparison to
the FP launched in 1984 (3,300 million euros) (Guzzetti, 1995; Caloghirou et al., 2002).
From its beginning, the FP promoted transnational joint projects for precompetitive
research activities among the member states of the EU.
Subsequent parts of this research project will analyze several aspects of the German
(see Chapters IV and V) and the European (see Chapters III) innovation policies in
detail, thus the following sections will provide a more detailed overview concerning their
historical development and address open research questions for the policies.
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2.1. German Policy
Historical background
In 1955, Germany founded the Federal Ministry for Nuclear Affairs and made its first
step towards a renewal of its innovation policy by becoming a founder member of the EU-
RATOM community (Fier and Harhoff, 2002). During the initiation phase, the priority
rested clearly upon the support of nuclear projects. However, Germany’s focus widened
to other large-scale projects in the 1960s. During that time, most public spending was
allocated to universities and self-governed of academic entities, such as the Fraunhofer
Society or the Max Planck Society. Even today, this form of institutional contribution
(“institutionelle Fo¨rderung”) provides a financial budget to the receiver of the promotion
(BMBF, 2014), which leaves a substantial degree of freedom concerning the spending of
the money.
Research projects sponsored by the public, which are restricted to specific techno-
logical activities, are called direct project contributions (“direkte Projektfo¨rderung”)
(BMBF, 2014). These projects are usually bundled into a specific, predefined tech-
nological field. The first program in 1967 contributed to projects in the field of data
processing, which was followed by a program for marine research (1969) and later on
by a wide list of other supported key technologies (Fier and Harhoff, 2002; Aschhoff,
2009). Another important characteristic is that an organization had to apply for a sin-
gle project (“Einzelprojekt”). During the 1970s this became a particular problem for
SMEs, as the government requested a demonstration of the project’s additional social
benefit and available capacities inside the firms from the grant recipients. This over-
charged the capabilities of almost all SMEs. The decision to grant project promotions
was carried out by a committee that decides whether to support or reject the submitted
proposal. The time horizon for these projects is short- and medium-term oriented, with
an average duration of approximately three years (Umlauf, 2014).
Research joint ventures on the move
Considering the theoretical discussion around innovation processes and innovation sys-
tems as well as the first international experiences concerning governmental incentives for
collaborative research joint ventures, Germany started rethinking its actual policy in-
struments in the early 1980s (Czarnitzki and Fier, 2003). The approach that innovative
performance depends on research alliances among large companies, SMEs, research lab-
oratories, and universities was implemented quickly. Thus, Germany was one of the first
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Figure II.3.: Number of governmental sponsored R&D projects in Germany
Source: Fo¨rderkatalog of the German federal government
countries in Europe to introduce cooperative funding instruments. The new objective of
the Federal government became supporting the diffusion of knowledge and innovations,
rather than trying to determine or plan the technological progress in detail (Fier and
Harhoff, 2002).
The implementation of the new policy went smoothly, as it was only necessary to
readjust the previously dominant instrument of direct project contributions. For that
purpose, the new contribution form of joint projects (“Verbundprojekte”) was added to
the preexisting funding instruments. Organizations still needed to apply for a project
grant, restricted to a specific task and a certain period of time, but it became necessary
to apply for a joint project in the form of a self-organized consortium consisting of several
independent organizations (Welsch, 2005). Apart from the argument that collaborative
research activities trigger the exchange of knowledge, cost and resource sharing rationales
also contributed to the implementation of this policy.
At the end of the last century, the discussion concerning regional ISs attained great
attention. Thus, Germany was affected by a trend that aims to regionalize innovation
policies in order to foster competition among regions as well as the promotion of regional
clusters (Dohse, 2000). Therefore, not only did the interconnection of organizations play
a role, but also the motivation to strengthen the inner and outer connectivity of whole
regions (Fier and Harhoff, 2002), as it has become evident that agglomeration effects
play a major role in the R&D activities of private firms.
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Since their initiation, joint projects have become a key instrument of Germany’s di-
rect project contributions (see Figure II.3.). The remarkable breakthrough happened
in 1999 when for the first time the number of joint projects exceeded the number of
single projects. This marks a system switch that is still in place today. Since the late
1960s more than 152,000 projects were sponsored by the federal government, whereas
now 60,000 projects – more than one-third – have been carried out as research joint ven-
tures. This of course entails the formation of a network linking thousands of actors from
different organizational backgrounds. Broekel and Graf (2012) found evidence that even
sub-networks for industry sectors exist with remarkable differences regarding their net-
work structure. For example, they may have relatively weak connections in geoscience,
but heavily intertwined actors in information and communication technologies (ICT) as
well as in biotechnologies.
2.2. European Policy
After an intensive discussion the European Commission started the European Strategic
Program on Research in Information Technology (ESPRIT) in 1982 as a one-year pilot
program. This served in many ways as a blueprint for the later European FP (Guzzetti,
1995; Caloghirou et al., 2002). The promotion of precompetitive research joint ventures
between twelve major European firms in the electronic sector was a particular feature
of this program. Over 50 percent of the project’s financial costs were covered by a
contribution. The research activities fell between fundamental and applied industrial
research in order to maintain a distance from the market and prevent unintended dis-
tortions (Roediger-Schluga and Barber, 2006). This was done to secure compliance with
European competition laws. The pilot phase was followed by four additional ESPRIT
programs running between 1984 and 1998. Research within the program was carried
out by firms, research institutes, and universities. It was required that at least two or-
ganizations come from different EU member states to secure the transnationality of the
program. At the end of the project, all members were allowed to make use of the research
results. Because of the remarkable success of this program, which attracted proposal sub-
missions from numerous consortia, additional programs were initiated for several other
technological fields, such as telecommunications, biotechnology, and medicine.
The First Framework Programme (FP1) was launched in 1984. It united most of the
preexisting and proposed programs under a common umbrella, and was based on the
experiences of the ESPRIT forerunner program. The program rejected the linearity of
the innovation process and emphasized the complexity and interdependency of the same,
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since the Work Programme of the FP was structured as a multi-dimensional matrix pro-
viding certain overlaps in frequent technological fields (Roediger-Schluga and Barber,
2006; Guzzetti, 1995). The FP institutionalized the idea “ that the importance of the
system did not lie in the sum of the individual programs, but rather in their interaction
as they worked together towards the aims of Community policy” (Guzzetti, 1995). The
main motivation for the program was to start a convergence process to reduce the frag-
mentation of national industries, innovation policies, and markets throughout the EU.
In addition, it was the purpose of the program, to overcome the technology gap between
Europe and Japan by exploiting Europe’s potential transnational-advantages (Breschi
and Cusmano, 2004), in order to maintain international competitiveness. Overall, the
innovation system approach had a significant impact on the formulation of the EU in-
novation policy, as subsequent FPs concentrated upon the training of professionals, the
inclusion of SMEs, the integration of costumers, and the diffusion of new technologies
in accordance with economic theory (Roediger-Schluga and Barber, 2006). Like the ES-
PRIT program, applicants needed to include organizations from at least two different
EU member states, and 50 percent of the overall project’s cost is eligible for financing
by the EU Commission.
Towards a revision of the EU policy
A remarkable shift occurred with the launch of the sixth FP (2002–2006), which was
highly affected by the development plan of the Lisbon Strategy (EU, 2000). Dissatisfied
with the convergence process regard to the persistent fragmentation of national inno-
vation policies, the EU Commission formulated a new ERA (European Research Area)
strategy in 2000 with the adoption of the Communication“Towards a European Research
Area.” The Commission clearly called for intensive efforts to create a pan-European re-
search network, as even after twenty years Europe was still falling behind its target of
catching up with the U.S. and Japan. The FP was selected as the main instrument to
achieve that goal (Hoekman et al., 2013). Therefore, the financial budget of the next
FP was disproportionately enlarged and new network-related instruments, such as the
networks of excellence and integrated projects, were installed. The objective was to
bring forward the European Research Area (ERA), which promoted the idea of the EU
as a continent-wide transnational innovation system. It focused upon the deduplication
of national or regional policy redundancies, as well as a better coordination of R&D
activities to achieve the critical mass of resources necessary to close the technological
gap.
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Framework Programme Period Projects Budget (billion euro)
FP1 1984 - 1987 3,283 3.3
FP2 1987 - 1991 3,885 4.4
FP3 1991 - 1994 5,529 6.6
FP4 1994 - 1998 15,061 13.1
FP5 1998 - 2002 15,559 15.0
FP6 2002 - 2007 73,399 17.5
FP7 2007 - 2013 130,390 50.5
FP8 2013 - 2020 / 70.2
Until FP6 adapted from Roediger-Schluga and Barber (2006). EURATOM
projects are excluded from the table.
Table II.2.: Overview about European Framework Programmes
Since the initial launch, seven consecutive programs have followed (see Table II.2).
Each program exceeds its predecessor in terms of both the number of participants as
well as its financial budget. With approximately 1 billion euros per year, the budget
of the first FP was rather low in comparison to the eighth FP, which started in 2014
with an indicative budget of 13 billion euros per year until 2020. Over time, the number
of organizations participating grew from 1,981 (Roediger-Schluga and Barber, 2006) to
approximately 31,345 organizations in the seventh FP.
The thousands of projects funded by the Commission since the early 1980s led to the
formation of a pan-European research network. The most complete analysis regarding
the network formation through the consecutive programs was from Roediger-Schluga
and Barber (2006). They found that among the FPs, which were running between
1984 and 2002, each network became more clustered and less fragmented over time.
Moreover, the number of average cooperations per organization rose from 7.4 (FP1) to
28.1 (FP5). However, the most important observation was that a remarkable number
of the organizations participated across subsequent FPs. During the second FP, more
than 60 percent of the participants were organizations that had already taken part in the
first FP (Roediger-Schluga and Barber, 2006). This is even more surprising when taken
into account that the number of organizations was steadily growing during that time.
It was not until the fifth FP that the proportion of recurring organizations diminished
continuously to approximately 30 percent. To a great extent the overlap was shaped by
larger firms, universities, and greater research centers. Thus, a large proportion of the
network formation transits between consecutive FPs, which may constitute the backbone
for the creation of the ERA as a pan-European research network (Roediger-Schluga and
37
II. The rising importance of networks in innovation policies
Barber, 2006).
2.3. Open research questions
As discussed above, networks are important stimulants for innovation processes; thus,
network policies have become a key asset for governments to intervene in the activities
of an IS. All industrialized countries have undertaken certain activities to enforce collab-
orative research activities among the organizations in their respective ISs. However, the
theoretical discussion has also revealed that public action originally intended to solve
marked failures might induce worse malfunctions in an IS, because of the potential in-
ability of the government to improve the situation. Identifying those failures is a difficult
task, particularly for network politics since standard techniques are still not established.
Several authors have paved the way toward a better understanding concerning the dy-
namics of organizational networks (Ter Wal, 2009; Broekel and Hartog, 2013; Balland,
2012; Hazir and Autant-Bernard, 2012). All of them have uniformly emphasized that the
structure of the network depends highly on the choice of the organizations with whom
they are partnered with (Ter Wal, 2009; Broekel and Hartog, 2013; Balland, 2012; Hazir
and Autant-Bernard, 2012), which is affected, for example, by different forms of prox-
imities (geographic, cognitive, institutional, and social) and the characteristics of the
respective organizations.
However, focusing unilaterally on the actions of organizations might be misleading
since this neglects the role of the governmental decision-making process regarding the
allocation of project grants, which ultimately affects the formation of the network struc-
ture. Previous sections have shown that various industrialized countries have developed
innovation policies that promote cooperative research joint ventures with an enormous
financial budget. Thus, the allocation mechanism of collaborative subsidies entails a
great potential to impact the overall configuration of the network and, therefore, the
efficiency of the entire IS. Several studies have revealed that organizations’ previous ex-
periences are critical acquiring project grants from the government (Brockhoff et al.,
1991; Barajas and Huergo, 2010; Paier and Scherngell, 2011; Aschhoff, 2009); however,
this is misleading since their approach does not consider the difference between hav-
ing experience with the formal application procedure and having previous cooperative
experiences.
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Research questions of Chapter III
The emergence of a large oligarchic core within the pan-European research network was
one of the first observations made regarding the Commission’s new ERA policy. Breschi
and Cusmano (2004) identified for the third FP (1992–1994) and fourth FP (1992–
1996) an intensely clustered area within the network, illustrating that a large fraction
of projects were allocated to a relatively small number of organizations. Their findings
particularly pointed to the role of “prime contractors” that have undertaken the coordi-
nator function at least once within a funded project. Their assumption stems from the
observation that nearly 80 percent of all organizations have only participated once in
projects, whereas 60 percent of all prime contractors participated in at least two projects
and 15 percent of those in more than ten projects (Breschi and Cusmano, 2004). More-
over, they emphasized the ambivalent role of such a network structure. On the one hand,
the quantity and quality of transmission capacity and knowledge production is carried
out in an effective manner in such a network formation, since it secures the small-word
properties of the research network (Watts and Strogatz, 1998). But on the other hand,
this network formation implies a certain vulnerability of the network, since the elimi-
nation of several organizations would cause a collapse of the network architecture and
would induce a significant reduction to the communication capacity, including the po-
tential to face path dependencies, technological lock-ins, institutional constraints, and
consolidation of technological paradigms (Breschi and Cusmano, 2004). If the European
innovation policy does not hold a sensible balance between network openness and close-
ness, strong or weak network failures might arise and cause a systematic malfunction of
the IS (Woolthuis et al., 2005). To avoid such disturbances, the evolution becomes quite
urged to explore, which patterns of the actual innovation policy support the emergence
of the observed core-periphery network structure.
A research gap exist, since the investigation of Breschi and Cusmano (2004) neglects
the role of organizations that transit between subsequent FPs, as shown by Roediger-
Schluga and Barber (2006). The formation of an oligopolistic network structure is per-
haps not only affected by prime contractors, but also from organizations that participate
across programs. It is unrealistic that after several years in service the evolved network
formation and multilateral relationships of a former FP should have no influence upon
its successor when the actual FP comes to an end. For example, projects that started
in the final year of the preceding FP, will continue service even if the next program has
already started. It is possible that these initial starting advantages for various organi-
zations accumulate over time toward the dense network structures observed by Breschi
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and Cusmano (2004). In this vein, to be a prime contractor is more than the outcome of
a selection process affected by organizational experiences. Rather, it is a logical choice
to select the most experienced organization to be the coordinator of a project.
Additionally, Hazir and Autant-Bernard (2012) analyzed the founding process of a
consortium before an initial application for a project grant. In their empirical investiga-
tion the authors highlighted the importance of other project experiences in the decision of
an organization to participate within a consortium. They found that organizations take
into account the potential partners’ access to further knowledge sources. Moreover, they
observed that organizations differ according to their institutional backgrounds (firms,
research centers, universities) and their geographical location with regard to their in-
terest in participating within a consortium. However, their empirical findings are not
convincing enough to explain the observed core–periphery structure. Their findings had
a rather limited impact to the organization’s overall decision, and they found no evi-
dence for their hypothesis that organizations tend to preserve their cooperation partners
across various applications.
As the Commission of the EU has the final say when it comes to the award of a project
grant, it needs to be determined if the allocation process of the project grant contributes
to the development of oligopolistic network structures. Therefore, Barajas and Huergo
(2010) have analyzed a two-stage process. In the first stage, the organizations have to be
aware of the funding possibility and have to join a consortium. At the second stage, the
proposals of the consortia were rejected or approved by a group of experts delegated by
the EU Commission. Barajas and Huergo (2010) found several significant determinants
affecting the chances of an organization receiving a project grant and aimed to identify
whether or not cooperative experiences have an impact. However, their understanding
of experiences is misleading since they did not distinguish between having experience
with the application procedure and having experience with cooperations.
Since the observation of an oligarchic core was made by Breschi and Cusmano (2004)
in front of the proclamation of the ERA, which aimed to strengthen the formation
of a dense network structure, a potential misunderstanding of the allocation process
could cause drastic policy failures. The whole process needed to be evaluated, since the
connectivity of the organizations did not seem to be the real problem of the actual policy.
Extreme clustering is not better than fragmentation, as it can induce path dependence
and technological lock-ins (Cowan and Jonard, 2004).
To investigate whether the EU’s allocation mechanism for project grants affects the
formation of an oligopolistic network structure, which divides the network into a highly
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clustered area and a weakly connected outer sphere around the cores. Chapter III makes
use of a unique database that includes accepted as well as rejected project proposals of
the seventh European FP. To approximate the allocation process, the prioritization of
project grants is used to estimate a classical linear regression model, which explains how
the formation process of the network is shaped by network-related and other exogenous
factors.
Research questions of Chapter IV
For the case of Germany, Aschhoff (2009) has analyzed the allocation process of project
grants. She found empirical evidence that the decision-making process of the govern-
ment is highly affected by the characteristics of the respective firms. For her analysis she
distinguished two different scenarios, namely the chance of an organization to obtain a
project grant for the first time, and the possibility that the firm is rewarded with an addi-
tional project contribution to the preexisting award. Here results were highly significant.
To a large extent, prior experiences do indeed affect the chances of an organization to
receive a project grant. But other factors also played a role, such as alternative funding
sources from regional and European entities the number of employees, the qualification
of the employees, the location of a firm, or its amount of R&D expenditures.
A research gap exists in this context, since Aschhoff (2009) neglected the possible
impact of network effects on the allocation process. She did not consider that to a
large extent, awards are restricted to cooperative research projects. Organizations with
previous experience in cooperative projects will have an advantage compared to organiza-
tions without, even if those organizations have participated in non-cooperative research
projects. Therefore, it is questionable whether the formation of an R&D network by
publicly sponsored R&D projects has an influence on the allocation process of further
research projects. If so, this pattern could open the door for a self-enforcing mechanism
with the potential to deliver unintended distortions to the allocation process, due to the
installation of an unobserved selection process both in before and during the project
allocation phase.
This question will be addressed in Chapter IV of this study by providing an analysis
of the German funding system. Therefore, the Chapter employs a rich data set of
government-subsidized project grants in Germany, and a statistical model using Markov
chains to explore whether the dynamic of the funding regime is affected by the policy
induced research network.
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Research questions of Chapter V
Moreover, questions also arise surrounding the benefit of those cooperative research
projects. Since government budgets are tight, policy instruments must be used in an
efficient and effective manner to ensure that the innovation policy achieves its own objec-
tives (Commission of Experts for Research and Innovation, 2013). For several years, the
Commission of Experts established by the German government has called for systematic
approaches to evaluate the impact of Germany’s current funding scheme. Regarding the
effect of R&D collaborations, Czarnitzki (2004) found evidence that the enterprises who
received a cooperative R&D project grant have a higher patent activity than companies
who obtained a non-cooperative project grant. Similar results were obtained by Fornahl
et al. (2011) for the biotechnology sector in Germany.
However, it remains unclear whether cooperative project grants spur cooperative in-
novations, as all studies have controlled for single firms and not for a consortium of
organizations. It is possible that enterprises follow a free rider strategy during their
research joint ventures with universities, research centers, or other firms and focus on
capturing as much knowledge as available. At the end of the project, the acquired knowl-
edge is free for every one participating in the project to use. This could persuade firms
to wait until the end of the project to innovate on their own. To test for this hazard,
one would have to check whether the successful innovation is implemented by the same
organization that participated in the research joint venture. It is worth questioning
whether the observation of Czarnitzki (2004) is the outcome of a rent-seeking process.
Many researchers found evidence (David et al., 2000; Wallsten, 2000; Lach, 2002) that
firms, particularly larger companies, frequently try to reduce their R&D investment cost
with public funds and since most of the sponsored projects are joint projects, this kind
of strategy may have lent a distortion to Czarnitzki’s results. It is appropriate to check
whether cooperative R&D entails cooperative innovations or vice versa.
To disentangle the effects between R&D and innovation networks, Chapter V will make
use of a stochastic actor-oriented model (SAOM) that is able to explain the interactions
between two co-evolving networks. For the purpose of the investigation, the innovation
network is approximated by a patent network based on data that are extracted from the
European Patent Office (EPO) Patstat database. The research network that represents
the governmental impact to the IS is constructed from a subsidized collaborative project
of the German federal government.
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III. Supporting the emergence of an
oligarchic core: the case of the
European innovation policy
1. Introduction
Since the early 1980s, the promotion of research networks attracted a lot of interest
as a policy tool that could help to fully exploit the potential innovative performance
of a region, country, or even a continent by uniting firms, universities, and research
centers into precompetitive collaborative research projects. At the European level, this
instrument is implemented through the Framework Programme for Research and Tech-
nological Development (FP), which was initially established in the early 1980s, during a
phase in which the industry competitiveness of the European Union’s (EU) enterprises
was falling behind their competitors from the US and Japan (Breschi and Cusmano,
2004). This early step towards a policy that weaves a research network among Euro-
pean organizations was concretized in 2000 by the formulation of the Lisbon Strategy.
Dissatisfied with the progress after a twenty years of ongoing catch-up, the heads of
state revised the former European innovation strategy and agreed to a plan that aimed
to develop a European Research Area (ERA), for which the FP was chosen as the key
instrument to accomplish that goal (Hoekman et al., 2013). Meanwhile, there is a long
tradition of eight consecutive FPs that spent approximately 180 billion euros to create a
comprehensive R&D network across Europe. Fostering the integration of organizations
at the European level, the revision of the innovation policy implies the understanding of
the ERA as a transnational innovation system among the members of the EU (Delanghe
et al., 2009). In this context, the strategy shares significant elements with Lundvall’s
(1988) and Freeman’s (1991) idea of a national innovation system, which emphasizes the
role of a complex network of organizations for the innovativeness of an economy, but
with a transnational focus. In high-tech sectors in particular, such as the biotechnology
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industry (Powell et al., 1996), the knowledge is dispersed among various independent
organizations. Thus, within a complex economy, innovating organizations are forced to
collaborate (Brusoni et al., 2001) since innovations strongly depend on the recombination
of diverse and complementary skills (Boschma, 2005; Nooteboom, 2000).
One of the first observations of the European research network was the discovery
of a large oligarchic core, representing a dense cluster of various central organizations.
Breschi and Cusmano (2004) identified this network formation for the thrid FP (1992–
1994) and fourth FP (1992–1996). Since the revision of the EU policy was sought to
foster a degree of network integration on the transnational level, it is highly probable that
their observed network formation process continues today. Later findings of Roediger-
Schluga and Barber (2006) support this argumentation, since they found that for all FPs
large fractions of the organizations transit between separate but consecutive FPs. As a
consequence, there is a significant overlap between the programs and a permanent repli-
cation of once established network formations. A certain degree of stability is definitely
needed for organizational research partnerships. Repetitive collaborations are embedded
in trustworthy relationships (Granovetter, 1985; Uzzi, 1996), which are known to be a
prerequisite for innovations since they reduce the risk of the counterpart’s unpredictable
behavior (Larson, 1992), extending the organization’s willingness to share its knowledge
and resources (Hippel, 1988; Kogut and Zander, 1992). However, excessive interactions
lower the chance for creative inputs (Cowan and Jonard, 2004; Boschma, 2005; Uzzi,
1997) and hinder new incumbents from acquiring central positions within the overall
network.
The funds of the FP are distributed as financial and project-based contributions to
groups of organizations that have submitted a project proposal to the European Com-
mission (EC). After an application, the EC decides whether to award or to reject the
financial contribution. During the seventh FP, the European administration awarded
only 15 percent of all proposed projects with a grant, which illustrates that the allocation
process for an EU funding award is extremely selective. Therefore, the decision-making
process regarding the allocation of a project grant potentially has a significant impact on
the performance of EU innovation policy. To a high degree, it is the administration that
decides consciously or not about the formation of the pan-European research network.
With each additional decision, the commission shapes the development of the network,
and thus the stage of the network at the end of a funding phase represents just one
specific network formation of endless alternative stages.
Contrary to the broad consensus about the emergence of oligopolistic network struc-
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tures and significant overlaps between consecutive funding phases, the process that de-
termines the formation of the network remains unclear. Breschi and Cusmano (2004)
suspected this network pattern as being shaped by the coordinators of the projects, since
they observed that those “prime contractors”are more frequent participants in promoted
research projects than other organizations; but this explanation omits all previous con-
tributions to the dynamics of networks that would direct the outstanding position of a
“prime contractor” to the outcome of a process rather than its initiator. Another con-
tribution to this topic comes from Hazir and Autant-Bernard (2012). Both analyzed
the funding process before the consortium’s initial application for a project grant. They
emphasized that organizations consider their benefit from additional access to other ex-
ternal knowledge sources when they participate within a consortium, but the impact
on the overall decision was rather limited, and they found no significance for their as-
sumption that organizations try to preserve their cooperation partners across various
applications.
It is expected in this research that the Commission’s process of allocation is both
affecting, and affected by, the formation of the network. For the application process,
previous experiences play an important role (Brockhoff et al., 1991; Barajas and Huergo,
2010; Paier and Scherngell, 2011; Aschhoff, 2009). They correspond to the learning curve
of the organizations and their ability in writing high-quality proposals. But it is also
expected that experiences that become manifested in networks (Ahuja et al., 2012), such
as trust, loyalty, and mutuality, also have a significant impact on the quality of a proposal.
After the decision and the award of a cooperative project grant, the network transits into
a new stage, representing the new experiences that are accumulated by the organizations
of the network. This ultimately induces a feedback link between experiences, network-
related as well as non-network-related, and the award of additional project grants.
Following the work of Barajas and Huergo (2010), the participation of an organization
in the FP depends on a two-stage decision-making process. During the first stage, an
organization that must be a member of a consortium decides whether to apply for an
FP project; secondly, depending on its quality, the EC approves or rejects the proposal
of the total consortium.
In the following sections, this paper analyzes whether or not the EU’s allocation
process of project grants is affected by the formation of the network. If so, this would
only become possible due to two explanations. As the EU is the responsible agency with
the authority over allocation, it is only possible that the administration appreciates or
neglects the influence of the network. In both cases, knowingly or unknowingly, the
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administration would facilitate a selective process that promotes submitted proposals of
well-connected consortia.
To bring clarity, this paper analyzes the evaluation procedure for two Knowledge
Based Bio-Economy (KBBE) calls that were part of the seventh FP (2007–2013). As
the funding decision of the EC strongly depends on the outcome of an expert evaluation
procedure that attaches a certain score value to each submitted project proposal, it is
possible to estimate the impact of network-related determinants on the allocation process
by estimating two ordinary least-square models. The first model analyzes a KBBE call
in 2013, asking whether the emerged network structure of the current FP determines the
proposal’s priority ranking. The second model investigates a KBBE call in 2007, lying
directly between the transition phase among the sixth and seventh FP, if the network
formation of a previous funding phase influences the selection process of the current one.
To the best knowledge of the author, there have been no previous studies that have
deployed this approach.
The next section gives a short introduction about the EU’s project allocation process.
The third section concludes with three theory-based hypotheses concerning the impact
of network-related determinants. The fourth section presents the employed data for the
empirical part of the paper as well as the construction of the networks. The fifth section
will introduce the variables that have been used to specify the models required for testing
the hypotheses. Section six discusses the results of the estimation. The paper concludes
with a summary of the key findings and limitations of the paper, presenting ideas for
further research as well.
2. The allocation mechanism of a project grant
As the EC is the responsible authority for the FP, the allocation process of the project
grants is one of its key assets in achieving their vision of a pan-European research
network. Since the first time the FP was established, only those consortia were eligible
to apply for project grants that consist of several independent organizations coming from
different EU member states or associated countries (Roediger-Schluga and Barber, 2006).
Thus, each additional allocated project contributes to the formation of the transnational
research network. Proposals that have passed the eligibility check, and therefore comply
with the minimum requirements, are subject to an evaluation process, which prioritizes
the submitted projects on the basis of a criteria catalog. In contrast to the rather
inflexible eligibility check, this stage of the allocation process provides space for pursuing
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political aims, for example, allocating at least 15 percent of the funding to small and
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) (EU, 2006), or promoting the formation of a research
network. Considering the results of the evaluation process, the Commission decides
whether to support the proposal with a project grant or to reject.
The prioritization is carried out by an appointed group of experts (EU, 2013) that
has to evaluate the submitted proposals under the following criteria: (1) scientific and
technological excellence, (2) relevance to the program objectives, (3) the potential im-
pact of the project results, and (4) the quality and efficiency of the implementation and
management. While the second criterion is directly related to the promotion of research
networks, as the formation of networks is a ubiquitous aspect within the “Work Pro-
grammes” for the FP (EU, 2013; EU, 2007), there are some additional indirect effects
that occur when fostering the evolution of the research network through the first and
third criterion. From an excellent proposal, the EC demands scientific and technological
state of the art and an efficient plan for the project implementation, which needs to
include significant coordination activities before of proposal submission, as the project
consortium has to submit its proposal jointly. At the final stage of this process each
proposal is assessed with a score value, which ranges usually between 0 and 100, sig-
naling the quality of the proposal. Ultimately, considering the expert’s prioritization,
the EU administration distributes the funds of the FP to the proposals with the highest
evaluation scores.
3. Hypotheses
The literature points to the important role of previous experiences for the application
process (Brockhoff et al., 1991; Barajas and Huergo, 2010; Paier and Scherngell, 2011;
Aschhoff, 2009). This is, however, misleading, since most of the researchers do not
distinguish or recognize the difference between having experience with the application
procedure and having experience with collaborative partnerships. For experiences with
the application process, an organization only requires a frequent number of previous
applications, which do not even need to be successful (Barajas and Huergo, 2010). On
the contrary, experiences with R&D cooperations require the award of a project grant
to establish a long-term research partnership. Since co-operative experiences become
manifested in networks (Ahuja et al., 2012), it is reasonable to question whether the
positioning of the consortium’s members, and, indirectly, the formation of the overall
network, has an impact on the expert committee’s project prioritization.
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Several theoretical arguments support this point of view. To ensure the quality of
a proposal, organizations could seek to collaborate mostly with those partners that
have already proven their credibility as reliable stakeholders. This reputation helps to
mitigate the problem of incomplete contracts (Larson, 1992; Mora-Valentin et al., 2004)
before and during the implementation phase of a project, which entails the possibility
for hazards, such as free riding or opportunistic behavior. Under these circumstances,
the trustworthiness of an organization becomes visible through their degree of social
embeddedness in networks (Granovetter, 1985; Uzzi, 1996), or, as Powell et al. (1996)
posit, by their “central connectedness.” Furthermore, organizations with experience
in collaborating and of a central network position are capable formulating a coherent
project proposal due to their access to a more diverse knowledge pool (Powell et al.,
1996). Similarly, Hagedoorn et al. (2006) and Umlauf (2014) have shown, in the case of
general inter-firm and funded research partnerships, that firms with strategic network
positions have a higher probability of obtaining additional partnerships or project funds.
Moreover, it harms the reputation of the experts if one of their chosen projects is
abandoned during the project implementation phase; thus, experts might tend to select
organizations that have already proven to be successful in completing a project, which in
their view reduces the probability of project failure (Blanes and Busom, 2004; Cantner
and Ko¨sters, 2009; Aschhoff and Schmidt, 2008). If so, that would promote the selection
of organizations with previous cooperative experiences, since these are the organizations
which are likely to accomplish the project objectives. To evaluate whether the positioning
of the consortium members within the research network influences the experts’ scoring
process, and ultimately the overall network formation, motivates hypothesis H1.
H1: The better the strategic positioning of the consortium within the net-
work, the higher the evaluation score.
The leading organization in the consortium is the project coordinator (prime contrac-
tor). The composition of the consortium members usually depends on the coordinator’s
choice and its ability to attract other organizations to participate, for which the coor-
dinator requires both a large bundle of contacts and a good reputation. Moreover, it is
the task of the prime contractor to coordinate the activities of the participants during
the initiation and implementation phase of the project (Breschi and Cusmano, 2004).
Thus, to a large extent, the success of the project application depends on the capabil-
ities and cooperative experiences of the coordinator (Barajas and Huergo, 2010). The
importance of prime contractors for the formation of the network is confirmed by the
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frequency of their participation in other projects (Breschi and Cusmano, 2004), which
lies significantly above the average. The implication of these thoughts is concentrated in
hypothesis H2, expecting, in accordance to the H1, that the quality of the submitted
proposal is associated with the coordinator’s position within the research network.
H2: The better the strategic positioning of the coordinator within the net-
work, the higher the evaluation score.
Additionally, it is expected that the degree of preexisting interlinkages among the
members of a consortium improves the quality of the project proposal. While the previ-
ous two hypotheses focus on the external network of the consortium, the question arises
whether the connection within the group has an effect or not. Particularly first hand
experiences, which come from previous bilateral relationships, reduce the probability
of a hidden agenda of the counterpart (Granovetter, 1985; Uzzi, 1996). Moreover, the
exchange of project-relevant knowledge among the potential partners requires long-term
cooperations (Hippel, 1988; Kogut and Zander, 1992). Previous give-and-take relation-
ships that have satisfied the expectations of the organizations are a prerequisite for a
non-defensive attitude, which enables the transfer of tacit knowledge through preex-
isting communication channels (Cavusgil et al., 2003), and organizations can therefore
collaborate more efficiently. The logic behind these preferential relationships leads to
a replication of the same relationships, entailing a strong social cohesion between or-
ganizational subgroups (Duysters and Charmianne, 2003; Rosenkopf and Padula, 2008;
Walker et al., 1997). All these factors lead to hypothesis H3.
H3: The more preexisting relationships within the group of a consortium,
the higher the evaluation score.
4. Data
To investigate whether the scoring process of the expert committee is affected by the
factors named in the hypotheses, the empirical analysis of this paper makes use of
different sets of databases related to the European FP. The evaluation results of the
KBBE calls are taken from the proposal database of the seventh FP1, which contains
various information about the group of applicants, such as organization names, contact
persons, required budgets, or whether the organizations are SMEs. The extraction of
1The proposals were extracted from the ECORDA database, June 2014 version.
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the database includes 414 proposals for the KBBE call 2007-1 and 467 for the KBBE
call 2013-7, respectively (see Table III.1). In total, 136 of 841 eligible proposals were
accepted for the Commission’s main list, which names all selected proposals that will
receive a project grant. Those proposals that have been named on the Commission’s
reserve list obtain a second chance to receive a project grant if the call’s budget is not
depleted by the projects from the main list. Proposals that have not been mentioned
on the main or reserve list have been rejected (332) and have no further opportunity
to access funding. Moreover, the database includes 11,101 entries about organizations
that have taken part in both calls. Due to the rather limited quality of the database,
it was necessary to apply an intensive deduplication procedure, which identified 4,832
unique organizations in both calls. Since most proposals name the highest legal entity
of the applying organization, subdivisions where aggregated to their highest legal level,
to secure the comparability between the organizations. Since ineligible proposals do not
receive an evaluation value from the group of experts, 41 proposals were excluded from
the estimation process.
call proposals ineligible eligible main list reserve rejected participants organizations
2007-1 414 17 397 64 157 176 4,248 2,035
2013-7 467 24 443 72 175 196 6,853 3,468
total 881 41 840 136 332 372 11,101 4,832
Source: E-CORDA database of the European Commission
Table III.1.: Overview KBBE calls
Despite the approximately equal number of project proposals for both KBBE calls,
there are some differences regarding the distribution of score values (see Figures III.1(a)
and III.1(b)), which could lead to difficulties comparing the estimation results for both
calls. While both evaluation processes lead to score values ranging from the highest
possible value of 100 to the lowest possible value of 0, the standard deviation of the
KBBE in 2013 (31.2) lies 60 percent above the deviation (19.1) in 2007. The mean score
value reaches 67.1 in 2007, compared to 54.3 in 2013. Both findings suggest, except for
the significance levels, that direct comparisons between the later estimated parameter
values should be avoided.
The ultimate grant decision of the EC is highly influenced by the expert’s prioritization
(see Figures III.1(c) and III.1(d)). Those proposals that obtained the highest evaluation
scores from the group of experts are usually named on the Commission’s main list.
However, in some situations, proposals are not part of the main list even if they have
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Figure III.1.: Results of the allocation process
Source: E-CORDA database of the European Commission
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higher comparative scores. This is because each call has some specific thematic sub-
divisions. For each sub-field there is a specific amount of money that can be spent and
if the budget’s limit is reached, proposals with relatively high scores are also added to
the reserve list.
The networks were extracted from two different databases. For the KBBE call 2007,
the network was constructed from the project database of the sixth FP, because in
2007 the network of the seventh FP was in its embryonic stage. As a by-product, it
is possible to evaluate whether the network configuration of the previous FP affects
the scoring procedure of the following one. As this approach requires a unification
of the sixth and seventh FP, the network was restricted due to the manageability of
the matching procedure to those projects that fall within the scope of biotechnology-
related topics.2 The network for the 2013 call was built on the project database of the
seventh FP, considering all projects which belong to the specific cooperation program
and whose initial starting dates lie before the call’s deadline for the proposal submission.
To focus on organizational interlinkages, the initial affiliation network which consists of
vertices representing projects as well as organizations, is projected to a unipartite graph
of organizations (Breschi and Cusmano, 2004) which has the advantage of using network-
related measures that are only available for one-mode networks.
characteristics network KBBE 2007-1 network KBBE 2013-7
organizations 8,826 18,793
edges 196,542 396,602
density 0.005 0.002
components 53 77
greatest component
organizations 8,490 18,611
share 96% 99%
average distance 2.75 2.74
isolates 16 48
degree centralization 0.18 0.25
betweenness centralization 0.04 0.11
average degree 44.5 42.2
transitivity 0.22 0.12
average transitivity 0.82 0.82
diameter 6 6
Table III.2.: Network structure of Framework Programmes
2Therefore, only those projects were selected from the 6th FP, which belong to the following sub-
themes: (1) life sciences, genomics and biotechnology for health, (2) food quality and safety, and (3)
sustainable development, global change, and ecosystems.
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The observed networks differ in terms of the number of organizations and the number
of edges (interlinkages). While the network for the KBBE call 2007 only includes 8,826
organizations, the network for the KBBE call 2013 consists of 18,793 organizations,
which is more than double. The same is true for the number of interlinkages, where
there are 196,542 edges against 396,602. The primary reason for this is the restriction of
the KBBE 2007 network to biotechnology-related projects and the different time horizon,
as the time frame for the KBBE 2007 network includes only four (2003–2007) instead
of six (2007-2013) years. Another factor that plays a role is that each subsequent FP
over-exceeds its precursor in terms of the financial budget and the number of subsidized
projects (Roediger-Schluga and Barber, 2006). In contrast to the different size, the
structural patterns of the networks is similar. For both networks the share of the greatest
component is close to 1 and the average transitivity (0.82) is identical to the second
decimal place. The same is reflected by the average degree that reaches a value of 44.5
in the case of the KBBE 2007 network and lies only slightly above the value of 42.2.
The structural similarity between both networks ensures the comparability of the model
results within the next sections.
5. Variables
Using an ordinal least square (OLS) model for the estimation of the score values that
have been awarded by the expert committees, it is necessary to include several exogenous
variables in order to check the relevance of the underlying hypothesis. Due to the
different closing dates for the analyzed KBBE calls, it is necessary to calculate the
variables for two different time points (see Table III.3).
Several measures are able to describe the centrality of an organization within the re-
search network, with each concept pointing to a specific role and position of actor’s in
relation to the rest of the network. To verify H1, that is the centrality of a consortium
has an influence on the expert’s evaluation processes, the model includes two distinctive
centrality measures. As the perspective focuses on the level of the whole consortium, the
individual centrality measures need to be aggregated to the level of the group. The first
indicator (group degreeavg) summarizes the average number of connections (degree) that
each member of the group has established to other organizations within the research
network. By doing that, a large number of neighbors reflect both past gained knowledge
and experiences through previous collaborations as well as preexisting external knowl-
edge sources. The expected improvement of the submitted proposal should encourage
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the expert group to give a higher priority score to the submitted proposal. The second
centrality measure refers to the group’s overall centrality within the network. While
the degree only reflects the direct neighborhood of the consortium, the eigenvector cen-
trality reviews the groups position with respect to the entire network. Measuring the
importance with respect to the entire network leads to a self-referential, problem since
the importance of an organization depends on the importance of its neighbors. This can
be solved due to the calculation of the research network’s eigenvector (Jackson, 2008;
Bonacich, 1987). For the construction of the variable group evcentsum, the individual
eigenvector centrality measures of the organizations were added up to the level of the
consortium. As the variable quantifies the quality of the group’s neighborhood, it is
supposed that a higher variable value improves the score value of the proposal.
Hypothesis H2 is similar to the first one, but with a different focus. It aims at the
centrality of the project coordinator instead of the centrality of the consortium. The
underlying assumption is that the primary contractor is of higher relevance in comparison
to the ordinary project participant. To describe the coordinator’s network positions, the
same indicators, as in the case of the first hypothesis, are used, with the only difference
being that the centrality measures are not aggregated to the level of the group.
While the first two hypotheses have an outward-looking perspective regarding the
consortium’s network position within the overall network, hypothesis H3 gives atten-
tion to the inner connectivity of the group. Previous bilateral project participations
are manifested in organizational interlinkages signaling both previous experiences and
mutual trust, and formed through face-to-face contacts and contract compliance. The
connectivity between the project applicants is measured by their subgroup’s network
connectivity. The value of the indicator varies between 0 and 1, 1 indicating whether
all members of the consortium are connected directly or indirectly with each other.3 In
that case, each member of the consortium has access to everyone else in the consortium.
A value of 0 would signal that the members of the group are totally unknown to each
other. For the confirmation of hypothesis H3, it is expected that indicator variable
group connectivity has a positive impact on the experts’ evaluation process.
As stated in the funding rules of the EU Commission, the project consortium should
contain at least three independent organizations. That is why the smallest consortium
counts three participants, whereas the greatest submitted proposal has 55 organizations
on its list. A key rationale behind R&D cooperation is to diversify the costs and risks of
3Therefore, the number of components within group’s sub-network is divided through the number of
organizations within the consortium. This subtracted from 1 represents the subgroup’s connectivity.
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an innovation process across different organizations. However, is has been shown, in line
with to the transaction-cost theory (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1981), that costs start to
grow with the administrative efforts are required to coordinate greater groups (Bara-
jas and Huergo, 2010). Moreover, the exchange of knowledge becomes more complex
and difficult; thus, the benefit comes to an end if the marginal profit of an additional
project participant does not exceed its own cost. To investigate the effect, the variable
memberscount was added, counting the number of applications to a submitted proposal.
The EC has to meet a balance of national interests regarding the allocation of the FP
budget. Since the budget for the European FP comes directly from the member states,
it is usual that national authorities claim a proportion of the project funding, which is
equivalent to their specific contribution. This leads to the expectation that the final list
of contributed consortia represents approximately the proportional origin of the public
funds. To ensure this, the experts’ evaluation procedure has to consider that no coun-
try is overrepresented regarding their financial contribution to the program. Therefore,
several variables were added to the model, counting the consortium’s number of appli-
cants coming from a specific country. A comparison between the variable country escount
and country decount for the KBBE call 2013 explains that (see Table III.3), on average,
Spanish organizations (2.0) are overrepresented compared to German (1.6), as it can
be assumed that Germany’s financial contribution to the budget of the FP exceeds the
Spanish one. Consequently, it can be expected that the evaluation process prioritizes
those consortia that ensure a balance of national interests.
Many authors have highlighted the importance of the geographic proximity (Ponds
et al., 2007; Broekel and Hartog, 2013; Ter Wal, 2013; De Stefano and Zaccarin, 2013;
Hoekman et al., 2013) for organizational cooperation. Closeness eases the communica-
tion between the members of the consortium; personal meetings become more likely and
therefore more affordable, which stimulates the creation of mutual trust, stimulating
the exchange of information and tacit knowledge (Kogut and Zander, 1992; Cavusgil
et al., 2003). Nevertheless, it is possible to substitute geographic proximity by other
confidence-inspiring factors, such as previous experiences or social proximity (Autant-
Bernard et al., 2007; Paier and Scherngell, 2011). To evaluate whether the geographic
proximity has an influence on the quality of a submitted proposal, the model includes the
variable coordinator distancesum, measuring the sum of the geographic distances between
the project coordinator and the rest of the consortium.
For the objective of the paper, it is necessary to distinguish network-related expe-
riences from those reflecting the organizational learning-curve concerning the formal
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application process (Barajas and Huergo, 2010; Yelle, 1979). While network-related ex-
periences become explained through the variables for the hypotheses, the organizational
know-how has not been implemented up to now. It describes the extent of the organiza-
tion’s professionalization in seeking and proposing further projects, which is shaped most
widely by former proposal submissions (Levinthal and Fichman, 1988; Mora-Valentin et
al., 2004; Aschhoff and Schmidt, 2008; Barajas and Huergo, 2010). Organizations with
previous submissions can build upon preexisting communication channels with the EU
administration, which entails an information advantage over other organizations when
formulating a high quality application. Taking this effect into account, the model in-
cludes three different variables. Counting the number of successfully acquired projects,
the variable log experience positivecount explains the sum of positive experiences that a
consortium has collected before a submission deadline, the KBBE call 2013 variable is
based on the seventh FP, and the KBBE call 2007 uses the sixth FP, respectively.4 For
the KBBE call 2013 it is also possible to consider negative experiences (log experience
negativecount) in the form the consortium’s list of rejected project proposals. In contrast
to the positive experiences, the number of negative project applications is considered to
have a negative impact on the experts’ evaluations. Possibly, a large share of rejected
proposals is a signal for a kind of spamming strategy, where a large set of low quality
submissions are used to obtain project funds from time to time.
Most importantly, the experts’ evaluations should reflect the scientific expertise of the
written proposal. It is obvious that the best approximation for the accumulated knowl-
edge of the consortium is their academic publication activity in recent years (Umlauf,
2014). For that purpose, the variable log publicationscount includes all publications of the
consortium members that refer to the topics of the KBBE calls. The publication data
was extracted for each organization from the Web of Science, the time horizon starting
in 2000 and ending at the closure date of the respective call. The number of publications
is logarithmized since it is assumed that each additional publication is less important.
It is a special aim of the EC to internationalize the participants of the seventh FP
(EU, 2013). The inclusion of third-party countries is an important objective under
the cooperation program, if those participants contribute to the innovative potential
of the elaborated proposal. A third-party country is neither a member of the EU nor
a currently associated country of the FP. The variable thirdparty countriesbool signals
whether a third-country is under the list of organizations.
4Another model setting which included the number of the coordinator’s positive and negative project
experiences was also tested, but it was rejected,
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5. Variables
KBBE 2013 KBBE 2007
variable mean min max sd mean min max sd
memberscount 15.12 3.00 55.00 6.93 10.21 1.00 25.00 4.40
country ukcount 1.31 0.00 8.00 1.45 0.93 0.00 6.00 1.09
country decount 1.57 0.00 10.00 1.64 0.85 0.00 5.00 1.08
country escount 1.97 0.00 20.00 1.97 0.79 0.00 7.00 1.12
country itcount 1.49 0.00 8.00 1.68 1.13 0.00 8.00 1.33
country frcount 1.10 0.00 8.00 1.49 0.65 0.00 6.00 0.96
country nlcount 1.00 0.00 9.00 1.41 0.46 0.00 3.00 0.76
country becount 0.59 0.00 6.00 0.97 0.40 0.00 5.00 0.76
country ptcount 0.49 0.00 6.00 0.96 0.21 0.00 5.00 0.61
thirdparty countriesbool 0.25 0.00 1.00 0.43 0.29 0.00 1.00 0.46
thirdparty lower middlecount 0.28 0.00 6.00 0.81 0.44 0.00 8.00 1.20
coordinator distancesum 1,377.46 0.00 7,356.75 1,093.31 1,542.98 0.00 7,058.80 1,171.02
log experience negativecount 6.62 0.00 8.27 1.13
log experience positivecount
* 8.02 1.10 9.70 1.11 4.14 0.00 5.91 1.24
log publicationscount 10.54 0.00 12.84 1.70 10.31 0.00 12.83 1.95
group degreeavg 375.18 5.50 1,177.33 212.44 25.80 0.00 73.89 14.54
group evcentsum 2.60 0.01 9.09 1.62 1.01 0.00 4.51 0.84
coordinator degree 723.86 0.00 4,647.00 872.05 31.91 0.00 114.00 39.20
coordinator evcent 0.32 0.00 1.00 0.31 0.14 0.00 0.99 0.24
group connectivityshare 0.47 0.00 0.94 0.24 0.14 0.00 0.75 0.17
theme Ibool 0.26 0.00 1.00 0.44 0.49 0.00 1.00 0.50
theme IIbool 0.31 0.00 1.00 0.46 0.35 0.00 1.00 0.48
theme IIIbool 0.43 0.00 1.00 0.50 0.16 0.00 1.00 0.36
theme IVbool 0.003 0.00 1.00 0.05
employee less 250count 6.35 0.00 22.00 3.87 4.20 0.00 14.00 2.91
turnover ls 50count 6.81 0.00 26.00 4.08 5.44 0.00 18.00 3.25
coordinator university educationbool 0.37 0.00 1.00 0.48 0.46 0.00 1.00 0.50
coordinator researchbool 0.35 0.00 1.00 0.48 0.34 0.00 1.00 0.47
expertsshare 0.02 0.00 0.27 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.50 0.06
number of observations 443 397
* For the KBBE call 2013 mesured in project aquisitions during 7th FP and in case of the KBBE call 2007 mesured in project
aquisitions during 6th FP.
Table III.3.: Variable statistics
Roediger-Schluga and Barber (2006) have shown that the institutional affiliation of
an organization also plays a role to a large extent. They reported that universities and
research organizations show a greater persistency among consecutive FPs in comparison
to firms and other organizations. Thus, they were able to gain in experience in regarding
the application processes in recent years. Another factor that might play a role for
the allocation process is that universities and research centers are experts in managing
basic research, since this activity is a major part of their daily business. To investigate
whether the sectoral affiliation of the coordinator plays a role, the variables coordinator
researchbool and coordinator universitybool have been added to the model, the variable
equals 1 if the organization belongs to the specific sector, and 0 otherwise.
Tanayama (2009) found some evidence that SMEs and large firms are treated differ-
ently, but it is unclear whether the consortium benefits more from the participation of
SMEs or large firms. While a regulation from the EC requires that at least 15 percent
of the overall funding goes to SMEs (EU, 2006), large organizations have the advan-
tage of economies of scale and lower vulnerability in terms of sunk cost and other risks.
Moreover, the “picking-the-winner” strategy contributes to the selection of larger firms
(Wallsten, 2000; Cantner and Ko¨sters, 2009). To measure this effect, two variables were
added to the model, containing the number of organizations in the consortium with less
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than 250 employees (employee less 250count) or an annual turnover below 50 million euro
(turnover less 50count). The limits of the variables are exactly equivalent to the limits of
the EU definition of whether an organization is an SME or not.
Each KBBE call is divided into different activities; thus, each call addresses several
specific research questions related to the respective technological field. During the ap-
plication process, organizations are able to decide for which kind of sub-activities they
want to submit their proposal. Notwithstanding the possibility considering a thematic
sub-field below the activity level, the model includes as much thematic dummy variables
as possible to represent the activity of the respective call. This procedure assumes that
the expert group’s evaluation procedure differs between the various activities, which is
possible since the composition of the expert group changes case-by-case.
The role of the expert group cannot be overstated. For the composition of the expert
group, the EC maintains a list of appropriate persons. To become an expert, persons
require a high level of expertise and competence regarding the requested scientific sub-
field (EU, 2011). Beside this, the group should reflect a sensible balance, between
academics, industrial experts and users, a reasonable gender balance and a reasonable
distribution of geographical origins and the principle of rotation. The requirement of
a person’s expertise entails the possibility of a conflict of interest. It’s very likely that
highly educated persons having a similar scientific background are familiar with each
other. Thus, personal acquaintances between experts and applicants cannot be avoided.
As a consequence, experts have to indicate whether they are in a conflict of interest
or not, and, if so, experts are usually excluded from the relevant decision. However, it
remains widely unclear whether further effects influence the decision, such as unconscious
preferences or even agreements between the experts in advance of the evaluation process.
To approximate this effect, the variable expertsshare was added to the model. Based
upon the persons named in the respective proposal, the variable explains the share of
the consortium’s members that have also been announced as experts evaluating a KBBE
call between the years 2007 and 2013.
6. Results
The model results of several OLS estimations are shown in Table III.4 and III.5. Unfor-
tunately, both models (1a, 1b) that have been estimated first lead to the problem of mul-
ticollinearity. Thus, it was necessary to reduce the list of parameters by those variables,
which have been indicated through the variance inflation factor. This is particularly the
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case for the variables log experience positivecount and log experience negativecount, showing
a high degree of positive correlation. Thus, it was decided to omit the latter one from
the model. The same applies to the parameters employee less 250count and turnover less
50count in the case of the KBBE 2013 call, since both employment and turnover are quite
interdependent. Due to the lower significance of the turnover, the variable turnover less
50count was eliminated from the model. Additionally, the variables explaining the hy-
potheses H1 and H2 were separated into two different models, since the variables for
both hypotheses caused further multicollinearity problems.
The findings for hypothesis H1 differ, depending on the circumstances of the respec-
tive call. While the hypothesis is rejected for the KBBE 2007 call, the hypothesis is
broadly supported from the results of the KBBE 2013 call in model (2b). Interestingly,
the results confirm the broadly observed and often theorized pattern that the quality
of interconnections counts more than the pure quantity of neighbors (Hagedoorn et al.,
2006; Rosenkopf and Padula, 2008; Umlauf, 2014). This is expressed by the significant
parameter values of the variables group degreeavg and group evcentsum. The value of the
degree variable indicates a negative influence on the experts’ evaluation score caused by
each additional link maintained by the consortium. This highlights the circumstance
that the maintenance of interconnections is a costly matter, which can exceed the ben-
efit.5 Contrastingly, the estimated parameter of the variable group evcentsum explains
that what really matters is the relative importance of the group’s neighborhood. Indeed,
if the members of a consortium are partnered with organizations obtaining central posi-
tions within the network, why should this be more important than being linked to many,
albeit unnecessary, organizations? The quality dimension possibly induces the observed
core–periphery structure of the network since this entails the organization’s strategy to
partner with the most central organizations within the overall network, irrespective of
their current centrality, even if they have already reached a central network position.
Due to the problem of collinearity, the variable group evcentsum was removed from the
model for the KBBE call 2007 (model 2b). However, this does not change the results
regarding the insignificance of the variable group degreeavg for the KBBE call 2007, which
aimed to explore the transition between two consecutive FPs. The observation that both
network measures are insignificant is surprising. It remains unclear whether the network
formation breaks between consecutive funding programs or if this observation is caused
by a selection bias since some compromises were made due to the manageability of the
5A quadratic influence of the variable group degreeavg was also tested, but it was rejected, refusing a
relation that follows an inverted U-shape.
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network construction. Another possible explanation for this pattern would be if the
Work Programmes for the respective calls differ in terms of their addressed thematic
priority; but there were no indicators in the outline of the programs that support this
point of view. In addition to that, it was checked whether differences occur between the
thematic priorities of the sixth and seventh FP; however, the little differences seem to
be negligible. Moreover, the group of experts that have evaluated the proposals of the
sixth FP was not accessible. Maybe information above the organization’s centrality gets
lost when it comes to a radical break regarding the member of the expert group between
consecutive FPs.
Similar observations were made concerning the role of the coordinator’s centrality
(H2 ). Two models (3a, 4a) were estimated for the KBBE call 2013, measuring the
effect of the coordinator’s network position. The finding that both centrality indicators
of the coordinator’s network position were found to be positive and significant might
be caused by the fact that it was impossible to combine the variables into one single
model, as the single model would run into the problem of multicollinearity. Otherwise,
the explanatory power of the variable coordinator degree might have turned out to be
insignificant or have a negative impact, as indicated by the model 1a, which is now
possibly overestimated in model 3a, caused by the missing variable coordinator evcent.
Nevertheless, the centrality of the consortium’s coordinator is an important factor in
terms of the experts’ evaluation. Well connected coordinators can use their networking
capabilities for the composition of a promising and well-shaped consortium, enabling the
group to deliver a high quality proposal for the application process compared to others.
The support for the hypothesis H3 is overwhelming. No estimated model questions
the positive effect that originates from the group’s internal connection resulting from
previous collaborations. To a great extent, the group’s performance depends on the pre-
existing relationships among the members, explained by the subgroup’s network density.
Bilateral relations, ideally formed through personal contacts, entail a sphere of trust and
familiarity among the project partners, which eases the exchange of tacit information
and knowledge due to already established information channels and elaborated routines.
In contrast to centrality, the group’s internal connectivity survives the regime switch
between two consecutive FPs since the variable group connectivityshare, based on the net-
work of the sixth FP was able to explain the experts’ prioritization within the seventh
FP.
The influence of the consortium’s size was found to be negative for the models of the
KBBE call 2013 and insignificant in the case of KBBE call 2007. It seems that the
70
6. Results
coordination costs of large consortiums exceed the benefit of additional group members,
due to the complexity of administrative efforts in larger groups.6
As theorized, the composition of nationalities represented within the applicant group
affects the prioritization of the expert committee. The case of the Spanish organizations
is an illustrative example. Compared to others, Spanish organizations were overrepre-
sented within proposals for the KBBE call 2013, but they were underrepresented within
the KBBE call 2007 (see Table III.3.). This observation is reflected by the estimators
for the variable country escount, counting the number of Spanish organizations within
the respective call. Due to their overrepresentation in the first case, the impact of the
variable was estimated to be negative for the KBBE call 2013 and positive for the KBBE
call 2007. This tendency reflects the aim of the EU administration to consider a certain
degree of balance between the member states. The parameter of the variable thirdparty
countriesbool, explaining whether the consortium includes an international organization,
was insignificant; thus, the internationalization of the program plays a secondary role or
is carried out through the eligibility check.
Interestingly, the geographic distance, expressing the distance between the coordinator
and the rest of the participants, has a positive but weak impact on the evaluation score,
in the case of the KBBE call 2007. This is contradictory since proximity is usually a
key driver for organizational collaboration (Broekel and Hartog, 2013; Ter Wal, 2013).
This might reflect the circumstance that there is a political aim behind the prioritization
process. Constructing the ERA, the administration might favor collaborations between
distant organizations to enlarge the pan-European research network. Another possible
explanation is that the geographic proximity was substituted through other factors,
reducing the importance of being located close to each other, such as social proximity
or previous experiences (Autant-Bernard et al., 2007; Paier and Scherngell, 2011).
Less surprisingly, consortia with a large amount of previous experience obtain higher
evaluation scores. The overall significance of the variable log experience positivecount
proves that producing high quality proposals is an iterative learning process, triggered
by a professionalization in writing submissions and preexisting communication channels
to the administration. The more project or proposal submissions are accumulated by the
members of the consortium over time, the better the result, as explained by the learning
curve.
Most surprisingly, the number of publications has a negative impact on the experts’
6A digressive impact of the variable was tested within an alternative model, but it was found to be
insignificant.
71
III. Supporting the emergence of an oligarchic core
prioritization for the KBBE call 2013. It seems counterintuitive that the degree of
academic expertise that is related to the biotech sector should not contribute to the
quality of the proposal. A possible explanation might be that the large amount of
publications leads to a concentration of academic actors within the consortium, which
is unintended by the administration’s policy since the EU tries to stimulate innovations
by bringing different sets of actors together.
The awarded score value depends on the respective activity of the call for which an
application has been submitted since the estimated parameters for variable theme IIbool
were significant for both KBBE calls. The exact cause of this remains unclear since
several effects come into question, such as a different composition of the expert group
or higher requirements for the consortium.
The results for the variables measuring the size of the firm are diverging. For the
KBBE call 2013, the variable employee less 250count explains that a consortium benefits
from each additional organization having less than 250 employees. This outcome likely
reflects the fact that a large number of projects that were offered by the call in 2013
explicitly require that at last 15 percent of the total EU contribution go to SMEs.7 The
fact that the KBBE call 2007 does not contain an equivalent requirement for the applying
consortia potentially leads to a change in the variable’s influence. The absence of the
SME requirement might induce a greater influence of economies of scale; thus, consortia
with larger human resources were able to succeed against those consortia with a higher
proportion of SMEs. The variable turnover less 50count was found to have a positive
influence in case of the call KBBE 2007, meaning that organizations with a rather low
annual turnover raise the experts’ evaluation score, which reduces the negative impact
of the preceding variable, if the same organization falls under the definition of SMEs.
If so, both effects nearly compensate for each other; thus, SMEs are seen as somewhat
neutral within the KBBE call 2007.
The institutional background of the coordinator does not play a role for the observed
calls. The explanatory power of the parameters coordinator universitybool and coordinator
researchbool, explaining the affiliation of the coordinator to the academic or research
sector, was insignificant.
The share of the experts named in the list of appropriate persons has a great influence
concerning the experts’ evaluation scores for the KBBE call 2013. Theoretically, a
proposal would receive a score value of nearly 100 percent if the composition of the
7An alternative model specification, using a variable explaining the number of organizations falling
under the EU definition of an SME, was also tested, but the result was insignificant.
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consortium consists completely of the expert group. However, the highest observed value
of the variable expertsshare was 0.27; thus, this is only an intellectual game. As stated
earlier, it remains mostly unclear what shapes this effect. Undoubtedly, the members of
the expert group have rich expertise in the field of biotechnology. Thus, it is very likely
that these persons are able to write high quality proposals. However, this might indicate
the possibility of an existing conflict of interests, if personal relations within the group
of experts have an influence on the decision-making process.
7. Conclusion
The aim of this paper was to analyze the factors that shape the formation of the pan-
European research network. Therefore, the paper argues that the allocation mechanism
of project grants is both affecting and affected by the formation of the research network.
The allocation mechanism is a political process regulated by the EU administration,
which is highly selective, and thus the resulting research network represents only one
possible stage of endless alternatives. With each additional awarded project, the EC
fosters the intended or unintended formation of the pan-European research network.
In evaluating this outcome, several hypotheses were formulated, postulating that the
project allocation is influenced by both the centrality of the consortium and coordinator
within the overall research network, as well as by the group’s internal network configura-
tion. Therefore, the empirical part of this paper used micro data from two FP calls that
were related to the biotechnology sector, representing 4,832 organizations in 881 pro-
posals. Several OLS models were estimated to analyze the impact of the hypotheses on
the experts’ prioritization, which represents the Commission’s basis of decision-making
for project allocation. Hypothesis H1, suggesting that the network centrality of the
group and the coordinator affects the experts’ assessments, was supported in the case
of the KBBE call 2013 but not in case of the KBBE call 2007. An explanation for this
might be that centrality is not transmitted or forwarded between two consecutive FPs,
since two different FP databases were used to construct the network for the respective
calls. The idea behind this was to show that the network configuration is maintained
between two different regimes, but the result does not support this point of view. The
same applies to hypothesis H2, investigating whether the centrality of the coordinator
plays a role for the experts’ evaluation procedure, which was found to be significant for
the call in 2013, but insignificant for the call in 2007. The outward-looking perspective
was complemented by the result of hypothesis H3, which focused on the internal con-
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nectivity of the group’s members. Interestingly, this last hypothesis was important for
the formation of the network, as bilateral relations are stable even between two consec-
utive FPs. Nevertheless, both findings, the impact of the group’s centrality and internal
affiliation with the prioritization of the experts, induce a feedback link between the allo-
cation mechanism and the formation of the network during the funding phase of a single
FP. The awarded projects of the analyzed KBBE calls lead to a reconfiguration of the
current network state and contribute, as a result of these additional impacts, to further
project allocations.
The result that the impact of centrality does not transits between consecutive FPs was
surprising. A possible explanation for this pattern might be a radical break between two
different FPs, for example, in terms of the research objective or the staff composition
of the expert committee. Another possibility is that those projects started in the final
year of the preceding FP will continue operating even if the next program has already
started, so that the same relations are shared across the FPs. To evaluate whether the
same observation is true for technological fields other than the biotech sector, further
investigations are needed for additional calls. Another interesting question would be
whether the identified pattern has something in common with the Matthew Effect in
social networks. The effect explains the formation of an oligopolistic network structure
by small starting differences that accumulate over time into a winner-takes-it-all network
formation, due to the preference of other actors in being tied to extraordinarily embedded
organizations. This contributes to the following interpretation: small starting differences
are secured between subsequent FPs by preexisting bilateral relations, which compromise
the initial network formation and the first central organizations. Due to the preference
of central actors, these initial advantages accumulate over time, ending in the formation
of the oligopolistic network structure as observed by Breschi and Cusmano (2004). To
buttress this presumption, further investigation is highly recommended for the empirical
analysis to evaluate whether the impact of the network rises over time.
By facilitating a network that has oligopolistic patterns, the allocation process induces
several risks in European innovation policy. Of course, a network requires some degree of
clustering and closeness for an efficient transmission and production of knowledge, which
is known as the small-word property of a research network (Watts and Strogatz, 1998).
However, many repetitions of the same network patterns entail the risk of technological
lock-ins and path dependencies, due to the homogenization of the knowledge, routines,
and interests among a large fraction of the network. New incumbents are forced to the
periphery of the network, from where it is difficult to get access to the promoters of new
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technologies. The displacement of diverse knowledge patterns decreases the chance for
innovations, as heterogeneity is a key driver for both incremental and, especially, radical
innovations. By this, the allocation process might counteract the political aim of the
EC, which is stimulating the performance of the EU by helping develop new innovations.
Additionally, the core–periphery network structure is likely to affect other networks, due
to cross-effects between various coexisting networks, which might induce the transition of
the same structure to non-target networks. This would be problematic and cause state
failure, since there is no imperfection in the market mechanisms that would possibly
legitimize governmental intervention.
It sounds less problematic if the oligopolistic structure of the research network is
unable to transit between two consecutive FPs. If so, this would ensure that in the case
of a transition, the core–periphery structure becomes broken so that there is a new round
in the race for the most central positions within the network. However, the duration of
the FPs has continuously risen in the past, which can indeed become a problem, since
grater durations help to prevent the oligopolistic formation of the network.
To soften the automatism that seems to increase the advantage of central and well-
connected organizations within a funding phase, the European Commission could mod-
ify the allocation process of forthcoming project calls. That could be, for example, a
wildcard for an organization that shows great potential, or financial pre-submission con-
tributions that mitigate the risk in an application. Another possibility would be that
consortia have to meet a threshold, which requires that a certain amount of the funding
goes to less connected organizations, similar to the basic requirement that allocates at
least 15 percent of the funding to SMEs. Any of these suggestions can contribute to
political decryption of the allocation process that mostly favors central organizations.
Further research is needed, since the results of this paper only rely on two selected
calls of the seventh FP, and it is questionable whether the same applies to sectors other
than the biotech industry. The selection of the KBBE call 2007 might have induced
several insignificant parameters of the estimated model, since the observed variance of
the score values was rather low, compared to the KBBE call 2013. Another interesting
question might be how the allocation of the projects and the resulting network would
look without the influence of the network effects. Knowing the impact of the network-
related determinants, it becomes possible to approximate an alternative setting of the
network formation one shaped only by non-network-related determinants. The results
could help to identity alternative outcomes of the European innovation policy.
75

Bibliography
Ahuja, G., G. Soda, and A. Zaheer (2012). ‘The Genesis and Dynamics of Organizational
Networks’. In: Organization Science 23.2, pp. 434–448.
Aschhoff, B. and T. Schmidt (2008). ‘Empirical Evidence on the Success of R&D Coop-
eration – Happy Together?’ In: Review of Industrial Organization 33.1, pp. 41–62.
Aschhoff, B. (2009). ‘Who gets the money? - The dynamics of R&D project subsidies
in Germany’. In: ZEW - Centre for European Economic Research Discussion Paper
08–018.
Autant-Bernard, C., P. Billand, D. Frachisse, and N. Massard (2007). ‘Social distance
versus spatial distance in R&D cooperation: Empirical evidence from European collab-
oration choices in micro and nanotechnologies’. In: Papers in Regional Science 86.3,
pp. 495–519.
Barajas, A. and E. Huergo (2010). ‘International R&D cooperation within the EU Frame-
work Programme: empirical evidence for Spanish firms’. In: Economics of Innovation
and New Technology 19, pp. 87–111.
Blanes, J. V. and I. Busom (2004). ‘Who participates in R&D subsidy programs?: The
case of Spanish manufacturing firms’. In: Research Policy 33.10, pp. 1459–1476.
Bonacich, P. (1987). ‘Power and Centrality: A Family of Measures’. In: American Journal
of Sociology 92.5, pp. 1170–1182.
Boschma, R. (2005). ‘Proximity and Innovation: A Critical Assessment’. In: Regional
Studies 39.1, pp. 61–74.
Breschi, S. and L. Cusmano (2004). ‘Unveiling the Texture of a European Research Area:
Emergence of Oligarchic Networks under EU Framework Programmes’. In: Interna-
tional Journal of Technology Management 27, pp. 747–772.
Brockhoff, K., A. K. Gupta, and C. Rotering (1991). ‘Inter-firm R&D co-operations in
Germany’. In: Technovation 11.4, pp. 219–229.
Broekel, T. and M. Hartog (2013). ‘Explaining the Structure of Inter-Organizational
Networks using Exponential Random Graph Models’. In: Industry & Innovation 20.3,
pp. 277–295.
77
Bibliography
Brusoni, S., A. Prencipe, and K. Pavitt (2001). ‘Knowledge Specialization, Organiza-
tional Coupling, and the Boundaries of the Firm: Why Do Firms Know More Than
They Make?’ In: Administrative Science Quarterly 46.4, pp. 597–621.
Cantner, U. and S. Ko¨sters (2009). Picking the winner? Empirical evidence on the tar-
geting of R&D subsidies to start-ups. Jena Economic Research Papers 93. Friedrich
Schiller Universita¨t Jena.
Cavusgil, S. T., R. J. Calantone, and Y. Zhao (2003). ‘Tacit knowledge transfer and firm
innovation capability’. In: Journal of Business & Industrial Marketing 18.1, pp. 6–21.
Coase, R. H. (1937). ‘The Nature of the Firm’. In: Economica 4.16, pp. 386–405.
Cowan, R. and N. Jonard (2004). ‘Network structure and the diffusion of knowledge’.
In: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 28.8, pp. 1557–1575.
De Stefano, D. and S. Zaccarin (2013). ‘Modelling Multiple Interactions in Science and
Technology Networks’. In: Industry & Innovation 20.3, pp. 221–240.
Delanghe, H., B. Sloan, and U. Muldur (2009). ‘European Science and Technology Policy:
Towards Integration or Fragmentation?’ In: ed. by H. Delanghe, U. Muldur, and L.
Soete. Edward Elgar Publishing. Chap. Transnational collaboration in pubilc research
funding and publicly supported research in Europe, pp. 175–188.
Duysters, G. and L. Charmianne (2003). ‘Alliance Group Formation Enabling and Con-
straining Effects of Embeddedness and Social Capital in Strategic Technology Alliance
Networks’. In: International Studies of Management and Organization 33.2, pp. 49–68.
EU (2006). The new SME definition – User guide and model declaration. Ed. by E.
Commission. Publications Office.
– (2007). Cooperation Work Programme 2007. EU Commission.
– (2011). Decision 4617/2008 - Related to the rules for proposals submission, evalua-
tion, selection and award procedures for indirect actions under the Seventh Framework
Programme of the European Community for research, technological development and
demonstration activities (2007-2013) and under the Seventh Framework Programme of
the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) for nuclear research and training
activities (2007-2011). EU.
– (2013). Cooperation Work Programme 2013. EU Commission.
Freeman, C. (1991). ‘Networks of innovators: A synthesis of research issues’. In: Research
Policy 20.5, pp. 499–514.
Granovetter, M. (1985). ‘Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Em-
beddedness’. In: American Journal of Sociology 91.3, pp. 481–510.
78
Bibliography
Hagedoorn, J., N. Roijakkers, and H. Van Kranenburg (2006). ‘Inter-Firm R&D Net-
works: the Importance of Strategic Network Capabilities for High-Tech Partnership
Formation’. In: British Journal of Management 17.1, pp. 39–53.
Hazir, C. S. and C. Autant-Bernard (2012). Using Affiliation Networks to Study the De-
terminants of Multilateral Research Cooperation Some empirical evidence from EU
Framework Programs in biotechnology. Tech. rep. Groupe d’analyse et de the´orie
e´conomique (GATE).
Hippel, E. von (1988). The Sources of Innovation. MIT Press.
Hoekman, J., T. Scherngell, K. Frenken, and R. Tijssen (2013). ‘Acquisition of European
research funds and its effect on international scientific collaboration’. In: Journal of
Economic Geography 13.1, pp. 23–52.
Jackson, M. O. (2008). Social and Economic Networks. Princeton University Press.
Kogut, B. and U. Zander (1992). ‘Knowledge of the Firm, Combinative Capabilities, and
the Replication of Technology’. In: Organization Science 3.3, pp. 383–397.
Larson, A. (1992). ‘Network Dyads in Entrepreneurial Settings: A Study of the Gover-
nance of Exchange Relationships’. In: Administrative Science Quarterly 37.1, pp. 76–
104.
Levinthal, D. A. and M. Fichman (1988). ‘Dynamics of Interorganizational Attachments:
Auditor-Client Relationships’. In: Administrative Science Quarterly 33, pp. 345–369.
Lundvall, B. (1988). ‘Technical Change and Economic theory’. In: Technical Change and
Economic theory. Ed. by Dosi, G. et. al. (eds.) Pinter. Chap. Innovation as an Inter-
active Process: From User Producer Interaction to National systems of Innovation.
Mora-Valentin, E. M., A. Montoro-Sanchez, and L. A. Guerras-Martin (2004). ‘Determin-
ing factors in the success of R&D cooperative agreements between firms and research
organizations’. In: Research Policy 33.1, pp. 17–40.
Nooteboom, B. (2000). Inter-firm Alliances: Analysis and Design. Reprinted. London,
New York: Routledge.
Paier, M. and T. Scherngell (2011). ‘Determinants of Collaboration in European R&D
Networks: Empirical Evidence from a Discrete Choice Model’. In: Industry and Inno-
vation 18.1, pp. 89–104.
Ponds, R., F. Van Oort, and K. Frenken (2007). ‘The geographical and institutional
proximity of research collaboration’. In: Papers in Regional Science 86.3, pp. 423–443.
Powell, W. W., K. W. Koput, and L. Smith-Doerr (1996). ‘Interorganizational Collab-
oration and the Locus of Innovation: Networks of Learning in Biotechnology’. In:
Administrative Science Quarterly 41.1, pp. 116–145.
79
Bibliography
Roediger-Schluga, T. and M. J. Barber (2006). The structure of R&D collaboration net-
works in the European Framework Programmes. Tech. rep. United Nations University
- Maastricht Economic et al.
Rosenkopf, L. and G. Padula (2008). ‘Investigating the Microstructure of Network Evo-
lution: Alliance Formation in the Mobile Communications Industry’. In: Organization
Science 19.5, pp. 669–687.
Tanayama, T. (2009). Rationales and reality of R&D subsidies: Are SMEs and large
firms treated differently? Helsinki Center of Economic Research - Discussion Papers.
Helsinki School of Economics and HECER.
Ter Wal, A. L. J. (2013). ‘The dynamics of the inventor network in German biotechnol-
ogy: geographic proximity versus triadic closure’. In: Journal of Economic Geography.
Umlauf, F. (2014). Network Determinants of a Collaborative Funding System: The Case
of the German Innovation Policy. Papers on Economics and Evolution. Centre for
Regional and Innovation Economics.
Uzzi, B. (1996). ‘The Sources and Consequences of Embeddedness for the Economic
Performance of Organizations: The Network Effect’. In: American Sociological Review
61.4, pp. 674–698.
– (1997). ‘Social Structure and Competition in Interfirm Networks: The Paradox of
Embeddedness’. In: Administrative Science Quarterly 42.1, pp. 35–67.
Walker, G., B. Kogut, and W. Shan (1997). ‘Social Capital, Structural Holes and the
Formation of an Industry Network’. In: Organization Science 8.2, pp. 109–125.
Wallsten, S. J. (2000). ‘The Effects of Government-Industry R&D Programs on Private
R&D: The Case of the Small Business Innovation Research Program’. In: The RAND
Journal of Economics 31.1, pp. 82–100.
Watts, D. J. and S. H. Strogatz (1998). ‘Collective dynamics of ‘small-world’networks’.
In: Nature 393.6684, pp. 440–442.
Williamson, O. E. (1981). ‘The Economics of Organization: The Transaction Cost Ap-
proach’. In: American Journal of Sociology 87.3, pp. 548–577.
Yelle, L. E. (1979). ‘The learning curve: Historical review and comprehensive survey’.
In: Decision Sciences 10.2, pp. 302–328.
80
IV. Network determinants of a
collaborative funding system: the
case of the German innovation
policy
1. Introduction
Since the 1980s, the innovation policy of Germany and other industrialized countries
developed toward an increased importance of government-funded research joint ventures
(Fier and Harhoff, 2002; Eickelpasch and Fritsch, 2005). Triggered by the awareness of
the innovation-stimulating nature of cooperative research activities – because of, for ex-
ample, knowledge spillovers, resource pooling, or risk sharing (Levinthal and March,
1993; Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999) – most of Germany’s publicly sponsored research
projects inherently integrate collaborative elements. What is new about this policy
is that no longer can a single organization apply for such a collaborative funding award,
but rather a whole consortium. During the project-implementation phase, organizations
have to collaborate within the scope of the project as well as to give access to their
knowledge and to the outcome at the end of the project (Broekel and Graf, 2012). Be-
cause of the huge number of joint projects that intertwined thousands of organizations,
a complex network has evolved, which is determined by policy-driven rules and organi-
zational behaviors. There is a rich literature on the dynamics of organization networks
(Ter Wal, 2009; Broekel and Graf, 2012; Balland, 2012; Hazir and Autant-Bernard,
2012) and policy implications (Aschhoff and Schmidt, 2008; Barajas and Huergo, 2010)
that drive the evolution of such a complex system, but interestingly less is known about
the way both sources of change are related to one another.
This becomes even more problematic since the government has had to comply with
EU-wide regulatory standards preventing distortions to the market, such as reducing
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incentives to innovate, promoting existing market power, or a cross-subsidization of
poorly performing enterprises. To some extent, the innovation policy of the German
federal government anticipates the possibility of such a failure, since financial support is
only granted for a certain period of time (BMBF, 2012). But the idea of strict regulation
is misleading, since there is no upper bound regarding the number of projects an orga-
nization be awarded consecutively or in parallel. There is no doubt that governmental
innovation policy dominates the funding regime to a high degree, but there are some
concerns that the regime is highly affected by its own self-enforced mechanisms that
potentially induces unintended feedback loops and distortions to the market.
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the extent to which the dynamics of the
system are influenced by its own structural patterns. Therefore, the next section gives
a systematic overview of the allocation mechanism of a project grant. The third section
presents some hypotheses, exploring the dependency of the funding system on network-
related determinants. The fourth section describes the empirical background of the
paper. The fifth section introduces the model and the employed data for the model
estimation. Section six discusses the results of the estimated models. The final section
summarizes the outcome of the paper and gives an outlook on further research questions.
2. The allocation mechanism of a project grant
Since the allocation of a project grant is a long-term process, it is necessary to ana-
lyze the overall decision-making process in detail (see Figure IV.1.). For the purpose
of the following analysis, it is useful to split the process into single steps: the “Eligi-
bility”, “Awareness”, “Application”, “Acceptance”, and “Execution” of a project grant
(Tanayama, 2007; Keese et al., 2012). While the government regulates whether or not
organization is eligible for an application, it is the organization itself that decides to
seek a contribution and, moreover, to apply for a project grant. The granting of the
promotion is the responsibility of the administration. At the end of the process, the
organization ultimately decides whether to start the project or not. Within these steps,
a lot of influences affect the decision-making process.
Eligibility Awareness Application Acceptance Execution
Figure IV.1.: Decision-making process
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2.1. Eligibility of the organization
The administration checks the eligibility of an organization on the basis of a criteria
catalog. On this account, it may be necessary to belong to a specific target group
of addressed organizations. Some of these criteria might be strong enough to have
an impact on the occurrence of differing organizations. An illustrative example might
be the “Central SME Innovation Programme” (ZIM) of the German government, which
explicitly aims to allocate a large amount of the finical budget to small- and medium-sized
enterprises (SMEs) (Brautzsch et al., 2015), thus SMEs may be overrepresented within
the funding system. Another example is the“InnoRegio”program, which was specifically
designed for the eastern states of Germany (Eickelpasch and Fritsch, 2005); it becomes
possible that therefore organizations of eastern Germany have a higher probability of
being represented within the system. Even the sectoral affiliation of an organization
possibly has an effect, since some programs are restricted to specific technologies or
industries. Furthermore, the awarding of a cooperative project grant requires that a
group of organizations applies jointly for a project grant (Eickelpasch and Fritsch, 2005).
So, without being a member of a consortium, an organization has no chance to obtain a
cooperative contribution.
2.2. Awareness of the funding programs
Without the awareness of a funding opportunity, no single organization would apply
for a project grant (Heckman and Smith, 2003) and the decision to seek funding can
only be taken by the organization itself. However, several additional factors have to
be considered. First of all, the government could support the visibility of the program
by providing information about the funding programs (Tanayama, 2007). Secondly, an
organization can benefit from previous project applications (Aschhoff, 2009), as moni-
toring is costly process which becomes more efficient in case of preexisting information
channels between applicants and administrations are preexisting and routines to seek
information are already trained (Nelson, 1982). Additionally, previous project acquisi-
tions promote both the prominence of the organization in administrative circles as well
as the familiarity with administrative procedures.
2.3. Project application
The decision of an organization whether or not to apply for a governmental project grant
takes into account the expected costs and benefits of the potential project (Tanayama,
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2007). Therefore, the organization has to consider the financial aspects of the project
grant, but also the additional utility of a cooperative project that stimulates the prob-
ability of innovation (Czarnitzki and Fier, 2003; Fornahl, Broekel, et al., 2011) due to,
for example, knowledge spillovers, risk sharing, or economies of scale (Levinthal and
March, 1993; Powell et al., 1996; Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999). The more the expected
profit exceeds the expected costs, the more attractive the project application becomes.
A general problem for this consideration is that the costs of a project cannot be com-
pletely specified before the project has come to an end. This is even more evident for
cooperative projects, since incomplete contracts entail the possibility of opportunistic
behavior among partners (Eickelpasch and Fritsch, 2005). The application requires the
formulation of a project proposal, which is a time consuming process, since the requested
information must be prepared, and each organization has to justify their financial re-
quirements (Tanayama, 2007; Eickelpasch and Fritsch, 2005). Moreover, detailed reports
have to be submitted during and at the end of the funding phase.
2.4. Project acceptance
A jury of experts, consisting of administrative members or other external profession-
als, has to decide whether to award a financial contribution or to reject the application.
Thus, additional effects come into account affecting the decision-making process. The le-
gitimacy of R&D subsidies is always in question, since governmental interventions could
lead to unintended distortions to the market mechanism. This places a certain pressure
on the government. If too many projects are canceled or fail during the implementa-
tion phase, the impression of government failure could arise. Since projects always run
the risk of failure, the committee of experts could systematically tend to select a pre-
viously successful organization or consortium with the aim minimizing the likelihood of
an abandonment – known as the “picking-the-winner” strategy (Wallsten, 2000; Blanes
and Busom, 2004; Colombo et al., 2007; Cantner and Ko¨sters, 2009).
2.5. Project execution
The project execution is the ultimate phase of the decision-making process. By the start
of the project prior expectations become concrete. During the phase of implementation
the organization benefits from knowledge accumulation and, in case of an additional
cooperative project, from knowledge spillovers.
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3. Hypotheses
The previous section has discussed how the allocation process is affected by various
circumstances. Based on these preliminary considerations, some hypotheses are formu-
lated to evaluate whether the German dynamics of the funding regime are affected by
network-related determinants.
The discussion of the decision-making process highlighted the importance of previous
project experiences for the allocation mechanism of a project grant. However, it remains
unclear which experiences are relevant for the application process. Various researchers
emphasized the importance of a rich expertise with the formal procedure of the applica-
tion process (Tanayama, 2007; Aschhoff and Schmidt, 2008; Banno` and Sgobbi, 2010),
but neglected the role of cooperative experiences. Following Ahuja et al. (2012), these
cooperative experiences are manifested in network relationships, thus it is possible to
measure the cooperative experience of an organization using the methodology of social
network analysis (Wasserman and Pattison, 1996).
Relationships serve as preexisting communication channels that possibly cause an
information advantage to organizations without prior cooperative experiences (Gould
and Fernandez, 1989; Burt, 2000). Thus, with each additional connection, an organi-
zation becomes increasingly visible to others. By this, it becomes more likely for an
organization to obtain an additional project in the long run, if the organization joins
a consortium that applies collectively for a cooperative project. Furthermore, having
previous cooperations with other organizations signals trust and credibility to potential
partners (Granovetter, 1985; Uzzi, 1996; Mora-Valentin et al., 2004). As the monitoring
of project partners is a costly and time–consuming process, other organizations could
tend to prefer to collaborate with firms they already know. This would entail an area
of mutual trust, and is well known as a promotion for the exchange of information and
tacit knowledge (Kogut and Zander, 1992; Cavusgil et al., 2003), which is highly im-
portant for research partnerships especially in high-tech sectors (Hippel, 1988). These
presumptions are concentrated into the first and second hypotheses.
The first hypothesis states rather conservatively whether a new project grant is more
likely to be accepted because of the participation within a joint project.
H1: The participation of an organization in a joint project raises the prob-
ability of the organization receiving a new project grant.
The second hypothesis is similar to the first but goes into more detail in terms of the
quantity and quality of the relationships. It states that the position of the organization
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within the network positively affects the chance of obtaining an additional project grant.
H2: The better the position of an organization within the network, the more
likely an organization is to receive a new project grant.
High priority should be given to the organization’s ability to absorb circulating knowl-
edge flows available from external knowledge spillovers (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990).
Within a complex economy, knowledge is dispersed among different organizations (Bru-
soni et al., 2001); thus, it becomes urgent to bring different skills together. This is why
the last hypothesis concentrates on the argument that the heterogeneity of the knowl-
edge base to which an organization has access, stimulates the chance to obtain a further
project grant, since the success of R&D depends to a large extent on the recombination
of diverse and complementary capabilities (Boschma, 2005; Nooteboom, 2000).
Therefore, a diversified knowledge pool should be both an advantage for the respective
organizations and a benefit for the rest of the potential cooperation partners, since
knowledge heterogeneity is known to be a promising driver of innovation (Mowery et al.,
1998; Boschma and Frenken, 2009; Fornahl, Broekel, et al., 2011). If an organization is
surrounded in the network by partners with close cognitive proximity, organizations may
exchange too much redundant information, thus the initiation of a creative process might
be harmed. In contrast, less cognitive proximity complicates the exchange of information
(Nooteboom et al., 2007) if the knowledge of the counterparts is incompatible. Mowery
et al. (1998) found evidence for an inverted U-shaped interrelation between the likelihood
to cooperate and the cognitive proximity, so that a pair of organizations is more likely
to cooperate owing to their promising heterogeneous knowledge structure.1
Therefore, the third hypothesis states that an organization has a higher probability
of obtaining another project grant when the organization has a certain degree of hetero-
geneity within its direct neighborhood.
H3: The better the access to heterogeneous knowledge, the more likely an
organization is to receive a new project grant.
1Networks that are subsidized by the government represents only a rather small fraction of organiza-
tions’ embeddedness in knowledge networks, but it is assumed that the observed subsidized network
approximates realistically the organizations’ general knowledge environment.
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4.1. Data
The empirical analysis of the German direct-funding system employes the “Fo¨rderkat-
alog”, which is a publicly available database that contains all funded projects of the
federal government. Reporting ministries are: the Federal Ministry of Education and
Research (BMBF); the Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology (BMWi); the
Federal Ministry of Transport, Building and Urban Development (BMVBS); and the
Federal Ministry for the Environment (BMU). The database reaches back to the late
1960s and includes more than 152,000 projects until the end of 2012. Each entry reports
the name of the organization which received funding, co-funded organizations, the loca-
tion of the organization, the amount of funding, the duration of funding, the project’s
task and a classification number concerning the project’s technological affiliation. In
line with Broekel and Graf (2012), we assume an intensive knowledge exchange through
cooperative research efforts among the participants of joint projects. Organizations that
obtain a public grant accepted the requirement to give every partner unrestricted access
to the outcome of the project and fee-free usage of its know-how and intellectual prop-
erty rights. The selected entries of the database are restricted to those projects dealing
with “technology and innovations,”“research and development” and “basic research,” to
exclude irrelevant projects such as “non R&D related expenditures on education”.
4.2. Individual approach
There is no official regulation that limits the duration time or the number of projects
an organization is allowed to have in parallel or subsequently. However, there are some
informal patterns that can be identified. Therefore, the time span between the beginning
and end of each project was averaged since 1980 for each respective year (Figure IV.2(a)).
The average varies around the overall mean value of 2.7 years. The approximately
constant variance of the average indicates the absence of major structural breaks among
the years, but the idea of a constant project duration is misleading (Figure IV.2(b)).
The percentile values of p0.25 = 1.838 and p0.75 = 3.411 indicate some hidden variance
behind the mean value, thus remarkable inequalities regarding the treatment of projects
should not be ignored.
Figure IV.3(a) addresses this question by controlling for the organization’s number
of projects for several distinct years (1990, 2000, 2005, and 2012). It is normal for
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Figure IV.2.: Project durations since 1980
Source: Fo¨rderkatalog of the German federal government
an organization to obtain just a single project, but there are some organizations that
obtained two or even more subsidized projects at the same time. Furthermore, Figure
IV.3(a) indicates a growing number of subsidized projects and organizations every year.
The number of funded projects increased tremendously (4,100) between 2005 and 2012.
At the same time, the distribution of organizations that have received a grant for one,
two, three, four, or even more projects is unaffected (Figure IV.3(b)). If an organization
is funded, the probability of being funded for exactly one single project equals 70 percent.
The others are supported by more than one project, whereas approximately 10 percent
of all organizations have more than four projects in parallel. Over the years, there is a
tendency towards more projects per organization, as the share of organizations with a
single project decreases over time.
4.3. Aggregated approach
This section shifts the focal point toward an aggregated perspective of the Germany
funding system, understanding the totality of all projects as a complex and involving
system shaped by the organizations that enter, stay in, or quit the system. Organiza-
tions with a current funding represent the system’s stock of organizations. The system
grows or shrinks due to continuously entering or quitting organizations (Figure IV.4).
If an unfunded organization obtains a contribution, the organization enters the funding
system, and leaves the system again if the funding comes to an end and there is no other
ongoing project. The number of organizations that enter, quit, or stay within the system
(Table IV.1) shapes the overall structure of the funding system. If more organizations
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Figure IV.4.: Dynamics within the funding regime
Source: Fo¨rderkatalog of the German federal government
flow/years 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
+ entry 882 901 961 1,217 1,862 1,322 2,489 2,323
+ stay 3,278 3,414 3,550 3,896 4,457 5,474 5,734 7,000
- exit 973 746 765 615 656 845 1,062 1,223
= stock 4,160 4,315 4,511 5,113 6,319 6,796 8,223 9,323
Until FP6 adapted from Roediger-Schluga and Barber (2006). EURATOM pro-
jectes are excluded from the table.
Table IV.1.: Stock changes within the funding system between 2005 and 2012
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Figure IV.5.: Persistence of organizations within the funding system
are entering than leaving, the system is expanding; whereas, in the reverse case, the sys-
tem is shrinking. In recent years there was a dynamic of entering organizations (Table
IV.1). Between 2005 and 2012, the number of organizations within the system doubled
from 4,160 in 2005 to 9,323 in 2012 and the stock of organizations grew by about 5,163.
The amount of organizations staying within the system indicates a strong persistence
of once-funded organizations. In 2010, for example, 5,474 organizations stayed in the
funding system (Figure IV.5(a)), whereas approximately one third of them received
funding for more than five years. Organizations with a newly funded project are mostly
organizations which have previously received funding (Figure IV.5(b)). In 2010, 2,831
organizations obtained at least one additional project, and, of those, 61 percent (1,723)
had an earlier contribution, while the others received their first funding. Thus, if an
organization is already present within the system, the probability of obtaining additional
funding increases significantly.
5. Model
5.1. Methodology
The analysis employs a model which was initially published by Gourieroux (2000). The
same approach was applied by various other authors (Nguyen Van et al., 2004; Fryges,
2007; Aschhoff and Schmidt, 2008), whereas this paper aims to estimate the effect of an
organization’s characteristics to the dynamic of the funding system. The model approx-
imates the dynamic of the system by a series of Markov chains, where each transition–
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probability depends the characteristics of an organization. Through the application of a
maximum-likelihood estimation, it is possible to check whether network-related as well
as other determinants have an impact the actual status of an organization.
Some definitions have to be made for the model. An organization i = {1, .., N} at
time point t can have the status Yit = {0, 1}, whereas Yit = 1 describes the status in
which organization i obtains a new project grant. Correspondingly, Yit = 0 describes the
situation in which organization i remains without a newly funded project (Gourieroux,
2000; Aschhoff and Schmidt, 2008), thus the occurrence of Yit = 1 depends on how
often an organization acquires a new project over time t = {0, ..., T}. The reason to
consider only time point t is because the decision to award a project is taken only
once by the committee and not continuously over time. Four possible combinations
of transitions can be distinguished. If an organization changes its actual status, the
organization switches either from unsubsidized to subsidized (0→ 1) or from subsidized
to unsubsidized (1 → 0). If the current status remains, the organization preserves its
unsubsidized status (0 → 0) or obtains a further promotion (1 → 1). Therefore, it
is necessary to know the transition matrix Mi for each organization i, whereas each
value reflects the likelihood of an organization changing its present status into the next
state. The transition–probability of an organization from the status j at t into state j
′
at t + 1 is explained by the probability Pijj′ . Since the Markov process is independent
from its previous stages, the actual transition only depends on current time (Chiang and
Wainwright, 2005).
Mi =
[
Pi00 Pi01
Pi10 Pi11
]
(IV.1)
The rows of a transition matrix add up to 1, so Pi00 + Pi01 = 1 and Pi10 + Pi11 = 1.
Simple transformations lead to Equation IV.2.
Mi =
[
1− Pi01 Pi01
1− Pi11 Pi11
]
(IV.2)
The substitution reduces the number of unknowns within the matrixMi. The variables
Pi01 and Pi11 represent the likelihood of an organization changing its actual status from
0 → 1 and 1 → 1, respectively. Using logistic regression techniques, it is possible
to analyze whether the probabilities are determined by organizational characteristics
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(Gourieroux, 2000).
Pijj′ (t+ 1) ≡ P (Yit+1 = j
′ |Yit = j) =
exp (xit+1βjj′ )∑1
j′=0 exp (xit+1βjj′ )
(IV.3)
Therefore, it is necessary to implement the probability Pijj′ into a logit model (Stock
and Watson, 2007; Greene, 2002). The vector xit = (1, xit1 , xit2 , . . . , xitp) contains
a regression constant and several specific characteristics of the organization i. The
impact of the variables on the transition-probability Pijj′ is captured by the vector
β = (β0, β1, . . . , βp). Inserting βj0 = 0 and j
′
= 0, 1 into Equation (IV.3) leads to:
Pij1(t+ 1) =
exp (xit+1βj1)
1 + exp (xit+1βj1)
. (IV.4)
Substituting Equation (IV.4) into Pij0 = 1 − Pij1 constitutes, after several transfor-
mations:
Pij0(t+ 1) =
1
1 + exp (xit+1βj1)
. (IV.5)
Inserting Equations (IV.4) and (IV.5) into the transition matrix leads to:
Mi =

1
1+exp (xit+1β01)
exp (xit+1β01)
1+exp (xit+1β01)
1
1+exp (xit+1β11)
exp (xit+1β11)
1+exp (xit+1β11)
 (IV.6)
The vectors β11 and β01 can be estimated by the application of the maximum-
likelihood method (Gourieroux, 2000) (Equation IV.7). Each organization i can choose
one of four possible statuses between time points t and t + 1. Therefore, ni,t,t+1(jj
′
)
equals 1 for organization i if an organization changes its status between t and t+1 from
j to j
′
and 0 otherwise.
lnL =
1∑
j=0
1∑
j′=0
lnLjj′with lnLjj′ =
N∑
i=0
T∑
t=0
ni,t,t+1(jj
′
) lnPij
′
(t+ 1). (IV.7)
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Variable vectors β01 and β11 are endogenous within the log-likelihood function. Their
choice determines the values
∑1
j′=0 lnL0j′ and
∑1
j′=0 lnL1j′ . Since both depend on the
choice of β01 and β11, it is possible to divide the log-likelihood function into two indepen-
dent parts (see Equation IV.8), so that if
∑1
j′=0 lnL0j′ and
∑1
j′=0 lnL1j′ reach their indi-
vidual maximum, the log-likelihood function is maximized. By this, the model equals two
binary choice models, one estimating the influences on the transition-probability between
event I and II, and the other between event III and IV, respectively. The maximization
of the log-likelihood function is carried out by the Broyden–Fletcher–Goldfarb–Shanno
(BFGS) algorithm.
lnL =
1∑
j′=0
lnL0j′ +
1∑
j′=0
lnL1j′ (IV.8)
An alternative approach model using fixed effects was considered. However, this
method would not be capable estimating the parameter for the different states, since
such a model only includes a single dummy variable for each respective case, so that an
alternative method was applied.
5.2. Employed data
Within the empirical model, exogenous variables are used to explain the dynamic of
the funding system. The estimation employs a database containing 88,758 firms of the
manufacturing sector.2 In addition to the name and the industrial affiliation of an enter-
prise, the database includes the annual turnover, the number of employees, the founding
year, and the geographical location of the German headquarter. Due to incomplete data
it was necessary to excluded 5,966 firms from the estimation. A matching procedure
identified that 2,954 of the enterprises have obtained a project grant.3
The model includes 248,376 profiles of firms between the years 2009 and 2012, of which
244,176 belong to firms have never received a project grant (event I, 0 → 0).4 Firms
2Section C of the WZ-2008, see Destatis (2008).
3In the case of the“Fo¨rderkatalog”, the entry“Zuwendungsempfa¨nger” is used, naming the organization
which receives the project grant.
4King and Zeng, 2001 warns of possible errors within the parameters if one of the events occurs quite
seldom. Since the event of no change (0 → 0) occurs more frequently than all the other cases,
this could lead to distortions of the estimated parameters βˆ11 and βˆ01. To exclude this failure, the
models were estimated by once again applying an alternative method, using the method proposed
by King and Zeng (2001). Since the results of both estimation procedures are very close, it does
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without previous project grants were newly funded in 1,727 situations (event II, 0→ 1,
see Figure IV.6), while in 1,873 cases firms did not obtain further funding (event III,
1→ 0). A further grant was awarded in two consecutive years exactly 600 times (event
IV, 1→ 1). Using these occurrences, it is possible to calculate the event probabilities in
order to construct the transition matrix (Equation IV.9).5
MDynamik =
[
244, 176 1, 727
1, 873 600
]
=
[
0.993 0.007
0.757 0.243
]
=
[
event I event II
event III event IV
]
(IV.9)
event I
I event III
event IV
event I
funding system
Figure IV.6.: Events of the model
5.3. Network construction
The network is constructed on the basis of the project database, including all organi-
zations of the funding system, such as firms, research centers, and universities.6 The
not matter, for the interpretation of the results, if the standard model is used in the following. The
estimation algorithm of the alternative model is published by Imai et al. (2008) and included in the
Zelig package for the statistical software package R.
5Alternatively, a model specification was considered, in which not only the receipt of a new funding
project causes a status change. Within the alternative model, a firm also stays within the funded
status (event IV ) if the duration of the project funding was granted for more than one year, so that
event III only occurs when all projects of a company have expired. Since the results of the alternative
model neither reject nor support the hypotheses, the estimated model results are omitted within the
scope of this paper. The results differ, because within the alternative model the network positions
of the most firms start to degenerate on the first day after of the project’s initiation. While most
firms obtain a project grant for a single time and do not change their neighbors in the subsequent
years, the overall network keeps on evolving, so that older network structures become less important
and migrate to the periphery of the network.
6In order to distinguish collaborations between companies and departments of the Fraunhofer Society,
the Leibniz Association, the Helmholtz Association or Max Planck Society, the departments are
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networkofyeartincludesnewlyfundedprojectsaswelascontinuedprojectsfrom
previousyears.Theinterrelationshipsofthecooperativeprojectsconstitutetheoveral
network.Sincethedatabaseincludesnoinformationaboutthedegreeofcooperation
amongtheorganizations,itisassumedthattheintensityoftherelationsdiminishes
byagrowingnumberofparticipantswithinthesameproject.Themoreorganizations
participate,thelesslikelyitisthatalpartnerswilcooperateintensively(Newman,
2001),sothattheintensityofarelationshipcanbeapproximatedbythenumberofal
possiblerelationshipsamongthepartnersofaconsortium(EquationIV.10).
wik=
(n
k
)−1
=
( n!
2!(n−2)!
)−1
= 1n∗(n−1)∗2 (IV.10)
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
organizations 4,160 4,315 4,511 5,113 6,319 6,796 8,223 9,323
edges 14,448 16,285 17,915 21,492 26,220 28,891 30,799 32,505
density 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
components 1,162 1,076 1,105 1,070 1,432 1,547 2,785 3,710
greatestcomponent
organizations 2,863 3,132 3,314 3,939 4,748 5,133 5,315 5,475
share 69% 73% 73% 77% 75% 76% 65% 59%
avgeragedistance 3.07 3.04 2.98 2.99 3.01 2.98 2.97 2.96
isolates 1,092 1,014 1,043 1,009 1,343 1,462 2,690 3,619
degreecentralization 0.24 0.26 0.28 0.29 0.28 0.29 0.25 0.23
betweennesscentralization 0.21 0.23 0.24 0.26 0.24 0.25 0.18 0.15
avaragedegree 6.9 7.5 7.9 8.4 8.3 8.5 7.5 7.0
transitivity 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09
diameter 4 4 5 4 4 4 4 5
max.intensity 8.8 13.3 9.9 10.3 10.5 11.2 9.9 10.3
TableIV.2.:Organizationalcolaborationwithinthenetworks
Thestructuralcharacteristicsdiferovertime(TableIV.2).Asalreadyobservedfor
theempiricalbackground,thenumberoforganizationshasrisenbetween2005and
2012.Thesameappliesforthenumberofcooperativeties,whichreachesitsmaximum
value(32,505)in2012. Asigniicantstructuralbreakoccursaround2008,whenthe
federalgovernmentdecidedtocounteracttheeconomiccrisis.Theshareofthenetwork’s
diferentiatedduetotheirgeographicallocation. Furtherproblemscouldariseiforganizations
changetheirnames.Tominimizethesedistortions,somecorrectionswithinthedatabaseweremade
andthemodelwaslimitedtoareasonabletimehorizon.
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greatest component reaches its highest value in 2008 (77 percent) and its lowest value
in 2012 (59 percent). This observation is unexpected as it indicates that a large share of
the allocated projects between 2008 and 2012 did not contribute to the connectivity of
the entire network. This point of view is supported by the growing number of isolated
organizations during that phase, and the same is reflected by the average number of
partners of an organization. In 2012, an organization has an average degree of 7.0
compared to 8.5 in 2010.
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5.4. Variables
Hypotheses variables
event event
I II III IV
0 → 0 0 → 1 t-test 1 → 0 1 → 1 t-test
log aget 3.46 3.33 *** 3.34 3.45 *
log employeest 3.22 4.62 *** 4.71 6.04 ***
log turnovert 1.40 2.93 *** 3.04 4.56 ***
small enterprisebool t 0.69 0.35 *** 0.32 0.18 ***
eastt 0.15 0.23 *** 0.24 0.18 **
projectbool t 0.01 0.36 *** 1.00 1.00 ***
projectcount t 0.02 0.66 *** 1.83 7.57 ***
publicationbool t 0.02 0.14 *** 0.16 0.35 ***
publicationcount t 0.01 0.15 *** 0.19 0.74 ***
cooperationbool t 0.01 0.34 *** 0.93 0.98 ***
cooperationcount t 0.02 0.60 *** 1.65 6.62 ***
degreeavg t 0.08 2.95 *** 4.19 21.60 ***
betweennessavg 8.91 783.95 *** 842.76 16,916.69 ***
eigenvectoravg t 0.00 0.01 *** 0.01 0.05 ***
knowledge heterogeneityt 0.01 0.19 *** 0.55 0.55
food industrybool t 0.07 0.02 *** 0.02 0.01 **
textile industrybool t 0.05 0.02 *** 0.02 0.01 **
wood industrybool t 0.15 0.04 *** 0.04 0.01 ***
chemical industrybool t 0.20 0.21 0.23 0.20
metal industrybool t 0.29 0.21 *** 0.21 0.15 ***
machinery industrybool t 0.43 0.67 *** 0.67 0.79 ***
othersbool t 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.09
number of obervations 244,248 1,693 1,846 595
Significances of a t-Test compairing the average values of the events I & II and of
the events III & IV: *** 0.1%, ** 1%, * 5%, . 10%
Table IV.3.: Variable statistics
This section describes all explanatory variables that are relevant in evaluating whether
the determinants affect the allocation process. Therefore, Table IV.3 provides an insight
into the influence of the explanatory variables. It focuses on the different transition-
possibilities and checks whether the average values of the variables differs regarding the
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current transition stage of a firm. The comparison between the variables is carried out
by a t-test.
For the confirmation of hypothesis H1 , two variables cooperationbool t and cooperat-
ioncount t were constructed, evaluating whether the participation of an enterprise within a
joint project raises the probability of obtaining a further project grant. The variable co-
operationbool t equals 1 in time t for those firms, which have participated in a cooperative
project within the preceding three years, and 0 otherwise. This indicates whether a
firm has participated in a prior joint project or not. The average value of 0.34 implies
that 34 percent of all firms that enter the funding system (event II ) have previously
participated in a joint project. In contrast, only 1 percent of all enterprises remaining
outside the funding system (event I ) have participated in a cooperative project. Firms
that obtain a further funding award (event IV ) have a higher average value compared
to those that do not obtain additional funding (event III ). However, the differences
regarding the number of joint projects (cooperationcount t) are even more obvious. Firms
that receive additional funding (event IV ) have on average 6.62 funded projects within
the preceding three years, which lies four times above the average of those firms which
do not obtain a further project grant (event III ). As a consequence, it is assumed that
previous experiences in cooperative projects stimulate the chance of an enterprise of
obtaining an additional project grant.
Hypothesis H2 predicts that the centrality of a firm within the funding network has
a positive impact on the likelihood of obtaining a further project grant. To analyze
the extent to which the dynamic of the system is influenced by the centrality of a firm,
three different concepts of centrality come into question: (1) the degree centrality, (2)
the betweenness centrality and (3) the eigenvector centrality.
Firstly, the degree centrality (degreeavg t) informs about a firm’s number of intercon-
nections with other organizations (Wasserman and Faust, 1994; Jackson, 2008). The
more neighbors, the more opportunities arise for a firm to initiate further collaborations
with these partners, due to preexisting experiences and trust. Since the partners usually
maintain their relations on an informal basis (Ter Wal, 2013; Fleming et al., 2007), it
makes sense to average the degree centrality of a firm for several years, of which it is
necessary to exclude the current year t. Otherwise the regression might possibly run
into causality problems, since the effect of a change cannot explain the change itself.
For this purpose, only the past three years are considered, in order to measure the cen-
trality indicators for the model. Secondly, the betweenness centrality (betweennessavg t)
measures how often a firm is located on the shortest paths of all indirectly connected
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organizations. If the betweenness centrality is high, the company has a function for
the network that is similar to the role of a broker, who ensures an efficient transfer of
information. The brokerage is an information–advantage for these firms (Gould and Fer-
nandez, 1989), since they are better informed about, for example, new funding offerings,
technologies, or cooperation opportunities. The betweenness centrality is measured as
proposed by Freeman (1978), who calculated the centrality indicator on the basis of a
weighted funding network. It is assumed that a high betweenness centrality increases the
probability of a company receiving an additional project grant. Finally, the eigenvector
centrality is used to indicate the importance of a company. The eigenvector centrality
measures the importance of a company, based upon the importance of its neighbors and
the weighted network. This entails a self-referential problem which can be solved due to
the calculation of the network’s eigenvector (Jackson, 2008; Bonacich, 1987). Therefore,
the eigenvector centrality indicates the interconnectedness of an organization within the
overall network, which leads to the assumption that a high eigenvector centrality entails
a higher chance of obtaining a further project grant. It is worth mentioning that all the
average values of the variables used to explain hypothesis H3 support the expectation.
Hypothesis H3 assumes that the probability of receiving an additional project grant
depends on the diversity of knowledge within the neighborhood of a company. Therefore,
the heterogeneity of the external knowledge base is measured by the variable knowledge
heterogeneityt, which ranges between 0 and 1, indicating whether the external knowledge
base of a company is completely divergent or congruent to the organization’s knowledge
base. Since a certain degree of heterogeneity is needed to stimulate the gain from new
knowledge, it is expected that both extremes of the variable point to the least produc-
tive situations, as the genesis of innovations requires complementary capabilities. In
accordance with Nooteboom (2007) and Mowery (1998), it is assumed that the relation
between the heterogeneity and probability of obtaining a project grant follows an in-
verted U-shape, so the optimal value lies somewhere between 0 and 1. Because of this, it
is necessary to implement an additional squared term of the variable to the model. The
external knowledge base of a company can be explained as the sum of the weighted (w)
cognitive proximities among the firm and all itsK neighbors (see Equation (IV.11)). The
cognitive proximity is calculated by the cosine similarity of two vectors (vi, vk), with the
vectors containing the capabilities of organization i and neighbor k, respectively. Again,
the values of the current year are excluded due to the possibility of causality problems.
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knowledge heterogeneityit =
∑K
k=1 cos-sim ikt−1 ∗ wikt−1∑K
k=1wikt−1
(IV.11)
with cos-sim ikt =
vit ∗ vkt
‖vit‖ ‖vkt‖
It is assumed that the technological knowledge of a company is manifested through
the firm’s prior experiences in R&D, thus the capability vector v of a company can
be described as the number of R&D projects in different technological fields (Equation
(IV.12)). Since each funded project is assigned to a certain category of 24 technological
fields (Broekel and Graf, 2012), it is possible to construct the vector by adding up the
number of previous projects. Each year, 20 percent of the capabilities of a company are
subtracted, as it is assumed that the firm loses some of its capabilities over time due,
for example, to organizational oblivion or labor mobility.
vit = pit + vit−1 ∗ 0.8 (IV.12)
Other variables
It is assumed that the size of a firm matters, due, for example, to economies of scale,
the costs or the “picking-the-winner” strategy (Blanes and Busom, 2004; Aschhoff, 2009;
Tanayama, 2009; Banno` and Sgobbi, 2010). Fixed costs diminish with increasing size,
thus potential sunk costs play a tangential role for larger firms. If a smaller firm cannot
afford the costs of an unsuccessful application, the application is canceled due to the lim-
ited amount of financial resources. Therefore, the model includes two different variables
indicating the size of an enterprise: the number of employees (log employeest) as well as
the annual turnover (log turnovert). It is expected that the influence of both variables
is not linear, but degressive, so that the original value of the variables is logarithmized.
To observe as many firms as possible, some values were interpolated to fill the gaps of
missing data. An additional variable indicates whether the company is an SME, since
several funding programs are especially designed for enterprises with less than 250 em-
ployees and a turnover below 50 million euros per year (EU, 2006). The variable small
enterprisebool t equals 1 if a firm is a SME. Otherwise, the value of the variable equals 0.
Surprisingly, Table IV.3 gives an unexpected outlook, as it predicts a lower probability
of an SME to obtain a new project grant, which is contrary to theory, but matches the
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findings of Tanayama (2009).
Another determinant that plays a role is the firm’s age. Similar to smaller companies,
younger firms usually have scarce resources and limited access to the financial market
(Tanayama, 2007; Aschhoff, 2009; Banno` and Sgobbi, 2010). This entails a disadvantage,
which should be compensated by the governmental innovation policy. It is assumed
that each additional year contributes less to the probability of obtaining a new project
grant, thus variable is logarithmized (log aget). The averages do not clearly support this
expectation, since both t-tests predict contrary impacts of the variable.
As mentioned earlier, it is possible for enterprises to gain experience from previous
project participations (Tanayama, 2007; Aschhoff and Schmidt, 2008; Banno` and Sgobbi,
2010). Due to the routine of practicing, further applications become easier and the prob-
ability of receiving a project grant increases. To approximate the firm’s learning curve,
two variables are added to the model. The first variable projectbool t explains whether
a company has obtained a project within the preceding three years. The same applies
for the second variable projectcount t, with the difference being that the variable counts
the number of projects. For both variables, Table IV.3 indicates a positive influence of
former experiences.
Prior R&D activities are advantageous for a company (Aschhoff and Schmidt, 2008;
Tanayama, 2007), since the investment of equity sends a positive signal to the govern-
ment and partners, which implies that the company believes in its own success. Because
the database does not contain any information about internal R&D investments, it is
necessary to approximate this information. Therefore, R&D expenditures are measured
by the number of scientific publications. This assumes that a firm which invests in R&D
is willing to informs sooner or later, the public about the outcome of the research, as
a kind of marketing. Two variables were constructed on the basis of the “Web of Sci-
ence”publication database. The variable publicationbool t informs whether a company has
published a scientific publication since 19907, whereas the variable log publicationcount t
counts the number of publications during that period. It is assumed that each additional
publication contributes less, thus the number of publications was logarithmized. In ac-
cordance with the averages of the variables in Table IV.3, it is expected that having one
or more publications positively affects the probability of receiving a new project grant.
Moreover, the sectoral affiliation of an enterprise should increase the chance of obtain-
ing project funding, since some branches are more R&D affiliated than others (Broekel
7The relatively long time period was chosen since the decision to invest is medium- and long-term
oriented rather than short-term.
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and Graf, 2012), and some subsidization programs were designed to support a specific
industry (Eickelpasch and Fritsch, 2005). Because of this, a set of variables captures the
industry effect, with each variable indicating whether a company belongs to a sector.
This is possible due to the German classification scheme of economic activities. Seven
variables were included to indicate whether a firm belongs to the food, textile, wood,
chemical, machinery industry, or another category.
The intensity of public subsidies differs among Germany’s regions (Fornahl and Um-
lauf, 2014), especially since funding programs are sometimes intended for the develop-
ment of regions (Eickelpasch and Fritsch, 2005). Germany’s reunification, for example,
induced several promotion programs for the eastern states, thus it is expected that the
location of a firm’s headquarters in one of the new states of Germany increases the prob-
ability of the company obtaining a project grant. To capture this effect, the variable
eastbool t equals 1 if the company’s headquarters lie in the eastern states, or 0 otherwise.
The condition index (CI) was calculated to analyze whether the estimation process
could be affected by problems of collinearity (Belsey et al., 1980; Greene, 2002). The
index rejects the possibility of collinearity within the model, since the calculated CI
(29.79) does not exceed the conservative upper bound of 30.
6. Results
For the verification of the hypotheses, three different models were estimated. During
the estimation, no variables were eliminated from the models, so that it is possible to
observe which variables lose their explanatory power due to the inclusion of additional
variables.
The formulated hypotheses aim to prove the importance of network-related determi-
nants for the dynamic within the funding system. The variables cooperationbool t and
cooperationcount t were included in order to check hypothesis H1, which argues that the
participation of a firm in a cooperative project raises the probability of the firm obtain-
ing a further project grant. Interestingly, both variables remain insignificant within the
first model, but, even more surprisingly, the variable cooperationcount t was found to be
significantly negative for a new project grant (event II) in the second and third models.
This is contradictory to hypothesis H1, since the reverse seems to be true. A possible
explanation for this outcome refers to a trend that dates back to the 1990s. The year
1999 was the first year in which the number of joint projects exceeded the number of
funded single projects (Figure IV.7). This trend continued until 2012, when the num-
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Figure IV.7.: Comparison between model and overall projects per year
Source: Fo¨rderkatalog of the German federal government
ber of joint projects exceeds the number of single ones by 38.3%. However, this overall
ratio is low compared to the data used for the model, as the number of funded joint
projects exceeds the number of single projects in 2012 by approximately 681% (Figure
IV.7). Since the system change in 1999, receiving a single project has become something
exclusive. Because of this, the second and third models are telling the truth – as they
indicate a higher probability of a firm with less cooperative projects but therefore more
single project grants – since the difference between the estimated variables projectcount t
and cooperationcount t indicates still a positive probability to obtain a funding.
The second hypothesis, H2 , goes into more detail, asking whether the centrality of
an enterprise increases the likelihood of receiving a new project grant. The centrality
of a company was operationalized through the degree, the betweenness and the eigen-
vector centrality. The expectations are basically confirmed, since the degree and the
eigenvector centrality are significantly positive in the second model. Interestingly, the
betweenness centrality (betweennessavg t) does not reach any significance, which leads to
the result that the ownership of a broker position neither stimulates nor diminishes the
chance of a company obtaining a project grant. This could be an indication that firms
prefer to communicate at arm’s length rather than at long distances. In contrast, the
degree centrality (degreeavg t) is positive and highly significant for both events. The more
connected a firm is to other organizations the higher the likelihood of the firm to obtain
a new project grant. The more contacts a firm has, the more potential partners the firm
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has gained for further cooperation. Interestingly, the degree parameter for the event II
is twice as high as same parameter for the event IV, which indicates that additional
effects play a role if a firm wants to obtain a further project grant. The eigenvector
centrality seems to fit into this explanatory gap, since the variable eigenvectoravg t be-
haves contrarily to the degree centrality. Both estimated parameters are positive and
significant within the second model, but the explanatory power and the impact of the
variable eigenvectoravg t is higher in the case of the event VI and thus more relevant in
obtaining an additional project grant. To receive an additional project grant (event VI )
it seems to be more relevant to whom a firm is connected, whilst it is more important
to have a lot of connections if a company seeks for a project grant without having on-
going funding (event II ). Therefore, the overall network position of a company is the
second-most important network determinant, which shapes the dynamic of the funding
system.
Hypotheses H3 assumes that a specific mixture of heterogeneity within the neighbor-
hood of an enterprise has a positive impact on the likelihood of obtaining a new project
grant. In contrast to the previous hypothesis, which concentrates on the centrality of
a firm, this hypothesis investigates for a balance of knowledge within the neighborhood
of a firm. To estimate this effect, the variables knowledge heterogeneityt and knowledge
heterogeneitysquare t were added to the third model. The estimated parameters support
hypothesis H3 . It is most satisfying that the value of the first variable is positive and
the squared variable is negative, which supports the parabolic relationship between the
knowledge heterogeneity and the probability of a new project grant. This shows that
those firms which have access to a diverse knowledge base in their direct neighborhood
are more likely to acquire a new project grant. For a closer look Figure IV.8 presents the
estimated curves for the inverted U-shaped relationships. Both curves reach their max-
imum close to 0.4. If the similarity of the knowledge within the neighborhood reaches
an index value of 0.8, the effect becomes negative, thus the overall likelihood obtaining
a new project grant deceases.
The remaining variables calibrate the model. All of them are in line with the theory
or previous. As the estimation results for the other variables do not differ among the
models, the variables will be discussed on the basis of the first model.
The constant is the baseline probability of a firm obtaining a project grant. Irrespec-
tive of the other variables, it depends on the present status of a firm whether the chance
of a company receiving a new project grant is 0.2% or 4.7%. Therefore, it seems to be
the normal case that a company does not receive subsidization. Moreover, the estima-
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Figure IV.8.: Effect of knowledge heterogeneity
tion proved a preference for younger companies (log aget), since older firms are less likely
to get a further project grant. The size of a company is represented within the model
by the number of employees (log employeest) and the annual turnover (log turnovert).
The assumption that size positively affects the probability of a company obtaining a
new project grant is supported. Only in cases of a further project grant, the variable log
turnovert was found to be insignificant. Due to their size, larger firms are less affected by
the problem of fixed costs or other risks. The variable for SMEs (small enterprisebool t)
is insignificant. Not even special programs for SMEs seem to change their probability of
obtaining a project grant.
It was assumed that the location of the firm’s headquarters within the eastern states
of Germany has a positive impact. Therefore, the variable eastbool t was constructed to
capture whether the location of the headquarters has an impact or not. The expectation
is validated for the event II, since the estimated parameter is positive and strongly
significant.
There can be no doubt that previous project experience stimulates the probability of
a firm obtaining a new project grant. Both variables projectbool t and projectcount t were
found to be positive and highly significant. The projectbool t variable was excluded from
the estimation process for the event IV, since the variable is identical to the regression
constant. The findings proved that companies can benefit from their former experience,
which entails an information advantage for those firm.
The extent of former R&D investments was approximated by the scientific engage-
ment of a firm within the academic discussion. Two variables, publicationbool t and
publicationcount t, were included to capture this effect. Interestingly, only the variable
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publicationbool t has a positive effect for the case of new funding. All the other cases re-
main insignificant. Maybe these variables are outperformed by the variable for previous
project experiences, since both indicators refer to experiences in R&D investments.
Interestingly, most of the sectoral parameters are negativly significant for those com-
panies that receive a new project without having a previous one. This can be observed
for the food, textile, wood, and metal industries. Only firms within the machinery in-
dustry, and those who fall within the “others” category, have a higher chance of receiving
a new project. For the case of an additional project (event IV ), only the parameter of
the machinery industry remains significant.
unsubsidized → subsidized subsidized → newly subsidized
variable parameter s.d. t-value sign. parameter s.d. t-value sign.
constant -6.12 0.17 -35.78 *** -3.10 0.45 -6.89 ***
log aget -0.28 0.03 -9.50 *** -0.11 0.07 -1.68 .
log employeest 0.35 0.04 8.84 *** 0.02 0.08 0.31
log turnovert 0.11 0.03 3.56 *** 0.14 0.06 2.11 *
small enterprisebool t -0.01 0.08 -0.07 0.19 0.18 1.10
eastt 0.43 0.07 6.32 *** -0.11 0.16 -0.71
projectbool t 2.50 0.26 9.80 ***
projectcount t 0.40 0.15 2.59 ** 0.29 0.07 4.07 ***
publicationbool t 0.76 0.11 7.19 *** 0.26 0.17 1.54
log publicationcount t -0.01 0.06 -0.24 0.05 0.08 0.62
cooperationbool t -0.27 0.26 -1.01 0.14 0.32 0.45
cooperationcount t -0.07 0.16 -0.43 0.11 0.08 1.43
food industrybool t -1.06 0.19 -5.47 *** -0.62 0.65 -0.96
textile industrybool t -0.52 0.18 -2.80 ** -0.24 0.55 -0.44
wood industrybool t -0.75 0.13 -5.79 *** -0.61 0.45 -1.37
chemical industrybool t 0.07 0.07 1.04 0.00 0.16 0.01
metal industrybool t -0.26 0.06 -4.09 *** -0.07 0.15 -0.48
machinery industrybool t 0.53 0.07 7.92 *** 0.51 0.16 3.24 **
othersbool t 0.32 0.08 3.79 *** 0.20 0.19 1.06
log-likelihood -7937.0 -1046.9
AIC 15915.9 2129.7
Significances of the parameter: *** 0.1%, ** 1%, * 5%, . 10%.
Table IV.4.: Estimation results model 1
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unsubsidized → subsidized subsidized → newly subsidized
variable parameter s.d. t-value sign. parameter s.d. t-value sign.
constant -6.05 0.17 -35.28 *** -2.92 0.45 -6.44 ***
log aget -0.28 0.03 -9.51 *** -0.12 0.07 -1.81 .
log employeest 0.33 0.04 8.48 *** -0.01 0.08 -0.07
log turnovert 0.12 0.03 3.59 *** 0.13 0.06 2.02 *
small enterprisebool t -0.02 0.08 -0.30 0.13 0.18 0.73
eastt 0.43 0.07 6.27 *** -0.15 0.16 -0.93
projectbool t 2.37 0.25 9.30 ***
projectcount t 0.40 0.15 2.63 ** 0.29 0.07 4.16 ***
publicationbool t 0.71 0.11 6.62 *** 0.21 0.17 1.22
log publicationcount t -0.01 0.06 -0.16 0.09 0.08 1.08
cooperationbool t -0.19 0.27 -0.71 0.24 0.32 0.77
cooperationcount t -0.38 0.17 -2.26 * -0.06 0.08 -0.78
degreeavg t 0.08 0.01 6.74 *** 0.04 0.01 3.70 ***
betweennessavg -5.1E-07 9.5E-06 -0.05 3.7E-06 4.6E-06 0.79
eigenvectoravg t 2.76 1.63 1.70 . 4.00 1.47 2.72 **
food industrybool t -1.05 0.19 -5.39 *** -0.50 0.65 -0.76
textile industrybool t -0.52 0.19 -2.79 ** -0.29 0.57 -0.52
wood industrybool t -0.75 0.13 -5.78 *** -0.65 0.46 -1.42
chemical industrybool t 0.09 0.07 1.22 0.04 0.16 0.27
metal industrybool t -0.27 0.06 -4.13 *** -0.10 0.15 -0.63
machinery industrybool t 0.51 0.07 7.60 *** 0.48 0.16 3.01 **
othersbool t 0.31 0.08 3.69 *** 0.14 0.20 0.71
log-likelihood -7908.6 -1033.1
AIC 15861.21 2108.3
Significances of the parameter: *** 0.1%, ** 1%, * 5%, . 10%.
Table IV.5.: Estimation results model 2
unsubsidized → subsidized subsidized → newly subsidized
variable parameter s.d. t-value sign. parameter s.d. t-value sign.
constant -6.04 0.17 -35.23 *** -2.84 0.46 -6.22 ***
log aget -0.29 0.03 -9.58 *** -0.12 0.07 -1.82 .
log employeest 0.33 0.04 8.45 *** -0.01 0.08 -0.11
log turnovert 0.12 0.03 3.65 *** 0.13 0.07 1.96 *
small enterprisebool t -0.03 0.08 -0.32 0.11 0.18 0.62
eastt 0.44 0.07 6.39 *** -0.13 0.16 -0.82
projectbool t 2.38 0.26 9.33 ***
projectcount t 0.41 0.15 2.65 ** 0.28 0.07 4.00 ***
publicationbool t 0.71 0.11 6.54 *** 0.19 0.17 1.12
log publicationcount t -0.03 0.06 -0.45 0.08 0.08 0.96
cooperationbool t -0.45 0.32 -1.41 0.10 0.39 0.26
cooperationcount t -0.36 0.17 -2.11 * -0.06 0.08 -0.72
degreeavg t 0.07 0.01 6.05 *** 0.04 0.01 3.38 ***
betweennessavg 4.8E-07 9.6E-06 0.05 3.4E-06 4.6E-06 0.73
eigenvectoravg t -0.09 0.11 -0.80 3.48 1.45 2.41 *
knowledge heterogeneityt 3.22 0.88 3.67 *** 2.34 1.02 2.29 *
knowledge heterogeneitysquared t -4.04 0.88 -4.60 *** -3.14 0.99 -3.17 **
food industrybool t -1.05 0.20 -5.36 *** -0.45 0.66 -0.68
textile industrybool t -0.51 0.19 -2.76 ** -0.27 0.57 -0.48
wood industrybool t -0.75 0.13 -5.78 *** -0.63 0.46 -1.36
chemical industrybool t 0.08 0.07 1.12 -0.02 0.16 -0.14
metal industrybool t -0.26 0.06 -4.03 *** -0.08 0.15 -0.50
machinery industrybool t 0.51 0.07 7.58 *** 0.46 0.16 2.82 **
othersbool t 0.30 0.09 3.53 *** 0.12 0.20 0.63
log-likelihood -7893.6 -1024.1
AIC 15835.3 2094.1
Significances of the parameter: *** 0.1%, ** 1%, * 5%, . 10%.
Table IV.6.: Estimation results model 3
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unsubsidized → subsidized subsidized → newly subsidized
variable parameter s.d. t-value sign. parameter s.d. t-value sign.
constant -6.11 0.17 -35.75 *** -3.03 0.45 -6.78 ***
log aget -0.28 0.03 -9.50 *** -0.11 0.06 -1.69 .
log employeest 0.35 0.04 8.82 *** 0.02 0.08 0.28
log turnovert 0.11 0.03 3.57 *** 0.14 0.06 2.12 *
small enterprisebool t -0.01 0.08 -0.08 0.19 0.18 1.09
eastt 0.43 0.07 6.34 *** -0.10 0.15 -0.68
projectbool t 2.51 0.26 9.83 ***
projectcount t 0.40 0.15 2.58 ** 0.28 0.07 3.92 ***
publicationbool t 0.76 0.11 7.20 *** 0.26 0.17 1.57
publicationcount t -0.01 0.06 -0.22 0.05 0.08 0.62
cooperationbool t -0.27 0.26 -1.04 0.10 0.31 0.33
cooperationcount t -0.07 0.16 -0.43 0.12 0.08 1.54
food industrybool t -1.05 0.19 -5.39 *** -0.47 0.64 -0.73
textile industrybool t -5.0E-01 1.8E-01 -2.72 ** -1.4E-01 5.5E-01 -0.25
wood industrybool t -0.75 0.13 -5.74 *** -0.54 0.45 -1.21
chemical industrybool t 0.08 0.07 1.06 0.00 0.16 0.03
metal industrybool t -0.26 0.06 -4.07 *** -0.07 0.15 -0.46
machinery industrybool t 0.53 0.07 7.91 *** 0.50 0.16 3.21 **
othersbool t 0.32 0.08 3.81 *** 0.21 0.19 1.10
log-likelihood -7.937,05 -1.046,85
AIC 15.912,09 2.129,70
Significances of the parameter: *** 0.1%, ** 1%, * 5%, . 10%.
Table IV.7.: Estimation results model 1 (rare events)
unsubsidized → subsidized subsidized → newly subsidized
variable parameter s.d. t-value sign. parameter s.d. t-value sign.
constant -6.04 0.17 -35.24 *** -2.85 0.45 -6.34 ***
log aget -0.28 0.03 -9.51 *** -0.12 0.07 -1.81 .
log employeest 0.33 0.04 8.46 *** -0.01 0.08 -0.08
log turnovert 0.12 0.03 3.60 *** 0.13 0.06 2.02 *
small enterprisebool t -0.03 0.08 -0.32 0.13 0.18 0.72
eastt 0.43 0.07 6.28 *** -0.14 0.16 -0.89
projectbool t 2.38 0.25 9.34 ***
projectcount t 0.40 0.15 2.61 ** 0.28 0.07 4.01 ***
publicationbool t 0.72 0.11 6.62 *** 0.21 0.17 1.26
publicationcount t -0.01 0.06 -0.14 0.09 0.08 1.07
cooperationbool t -0.19 0.27 -0.73 0.21 0.31 0.66
cooperationcount t -0.38 0.17 -2.26 * -0.06 0.08 -0.67
degreeavg t 0.08 0.01 6.70 *** 0.04 0.01 3.73 ***
betweennessavg -1.6E-07 9.5E-06 -0.02 2.8E-06 4.6E-06 0.61
eigenvectoravg t 2.75 1.63 1.69 . 3.89 1.46 2.67 **
food industrybool t -1.04 0.19 -5.31 *** -0.35 0.64 -0.54
textile industrybool t -0.50 0.19 -2.70 ** -0.19 0.56 -0.34
wood industrybool t -0.74 0.13 -5.74 *** -0.57 0.46 -1.26
chemical industrybool t 0.09 0.07 1.23 0.04 0.16 0.28
metal industrybool t -0.27 0.06 -4.12 *** -0.09 0.15 -0.61
machinery industrybool t 0.51 0.07 7.59 *** 0.48 0.16 2.98 **
othersbool t 0.32 0.08 3.71 *** 0.14 0.19 0.75
log-likelihood -7.908,607 -1.033,137
AIC 15.861,21 2.108,3
Significances of the parameter: *** 0.1%, ** 1%, * 5%, . 10%.
Table IV.8.: Estimation results model 2 (rare events)
108
7. Conclusion
unsubsidized → subsidized subsidized → newly subsidized
variable parameter s.d. t-value sign. parameter s.d. t-value sign.
log aget -0.29 0.03 -9.58 *** -0.12 0.07 -1.83 .
log employeest 0.33 0.04 8.44 *** -0.01 0.08 -0.12
log turnovert 0.12 0.03 3.64 *** 0.13 0.06 1.96 *
small enterprisebool t -0.03 0.08 -0.34 0.11 0.18 0.61
eastt 0.43 0.07 6.34 *** -0.12 0.16 -0.79
projectbool t 2.38 0.26 9.33 ***
projectcount t 0.41 0.15 2.68 ** 0.27 0.07 3.84 ***
publicationbool t 0.70 0.11 6.50 *** 0.20 0.17 1.17
publicationcount t -0.02 0.06 -0.38 0.07 0.08 0.95
cooperationbool t -0.45 0.32 -1.39 0.08 0.39 0.22
cooperationcount t -0.38 0.17 -2.26 * -0.05 0.08 -0.61
degreeavg t 0.07 0.01 5.92 *** 0.04 0.01 3.41 ***
betweennessavg 1.9E-06 9.6E-06 0.20 2.5E-06 4.6E-06 0.55
eigenvectoravg t 1.90 1.59 1.19 3.37 1.43 2.35 *
knowledge heterogeneityt 2.89 0.80 3.60 *** 2.25 1.01 2.22 *
knowledge heterogeneitysquared t -3.68 0.80 -4.58 *** -3.05 0.98 -3.10 **
food industrybool t -1.03 0.20 -5.28 *** -0.30 0.65 -0.46
textile industrybool t -0.50 0.19 -2.68 ** -0.17 0.57 -0.30
wood industrybool t -0.75 0.13 -5.75 *** -0.55 0.45 -1.20
chemical industrybool t 0.08 0.07 1.11 -0.02 0.16 -0.13
metal industrybool t -0.26 0.06 -3.99 *** -0.07 0.15 -0.48
machinery industrybool t 0.51 0.07 7.54 *** 0.45 0.16 2.79 **
othersbool t 0.30 0.09 3.56 *** 0.13 0.20 0.66
log-likelihood -7,893.23 -1,024.06
AIC 15,830.0 2,096.1
Significances of the parameter: *** 0.1%, ** 1%, * 5%, . 10%.
Table IV.9.: Estimation results model 3 (rare events)
7. Conclusion
The aim of the paper was to analyze whether the dynamic of the German funding
system is influenced by network-related structural patterns. The preceding theoretical
and empirical investigation has shown that the allocation process shapes the dynamic of
the system and is more than just a stochastic process, since some organizations seem to
remain permanently within the funding system, while others are not. Some determinants
were previously identified by other authors, but, surprisingly, none of them have taken
network effects into account, which appears even more dubious since joint projects have
become a popular policy instrument in Germany and the rest of the world. To analyze
this, three theoretically motivated hypotheses were presented, aiming to explore the
relatedness of a firm’s embeddedness within the subsidy network and its probability of
obtaining further funding. Using the empirical model of Markov chains, it was possible
to distinguish between firms receiving a funding without having a previous one and
companies with subsequent funding. The basic sample includes 88,758 firms from the
manufacturing sector between 2009 and 2012.
The first hypothesis that the participation of an enterprise in a joint project raises
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the probability obtaining a new project grant was rejected. This was surprising and
counterintuitive, but explainable due to the large amount of single projects for a rela-
tively exclusive group of firms. The government has to be aware of this effect, which
results from current R&D policy, since this indicates the privilege of a small group. The
hypothesis that the centrality of a firm stimulates the chance of a new project grant was
broadly supported. Three measures were employed to test the most important centrality
measures of networks. The degree was found to be the most important one, indicating
a high significance of preexisting information channels and trustworthy relations with
other organizations for securing new funding opportunities. No other network effect was
similarly significant, but the variable loses some of its explanatory power if a firm ob-
tains additional funding. This gap was closed by the eigenvector centrality, so that both
centrality parameters seem to complement one another. This entails that the obtaining
of an additional project grant requires a central position within the overall network,
whereas a firm without a prior funded project needs to have a high degree centrality.
Surprisingly, brokers do not own a privileged position within the funding system,
since the parameters of the betweenness centrality were insignificant. Firms seem to
prefer to seek partners within their direct neighborhood, thus bridging links are less
necessary for the communication patterns within the funding system. Overall, it seems
necessary to keep a useful scope of centrality on the one hand, and enough openness for
new competitors within the funding system on the other, since the high impact of the
network effects signals a tendency of the funding regime to reproduce itself.
Finally, a diverse external knowledge base is significant for a firm to obtain a new
funding project. Since this finding was important for both situations, for a new as well
as for an ongoing project grant, all involved stakeholders in the allocation process seem
to acknowledge the high importance of a certain degree of heterogeneous capabilities
within an R&D project.
Further research questions arise, due to the limitation of this paper, in that only suc-
cessful project applications of firms have been taken into account. To conclude, whether
the funding regime is systematically reproducing itself or not, it is necessary to include
the rejected project proposals within the analysis. Without these observations there can
be no final certainty as to whether the patterns evolve because of the strong network
effects or due to a low number of applicants. Moreover, the focus on the manufactur-
ing industry restricts the generality of the results. Further investigations are needed to
validate the outcome for other industries.
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V. Disentangling effects between
collaborative subsidies and
innovations: a mulitplexity
approach for R&D and innovation
networks
1. Introduction
During recent decades, a major shift has occurred in the way governments of developed
countries promote technical change through R&D oriented subsidies – away from the
isolated support of a single organization towards a collaborative funding regime with
several participants in each project. The idea behind this originates from the growing
awareness of the stimulating nature of collaborative research efforts, which is grounded
in the positive effects of, for example, collaborative learning, risk sharing or resource
pooling (Levinthal and March, 1993; Powell et al., 1996; Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999).
By triggering collaborative R&D projects, governments aim at stimulating interactions
between organizations coming from academia, research centers or commercial firms, and,
at the end and most importantly, the generation of innovations (Powell, 1990).
Recently, several papers analyzed which factors lead to the formation of collaborative
relationships in R&D networks (Hazir and Autant-Bernard, 2012; Broekel and Hartog,
2013; Balland, 2012; De Stefano and Zaccarin, 2013; Ter Wal, 2013) and especially point
to the role of Boschma’s (2005) proximity concept in uncovering the sources of inno-
vation. But the question of how networks or dyadic relations evolve in the context of
multiplex relationships among R&D and innovation networks over time is still mostly
open (Ferriani et al., 2013; Bergenholtz and Waldstrøm, 2011; McPherson et al., 2001).
Although, economists have highlighted the bi-directional nature of science and technol-
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ogy networks (Murray, 2002) and stressed the importance of government-funded R&D
collaborations as a major source of innovation (Lundvall and Johnson, 1994). Murray
(2002) and Breschi (2010) found evidence for a distinctive overlap and a dependency on
network position between both networks, but to our best knowledge there is no empirical
evidence concerning how an R&D network and an innovation network will co-evolve over
time.
To shed some light on this question, our paper examines the interdependence of a
government-financed R&D network with a patent-oriented innovation network. In do-
ing so, we will investigate the causality of the emergence of dyadic relations in both
networks, disentangling the possibility of stimulating collaborative innovations between
organizations through a governmental R&D policy and, in addition to that, examining
how the resulting R&D network is influenced by already existing innovation alliances.
Addressing these questions, we formulated a set of hypotheses, exploring the drivers
of change in the R&D and innovation network. To test our hypotheses, we performed an
actor-oriented model – SIENA – provided by Snijders (2001), which allows for control
of multiplex relationships between a set of actors who can decide to cooperate with
each other. For the reliability of our results and the manageability of our calculations,
we concentrate our analysis on the chemical and automotive industries in Germany.
Both sectors are important for the German economy and are responsible for a large
share of innovational activity. Additionally, we include all other organizations, such as
research centers and universities, in our model, as research centers and universities are
both major sources of collaborative innovation. We expect a significant effect working in
the direction from the subsidization network to the innovation network and the same in
reverse. Additional effects mostly come from Boschma’s (2005) proximity concept, while
other explanatory variables are also included, such as structural network characteristics
representing properties of the entire network, nodal effects describing actor-dependent
attributes of the organizations, and dyadic covariate effects characterizing the kind of
relationship between two organizations. For the construction of the subsidy network, we
make use of the German “Fo¨rderkatalog”, which includes project-based R&D subsidies
provided by the German federal government. For the innovation network, we employ
the PATSTAT database provided by the European Patent Office. The networks were
observed between 2005 and 2008.
The outcome of the model confirms the expectations. The emergence of both networks
deeply intertwined. The probability of collaborative innovation becomes significantly
higher if the organizations have previously been involved in a collaborative research
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project together, and we found the same to be true for collaborations inside the R&D
network. Interestingly, all the network determinants coming from the proximity con-
cept are also verified, suggesting that we found an additional explanation for the tie
creation process inside the R&D and innovation networks. Our findings confirm the
possibility of the government stimulating innovations through bilateral R&D projects,
but the outcome also indicates that policymakers have to be aware of the bi-directional
effects of network multiplexity. While we have proved that policy instruments are ca-
pable of influencing the innovation processes, we have also found that the governmental
innovation policy is influenced by the innovation network, which is governed by private
firms and other organizations. In our opinion, future subsidization programs must take
this into consideration in order to identify promising candidates for funding and uncover
organizations that are, for example, mostly rent–seeking.
Our paper is structured as follows. The second section briefly theorizes about the
drivers of multiplexity ties in R&D and innovation networks based on recent literature.
The third section describes the data used for the construction of the networks and gives
some information about the networks’ statistics with a special focus on the occurrence
of multiplex tie formations. The fourth section reviews the employed methodology.
Section five explains the characterization of variables. In section six, we will present and
discuss the results of the estimated models. The last section summarizes our findings
and addresses further research questions.
2. Theory
During recent decades, the literature on organizational networks has mostly addressed
single relations (Hazir and Autant-Bernard, 2012; Broekel and Hartog, 2013; Balland,
2012; De Stefano and Zaccarin, 2013; Ter Wal, 2013) while overlooking the complexity
of intertwined relationships through multiple interaction platforms operating simulta-
neously (Robins and Pattison, 2006). However, there was an early awareness of the
theory of networks concerning the bridging function of multiplex ties (White et al.,
1976; Wasserman and Faust, 1994). The predominant absence of multiplex relationships
in organizational networks is even more dubious as there was a large consensus that R&D
and innovation are highly related processes. Because of the underinvestment of private
firms in R&D, Arrow (1962) argued that the government should provide public funds
in order to stimulate the innovational output of a nation, while Lundvall and Johnson
(1994) went further when they stated, that public R&D expenditures become even more
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promising if they inherently integrate collaborative elements, connecting organizations
that would otherwise be reluctant to cooperate.
In the following we concentrate on two kinds of relationships: an R&D network ex-
plaining which collaborations have been founded, and a collaborative innovation network
indicating which relationships have successfully led to an innovation. We will investi-
gate arguments theorizing the implication of interrelated networks and disentangle some
major dependencies between R&D and innovation networks.
First of all, Granovetter (1985) and Uzzi (1996) argued, in their concept of social
embeddedness, that for an initiation of collaboration, there may be nothing as valuable
as having first-hand experience concerning the behavior of a potential partner. Those
memories become manifested in networks, representing historical experiences through
network ties (Ahuja et al., 2012). Having an extant cooperative project on the basis
of a common R&D or innovation activity, therefore, allows the development of reliable
expectations about the intention of the potential partner. This information reduces the
risk of hidden agendas or radical changes compared to other organizations without prior
collaborations (Ferriani et al., 2013). There is little that can exceed the benefit of know-
ing each other through other circles, except for the upcoming experiences gained through
the outstanding collaboration itself (Uzzi, 1996). Maybe there are other promising co-
operation alternatives for the potential partners, and such possibilities might become
more plausible at the end of the process for one of the organizations, but as a whole the
probability of the emergence of a new tie will be much more likely if there are preexist-
ing ones. As innovation performance can be seen as one major driver of organizational
performance, especially for firms in high-tech industries (Coad and Rao, 2008), collab-
orative innovation processes touch quite a sensitive aspect of organizations’ interests.
Because of that, a less sensitive collaboration, as in our case of a government-sponsored
R&D project, can act as a door–opener for a more delicate innovation activity (Lundvall
and Johnson, 1994). Nevertheless, trust is the crucial currency for establishing further
collaborations. To initiate a common innovation, some collaborative learning (Powell
et al., 1996) must have taken place, which becomes more through a collaborative R&D
project (Hagedoorn, 2002), widening the capabilities necessary for success (Cohen and
Levinthal, 1990), which leads us to hypothesis H1a.
H1a: Collaborations on the basis of government-funded R&D projects do
stimulate collaborative innovations.
In a similar fashion, we expect prior collaborative innovation activities to increase
the probalility of having a collaborative R&D project. Even here, prior experiences of
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cooperation form the basis for further interactions, but slight differences may occur,
since governmental ambitions come into account (Aschhoff and Schmidt, 2008). Ad-
ministrations may favor certain organizations that have already engaged successfully in
collaborative innovations. In this vein, they are seeking security for their public invest-
ment, since they have to take responsibility for it, which is also known as the“picking the
winner” strategy (Wallsten, 2000; Blanes and Busom, 2004; Cantner and Ko¨sters, 2009).
Ultimately, this habit could lead to a preference for organizations that have an extant
collaborative tie. On the other hand, organizations that already innovate together may
try to reduce their R&D expenditures through governmental contributions (David et al.,
2000; Duguet, 2004). Their probability of receiving a contribution is increased if they
apply for funded R&D projects together, since there are currently more collaborative-
funded projects than single-funded ones; rent–seeking might also be a motivation for
these organizations. Both circumstances explain hypothesis H1b.
H1b: Collaborative innovation activities do increase the chance of receiving
a government-funded joint project.
The next best alternative, after knowing someone in person, is having a friend in
common as an intermediary who vouches for the credibility of the counterpart. This
is described by Uzzi (1996) as a “third-party referral network,” where one organization
stands as an intermediary between two potential partners. The organization in the
middle acts as a trusted informant for both potential partners (Granovetter, 1985) and
transfers its reputation and mutual experiences with both organizations from one side
to the other (Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999). If the exchanged information convinces both
organizations, a partnership should more likely arise. This situation is best described
as a transitive triad.1 Since transitivity is already proven as a major driver of dyadic
tie evolution in organizational networks (Broekel and Hartog, 2013; Ter Wal, 2013;
Hagedoorn, 2002), we suppose that transitive triads also work for multiple overlapping
networks, connecting organizations through different dimensions, which leads to our next
two hypotheses.
H2a: The likelihood of collaborative innovation between two organizations
increases if both organizations have an R&D partner in common.
1The definition of transitive triads is formulated for directed networks, but also works for undirected
networks, if we leave the direction of ties aside. Having a trio of actors – i, j, and k – and the ties
between them, a triad would involve actors i, j and k, if i is connected with j, j is connected with k
and i is connected with k (Wasserman and Faust, 1994).
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H2b The likelihood of a collaborative R&D project between two organizations
increases if both organizations have an innovation partner in common.
3. Data
3.1. Data sources
For the empirical analysis, we employed different sets of data sources. The construction
of the subsidization network is based on a publicly available database that contains all
projects funded by the German federal government. The reporting ministries are: the
Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF); the Federal Ministry of Economics
and Technology (BMWi); the Federal Ministry of Transport, Building and Urban De-
velopment (BMVBS); and the Federal Ministry for the Environment (BMU). The so
called “Fo¨rderkatalog” goes back to the late 1960s and accounts for more than 152,000
projects until 2012. Each entry provides information about, for example, the organiza-
tion that received the funding, co-funded organizations, the location of the organization,
the funding amount, the funding period, the project themes and a classification number
concerning the project’s technological affiliation. In line with Broekel and Graf (2012),
we assume an intensive knowledge exchange through collaborative research efforts be-
tween participants of those joint projects. Those organizations that receive a public
grant accept the condition that they are to allow every partner unrestricted access to
the project’s results and allow fee-free usage of their know-how and intellectual property
rights. Since not all projects included in this database are R&D related-projects, we
make a restriction and include only those projects dealing with “technology and inno-
vations,”“research and development”, and “basic research,” excluding irrelevant projects
such as “non-R&D-related expenditures on education”.
The innovation network is based on patent data that have been extracted from the
PATSTAT database published by the European Patent Office (EPO), since patent data
receives growing attention as an empirical source for collaborative innovation activities
(Ter Wal, 2009; Breschi and Lissoni, 2005). To construct the network, we followed
Breschi and Lissoni (2003), who made the reasonable assumption that two organizations
(o1 and o2, see Figure V.1) are linked to each other if both organizations applied for the
same patent (p1) or if any employee (w2) working at a firm (o2) is named as an inventor
of a patent (p2) applied by another firm (o1). While there is no doubt concerning
an interlinkage between both organizations in the first case (co-application), we also
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support the interlinking character of the second case (co-invention). When inventors
of more than one organization have been directly involved in the process of a patent
development, we assume those organizations to be interlinked, because of the knowledge
transactions and the sharing of capabilities during the time of the collaboration, similar
to R&D collaborations.
Hagedoorn (2003) mentioned that due to legal reasons it is common to split the prop-
erty rights of a collaborative innovation into a standard patent held by one single orga-
nization, which issues licenses to the rest of the partners to avoid overlapping property
rights. Doing so, Ter Wal (2009) concludes that inventors of different firms will appear
jointly on a standard patent while they work for different organizations at the same
time. According to Giuri et al. (2005), more than 20 of all patents were created through
a collective R&D activity, whereas only 3.6 percent of total patents have been official
jointly owned patents. If we try to control for co-inventions, Ter Wal (2009) hints at the
possibility of observing an effect of labor mobility, when inventors appear on patents for
different organizations, so that there is a possibility of misinterpreting labor mobility as
a kind of collaboration. To minimize such misinterpretations, we applied a conservative
two-stage process to identify collaborations based on co-inventions: (1) We defined a
“home base” for each observed inventor, so that she/he is “at home” in the organization
where she/he made most of her/his applications. An interlinkage between two orga-
nizations is possible if an inventor appears on a patent that has not been applied by
her/his home organization. (2) To avoid declaring labor mobility as a collaboration, it is
necessary for the inventor to return home at a later point in time, which is fulfilled when
the inventor is named on a patent application of her/his “home base” at a later point in
time. Otherwise, the establishing of a link between both organizations is refused. Due
to the delay of patent publications, we concentrate our analysis on observations between
the years 2005 and 2008. We approximate the time of the invention by the date of the
patent application, since the application date is very close to the date of invention.
Even if our analysis is based on networks observed between the years 2005 and 2008, we
started building up our subsidization networks in 2000. This means we are evaluating a
mature network in 2005 that is evolving over the next three years. After the official end of
a funded “joint-project” or the application date of a patent, we keep the interconnection
between those organizations alive for three more years, since we suppose that informal
channels will remain in place for a while between all collaborative partners even if there
is no ongoing project. This is in line with other authors (Ter Wal, 2013; Fleming et al.,
2007), but since our networks consider only a four-year time frame, we decide to limit
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the additional duration time to three instead of five years.
We are aware of the limitations that come from measuring innovativeness as a kind
of patenting activity. But in our case, the major critique – that the patenting activity
is distorted by strategic patenting or secrecy of innovations – is not convincing. We
think that the outcomes of collaborative innovations are mostly codified (Hertzfeld et
al., 2006), since the participating organizations need some kind of intellectual property
rights to legalize their access to the innovation. Distortions due to strategic patenting
should not arise in our selected data, since the most predominant motive for strategic
patents is to block competitors (Blind et al., 2006), instead of collaborating together.
We build up our basic population on a firm database that contains more than 22,523
different organizations coming from academia (657), research centers (5,711), and com-
mercial firms, including 12,963 organizations from the chemical industry and 7,174 or-
ganizations from the automotive industry. The sectoral distinction is possible due to the
German classification scheme of economic activities which separates the organizations
into categorical subgroups (Table V.1). It is worth mentioning that it is possible for an
organization to be a member of more than one industry. Through a matching algorithm,
we identified 960 organizations having received a contribution and 3,494 organizations
having been mentioned on a patent application between 2005 and 2008. Since we want
to evaluate the ability of subsidized projects to stimulate collaborative innovations, we
decided to exclude all organizations having no funding or patent application. Ignoring
organizations without patent applications does not lead to distortions, since only two
organizations became excluded due to their missing patent application, while more than
2,500 organizations were excluded because they had not obtained any public contribution
between 2005 and 2008.
3.2. Network statistics
In line with other authors (Murray, 2002; Breschi and Catalini, 2010; De Stefano and
Zaccarin, 2013), we found serious structural differences between collaborative R&D and
innovation networks (Table V.2 and V.3). The number of observed organizations inside
the chemical network (815) exceed the number of organizations (671) being observed
inside the automotive-related network. Interestingly, the reverse applies for the number
of collaborations (edges) for the R&D network as well as for the innovation network, sig-
naling a larger extent of cooperation inside the automobile industry in comparison to the
chemical industry. This is also reflected through the average degree (acts of cooperation
per organization), where the automotive industry always exceeds the chemical industry.
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Figure V.1.: Possible situations of collaborative innovations
matches
subgroup classification* obs. r&d innovation intersection
academia 854 657 142 148 142
research center 721 5,711 371 854 371
chemestry industry 19,20,21,22 12,963 355 1,895 354
automobile industry 29,30 7,174 364 1,504 362
total 22,523 960 3,494 958
*German classification scheme of economic activities, (edition 2008).
Table V.1.: Organizational matching results
r&d network innovation network
characteristics 2005 2006 2007 2008 2005 2006 2007 2008
organizations 815 815 815 815 815 815 815 815
edges 2,880 2,613 2,619 2,914 159 192 181 172
density 0.009 0.008 0.008 0.009 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001
components 400 386 371 339 690 678 681 684
greatest component
organizations 416 428 440 476 104 126 118 119
share 51% 53% 54% 58% 13% 15% 14% 15%
average distance 2.58 2.59 2.58 2.61 3.46 3.68 3.57 3.65
isolates 399 383 366 337 673 668 667 674
degree centralization 0.24 0.26 0.29 0.31 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
betweenness centralization 0.09 0.10 0.13 0.14 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
average degree 7.1 6.4 6.4 7.2 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.4
transitivity 0.42 0.39 0.39 0.38 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.04
diameter 6 6 6 6 8 10 8 7
Table V.2.: Chemical industry network structure
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Also the number of components expresses a difference regarding R&D and innovation
networks. As with prior authors (Murray, 2002; Breschi and Catalini, 2010; De Stefano
and Zaccarin, 2013), we found the innovation network to be fragmented, with frequent
components, a low density, and a relatively small largest component compared to the al-
ternative network coming from a more science-related background. Results provided by
Breschi (2010) and De Stefano (2013) suggest that the largest component of innovation
networks typically accounts for 9.3 percent and 33.8 percent of the total organizations,
depending on the sector’s technology-intensity. This is similar to our results, where the
innovation network of the chemical industry reaches a share between 13 percent and
15 percent, while the share of the in comparison more technology-intensive automotive
industry ranges between 22 percent and 26 percent. The share of the largest component
inside the R&D network lies in both networks between 51% and 63%, which is consis-
tent with R&D networks found by Broekel (2012). Even the average distance between
organizations inside the largest component is higher for both sectors.
After all, it is not surprising that the transitivity of the R&D network is significantly
higher in comparison to the innovation network, while the transitivity inside the auto-
motive innovation network reaches nearly double that of their chemical counterparts.
Summing up, it is much more common that our observed organizations collaborate in
R&D projects, while collaborative innovations turn out to be quite rare. Reasons lead-
ing to a different set of rules and constraints can be found in the distinctive nature of
both activities. On the one hand, the government can regulate the collaborative actions
inside publicly funded R&D projects, while on the other hand, collaborative innovations
are based on voluntariness.
Since our interest lies in tie-creation processes, Table V.4 reports the number of ties
being created, dissolved, alive or absent for each industry sector and network type. The
first column shows year-to-year comparisons, since network shift can only be observed
between the years. For the chemical and automotive industries, the number of network
changes inside the innovation network is rather low in comparison to the R&D network.
There is no stringent pattern of growth or decline phases among the years. There are
years showing a remarkable growth of new established ties (0→ 1) in one network, while
the corresponding network is losing (1 → 0) connections. However, what they seem to
have in common is a relatively stable share of network change, which is expressed by
the column of the Jaccard index.2 The lowest values for the Jaccard index can be found
2The jaccard index measures the amount of network change between two consecutive years. N11/(N11+
N01 +N10), N11 (1→ 1), N01 (0→ 1), N10 (1→ 0).
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r&d network innovation network
characteristics 2005 2006 2007 2008 2005 2006 2007 2008
organizations 671 671 671 671 671 671 671 671
edges 3,094 2,817 2,804 3,082 262 297 315 328
density 0.014 0.013 0.012 0.014 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
components 294 287 281 246 513 492 495 489
greatest component
organizations 375 383 388 422 145 178 171 173
share 56% 57% 58% 63% 22% 27% 25% 26%
average distance 2.47 2.51 2.46 2.49 3.00 3.26 3.03 2.95
isolates 290 284 277 242 500 489 490 482
degree centralization 0.28 0.29 0.33 0.35 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.10
betweenness centralization 0.10 0.10 0.13 0.15 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03
avarage degree 9.2 8.4 8.4 9.2 0.8 0.9 0.9 1.0
transitivity 0.42 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.09
diameter 5 5 5 5 7 10 7 8
Table V.3.: Automobile industry network structure
chemistry industry automotive industry
periods 0⇒0 0⇒1 1⇒0 1⇒1 jaccard 0⇒0 0⇒1 1⇒0 1⇒1 jaccard
innovation
2005→2006 337,209 65 31 126 0.568 225,111 82 47 216 0.626
2006→2007 337,205 35 46 145 0.642 225,095 63 45 253 0.701
2007→2008 337,214 37 45 135 0.622 225,075 65 53 263 0.69
R&D
2005→2006 334,189 353 612 2,277 0.702 222,015 344 621 2,476 0.72
2006→2007 334,440 361 336 2,294 0.767 222,284 352 360 2,460 0.776
2007→2008 334,309 467 184 2,471 0.791 222,184 460 187 2,625 0.802
Table V.4.: Dyadic evolution of networks
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for the innovation networks, varying between 0.57 and 0.7. This mostly refers to the
duration time of collaborative innovations, which we suppose to be three years after the
date of application. For the R&D network, the Jaccard index reaches values between
0.7 and 0.8, signaling a higher stability of the existing ties throughout the observed time
periods.
chemical industry automobile industry
2005 2006 2007 2008 2005 2006 2007 2008
existing multiplex ties 53 74 72 71 86 118 124 123
new multiplex ties 21 31 18 16 23 46 25 22
prior R&D cooperation 16 22 13 10 19 31 18 12
prior innovation cooperation 3 4 5 5 3 10 7 7
instant multiplex 2 5 0 1 1 5 0 3
Table V.5.: Occurrence of multiplex ties in networks
As multiplexity is of special interest to our work, Table V.5 reports occurrences of
multiplex ties for the chemical and automotive industries between 2005 and 2010. For
a multiplex tie, it is necessary that exactly two ties exist between a pair of actors,
inside the R&D as well as inside the innovation network (see Figure V.2). The first row
of Table V.5 reports the number of existing multiplex ties for each year and network.
As the average degree of the automotive industry lies above the average degree of the
chemical industry, it is no surprise that more multiplex ties occur for the automotive
industry. The second row includes the number of new multiplex ties created each year,
while the rows below explain the circumstances under which the new multiplex ties have
been established. In most cases (141, including both sectors), there was a single prior
R&D collaboration between both organizations before a second becomes established,
representing a collaborative innovation (type 1, see Figure V.2(b)), while a collaboration
on the basis of a prior innovation (type 2 ) occurs only in 22 percent (44) of all cases.
The last possibility where the multiplex tie becomes installed instantaneously without
any prior collaboration (type 3 ) is quite seldom and represents only 8 percent (17) of all
cases.
Moreover, we compared the time needed to establish a multiplex tie after the initial
R&D project or patent application. We found serious differences between both constel-
lations. The creation of a multiplex tie based on a prior R&D collaboration (type 1 )
takes 3.6 years on average in the case of the chemical industry and 3.8 years on average
for the automotive sector, while it takes 2.75 or 2.9 years, respectively, in the cases of the
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chemical and automotive sectors to establish a multiplex tie based on a former innovation
tie (type 2 ). Additionally, Figure V.3 presents the distributions of the duration times,
showing a peak for the type 1 constellation in the third year and a peak for the type 2
constellation in the second year. This meets our expectations, since the emergence of an
innovation should naturally take some time after the start of an R&D project, whereas
a collaborative R&D project can be started directly after a prior innovation.
These findings give us some certainty about our hypotheses. As the instantaneous gen-
esis of multiplex ties is quite rare, it becomes more likely that the evolution of multiplex
ties follows a process, where one collaboration entails the other, supporting hypotheses
H1a and H1b.
chemistry industry automobile industry
triad closure innovation 2005 2006 2007 2008 2005 2006 2007 2008
existing (1) 199 212 278 259 471 383 382 481
new triads (2) 21 33 7 43 45 56 36 78
triad closure R&D 2005 2006 2007 2008 2005 2006 2007 2008
existing (1) 10 30 29 12 49 52 36 52
new triads (2) 3 3 0 0 0 3 5 1
Table V.6.: Occurrence of multiplex triads in networks
Our second objective is to shed light upon the tie-creation process of a multiplex
triad, where two organizations are indirectly connected by an intermediary and the
triad becomes closed through a parallel network. As we control for collaborations in
R&D and innovation networks, Figure V.4 illustrates the architecture of the possible
triads. At the beginning (t = 0), neither the triad in Figure V.4(a) nor the triad in
Figure V.4(b) are closed, which means that in both situations two organizations have a
partner in common.3 Because of the effects we described for hypotheses H2a and H2b
(“third-party referral network”), we suppose o1 and o3 to become very likely partners
until the next point in time (t = 1), while the basis of the collaboration is different
to the previous one. The first row of each section presents the occurrences of already
existing multiplex triads inside the networks of the chemical and automotive industry.
As can be found in the Table V.6, there are many more triads closed by a common
innovation (type 2 ) than triads closed by a common R&D project (type 4 ). This is
of little surprise, as there are many more configurations of type 1 inside the networks
3This statement refers to network architectures labeled as type 1 and type 3 in Figure V.4.
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of the chemical and automotive industries, which can be closed through collaborative
innovation. The second row includes the number of new multiplex triads established
each year. As the dynamic is higher for triads established by collaborative innovation
activities, we expect a more significant result for our Hypothesis H2a.
4. Method
For the empirical validation of the hypotheses we specified and estimated two Stochas-
tic Actor-Oriented Models (SAOM), since the explanatory power of standard regression
techniques and other alternatives, such as the log–linear and the Markov approach, are
too limited to explain the dynamics of networks (Bunt and Groenewegen, 2007). The
analysis is performed by a statistical software package called SIENA – shorthand for Sim-
ulation Investigation for Empirical Network Analysis. SIENA includes a set of functions
for studying the evolution of networks over time driven by endogenous and exogenous
effects, where the statistical inference is gained from a network simulation model (Sni-
jders, 2001; Ripley et al., 2014). Since SIENA has become a standard tool for social
scientists, the interest of economists is steadily growing (Ter Wal, 2009; Castro et al.,
2014; Giuliani, 2013). SIENA assumes a continuous process of network evolution over
time, where only actors (organizations) are allowed to establish or dissolve ties (coop-
erations). Since most of the network observations are made in discrete time, the micro
steps of network change are unobserved. As a consequence, SIENA tries to simulate
the evolutionary path of network transition between observed time points via Markov
Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) simulations. This simulation algorithm is repeated 1,000
times (Snijders, 2002). During each simulation process actors evaluating the entire net-
work seek a chance to improve their actual network position into a more “pleasant” one,
explained by the model as a utility function that the actor is trying to maximize, also
known as the evaluation function. For the maximization of the utility, the evaluation
function requires some model ingredients, including information about the nodal, dyadic
and structural configuration, representing the costs and benefits of the alternatives, and
additionally a random disturbance. Since only the actual composition of the network
matters, an actor’s decision is made without memory of prior stages. For undirected
networks SIENA provides several decision rules for the negotiation of a new interlink-
age between two actors, as reasons for an interaction can differ (Snijders and Steglich,
2007; Ter Wal, 2009). In our case, it seems reasonable to select the unilateral initiative
and reciprocal confirmation algorithm, since it is sensible to expect that one actor takes
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the initiative for a collaboration and the counterpart accepts or refuses the offer. Less
probable for our model would be, for example the “forcing model,” where one actor can
force another actor into a collaboration. At the end, the influence of the model effects
is represented by a set of weighted parameters, covering the observed strengths of the
model parameter. If the parameter value of an estimated effect equals zero, the effect
has no influence on the tie-creation process, while a positive parameter explains a higher
probability for the creation of a relational tie. The reverse applies for an effect with a
negative parameter value. SIENA distinguishes between three classes of model effects:
(1) structural effects depending on the characteristic of the network only (e.g. triadic
closure, multiple network effects), (2) individual covariates reflecting the characteristics
of the actors such as the number of employees, the annual turnover or the industry
sector and (3) dyadic covariates representing tie-related attributes such as distance or
proximity scores between potentially tied actors. Since the estimated model parameters
have an approximate standard normal distribution, the significance of the parameter can
be tested through a Wald-test (t-test) (Snijders, 2001; Ripley et al., 2014). The rate
function of a SIENA model explains how often an actor has the opportunity to establish
a new tie. As it seems reasonable that some differences occur between heterogeneous
actors and their chance of being the next selected one, SIENA allows the inclusion of
a set of special rate effects favoring or discriminating against actors according to their
individual attributes. The model convergence is good if all t-ratios are below 0.1, which
means that the model parameters can describe the simulated networks quite well. The
reliability of the model can be evaluated with the help of goodness-of-fit measures, using
network descriptives (for example, degree distribution, geodesic distance, or triadic cen-
sus) for a comparison between the observed network and the obtained model networks.
5. Variables
For the verification of our hypotheses, we included a set of explanatory effects to the
model. In line with Ahuja et al. (2012) we distinguished three differential sets of parame-
ters that trigger the evolution of networks: (1) factors coming from the nodal (individual)
level of the organizations, (2) the dyadic level of relationships between the organizations,
and (3) the structure of links resulting from these interconnections. In our model, each
set of parameters occurs twice, since we are dealing with two parallel evolving network
formations.
Nodal attributes are related to organizational characteristics such as organization size,
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sectoral affiliation, received subsidies or the number of patent applications. Schwartz et
al. (2012) found evidence that patent application, as the outcome of a R&D cooperation,
is positively affected by the size of an organization, thus we expect that the creation of
a new tie between a pair of organizations is affected by the size of both partners, too.
In the first place, size reduces the administrative burden for the acquisition and imple-
mentation of R&D projects or patent applications because initiation costs, equivalent
to sunk costs, are nearly fixed so that the impact diminishes as organizations grow in
size (Blanes and Busom, 2004; Aschhoff and Schmidt, 2008; Tanayama, 2007). Even
the cost for monitoring R&D projects and patents decreases with firm size, when pro-
fessional departments support the process for the application and control of financial
risks (Banno` and Sgobbi, 2010). But, at the same time, size may be an obstacle to co-
operation, because, for example, of competition in similar markets. For the description
of an organization’s size, we used the number of employees and the annual turnover (in
millions of euro), as both indicate different aspects of an organization’s size. Finally,
we applied the cube root to each value, since we expect a degressive influence of both
variables, labeled as sum employeesfix and sum turnoverfix within the model. Because
of limitations to our organizational data, we only have values of the year 2012 for both
variables. However, these constraints should not be problematic, since we are mostly
interested in differences in the levels between organizations.
Kirat (1999) pointed to inter-nodal characteristics of the network when he mentioned
that “Technological innovation is a process that is based on relationships of proximity.”
Our model contains a set of dyadic effects reflecting those relationships of proximity.
While nodal attributes refer to the probability that one node is becoming a tie, bilateral
characteristics influence the likelihood of two organizations getting connected. The idea
of lateral effects mostly refers to the contradicting concepts of homophily and heterophily.
Coming from sociology, homophily describes an organizational preference to being tied
to someone similar in the sense of common attributes (McPherson et al., 2001). In a
reverse sense, heterophily suggests that organizations might prefer partners having some
dissimilarities, as complementary skills might be more fruitful than having the same ones
(Rivera et al., 2010). As Broekel and Hartog (2013) argued, homophily, and, according to
our understanding, also heterophily, have most in common with the proximity approach
of Boschma (2005), where cognitive, geographical, social, institutional, or organizational
proximity enhance or reduce the probability of an organizational tie.
Cognitive proximity, also known as technological proximity, refers to the share of
knowledge two organizations have in common. As the gain of knowledge often relies
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on the recombination of diverse capabilities, the genesis of innovations performs best
between heterogeneous actors with complementary capabilities (Mowery et al., 1998;
Boschma, 2005; Fornahl et al., 2011). Nooteboom (2000) directs this to a trade-off be-
tween a sufficient distance and meaningful closeness of organizational knowledge, where
the distance provides space for complementarities and closeness for an efficient transfer
of information. This relationship corresponds to an inverted U-shaped function of cog-
nitive proximity and innovativeness, which has been shown by Nooteboom et al. (2007),
Gilsing et al. (2008) and Fornahl et al. (2011). As our focus relies on technological inno-
vations, we express cognitive proximity between two potentially tied organizations as the
overlap of their knowledge base, which becomes operationalized as project participations
and patent applications, differing for technological fields. As the “Fo¨rderkatalog” con-
tains a technological–classification scheme, projects can be differentiated between a set
of 19 technological areas (Broekel and Graf, 2010). As the innovation network is based
on patent data, the international patent classification (IPC) describes the technological
context of the innovation. Based on the IPC, Schmoch (2008) created a technology
classification scheme indicating 35 fields of technological innovations coming from areas
such as electrical engineering, instruments, chemistry, mechanical engineering, and oth-
ers. Instead of the IPC, we will use Schmoch’s technology classification scheme, as it
reduces the technological spectrum to a convenient number of technological fields.
Equation V.1 shows the calculation of the cognitive proximity between two organiza-
tions (x and y), where c represents a capability vector, containing the knowledge base of
an organization i at time point t. We suppose that organizations, once they have built
up their capabilities, will start to lose them again because of, for example, organizational
oblivion or labor mobility. This is implemented through a discount factor in Equation
V.1, which subtracts 20 percent of the capabilities an organization had in the previous
year. At the same time, c rises with the number of new capabilities p acquired by the or-
ganization i in year t. Capabilities c are explained through the number of newly funded
R&D projects or patent applications at time point t. The cognitive proximity between
both organizations is equal to the cosine-similarity of the vectors cxt and cyt. We expect
organizations with a similar cognitive proximity to be more likely to collaborate than
organizations having fewer capabilities in common.
cognitive proximityxyt = cosine-similarity(cxt, cyt) with
cit = pit + cit−1 ∗ 0.8 (V.1)
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Common institutions, consisting of formal rules, informal constraints, routines or
habits, establish a space around organizations, regulating the behavior and interac-
tions between members of a group (Kirat and Lung, 1999; Edquist, 2005). Institutional
proximity refers to the institutional overlap between possibly connected organizations.
Having a similar institutional background creates mutual trust between those organiza-
tions and increases the likelihood of being connected (Broekel and Hartog, 2013; Ponds
et al., 2007). But, in the same manner, too much proximity can also hinder new ideas
and innovations because of institutional lock-in and inertia (Boschma, 2005) caused by
a limited perception of new opportunities and less flexibility. In this sense, institutional
proximity should maintain the balance between well-established structures, openness,
and flexibility.
Because the institutional setting is strongly correlated to sectoral background, we
measure institutional proximity between two organizations in terms of being members
of the same sector, in which we differentiate academia (A), research centers (R), and
commercial firms (F). In order to identify homophilous preferences of an organization,
which prefers to collaborate within a common space of shared institutions, we included
three model variables.4 In the same manner, we included three variables reflecting a het-
erophilous tendency of an organization.5 Each of the variables reflects one of the possible
institutional combinations, three homophilous (A-A, R-R, F-F) and three heterophilous
variables (A-R, A-F, R-F). The values equal 1 if the variable matches the institutional
situation between a pair of organizations. Otherwise, the values equal 0. Previous con-
tributions (Belderbos et al., 2006; Aschhoff and Schmidt, 2008) have already shown that
the involvement of universities and research laboratories within a research joint venture
can be a significant fertilizer for the innovative outcome.
Organizational collaborations become more likely with geographic proximity, (Ponds
et al., 2007; Broekel and Hartog, 2013; Ter Wal, 2013; De Stefano and Zaccarin, 2013).
Being closely located to each other increases the opportunity for personal interaction,
stimulating the exchange of information and tacit knowledge due to mutual trust (Hippel,
1988; Cavusgil et al., 2003). At the same time, geographic proximity requires cognitive
proximity as otherwise both organizations would not be able to exchange knowledge
efficiently (Boschma, 2005; McPherson et al., 2001; Rivera et al., 2010). Geographic
proximity can help to overcome inadequate institutional or organizational settings be-
4Model variables for homophily: inst-proximity businesshomo fix, inst-proximity researchhomo fix, inst-
proximity academichomo fix.
5Model variables for heterophily: inst-proximity businesshomo fix, inst-proximity academic &
businesshetero fix, inst-proximity academic & researchhetero fix.
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tween organizations, where mutual trust is needed to fix these gaps. In line with this,
geographic proximity is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for collaborations,
but an effective substitute for institutional differences (Boschma, 2005; Ponds et al.,
2007). At the same time, it is possible to substitute geographic proximity through other
confidence-building factors, for example, social proximity (Autant-Bernard et al., 2007;
Paier and Scherngell, 2011). We measured geographic proximity as the physical distance
between a pair of organizations, based on the great-circle distance. Again we applied
the cube root to the variable, since we expect a degressive influence.
Social proximity is implemented as a structural effect, since social proximity can be
well described through a transitive triad (Ter Wal, 2013), including the interlinkages
of the whole network instead of the ego or bilateral level of organizations (Ripley et
al., 2014). In contrast to geographic proximity, addressing physical distance, social
proximity refers to the inner network distances of organizations. The triadic closure effect
measures the tendency of an organization to become a friend of a friend, whereby both
organizations are separated by one intermediary (Granovetter, 1973). Having a friend
in common creates opportunities for interaction in subsequent time periods (Rivera et
al., 2010), due to unintended encounters and the signal of trustworthiness as a reliable
partner (Uzzi, 1996; Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999). Being isolated reflects an extreme form
of social proximity. Without any neighbors within the network, the opportunity for
involvement in the next cooperation will be reduced drastically, due to the low status of
social embeddedness. As our data includes many organizations without any neighbors,
we included a network-isolate effect to our model.
A SIENA model requires some constant rate effects, which can be seen as a kind of
intercept for each time interval, explaining the likelihood of each organization receiving
the next tie. Since the sectors differ significantly in their tendency to cooperate, we
expect different rate effects for commercial firms, universities, and research centers. As
the government tries to stimulate collaborative R&D projects between the sectors (Fed-
eral Ministry of Education and Research, 2010; Pyka, 1999; OECD, 1994), we expect
universities to have a higher probability of cooperating with other organizations inside
the R&D network. This is because a limited number of universities meet hundreds of
firms and research centers. Since organizations are free to choose their partners in a
patent application (innovation), the same effect should not be present for the innovation
network. To represent this sectoral pattern, the model contains two rate parameters for
each kind of network, explaining the sectoral affiliation of the organization (bool research,
bool university). If an organization belongs to a sector, the organization is represented as
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a 1, or 0 otherwise. Similar to the sectoral rate parameters, we expect that prior activi-
ties affect the likelihood of receiving the next tie. Organizations benefit from experiences
gained through former applications. Routines have already been trained to manage the
different stages of the R&D projects and patent applications. This helps to minimize the
risk and signals a good reputation to other organizations as a potential partner (Nelson,
1982; Aschhoff and Schmidt, 2008; Tanayama, 2007; Beesley, 2003). As an indicator
for prior experiences we implemented one variable for each network. We approximate
the extent of already gained knowledge from further R&D projects through the sum of
contributions (sum subsidiest) an organization has absorbed in the past. Each year, we
discount the contributions of previous years by 20 percent as we expect organizations to
lose knowledge over time (Nelson, 1982). The same is true for innovation experiences.
Here, we used the number of patent applications as an indicator for the trained routines
(sum patentst). Even here we applied the cube root to each value, because we expect a
degressive influence of both variables.
The degree effect has to be included into each SIENA model, since it serves as an-
other kind of baseline parameter, indicating the tendency of organizations to increase
or decrease the number of linkages they have already obtained. A negative estimated
parameter value signals the cost, and a positive estimated parameter value signals the
benefit of having an additional relation (Ter Wal, 2013; Ripley et al., 2014). Another
important structural effect that should be implemented comes with the degree of altersqrt
effect, representing the preference of an organization to become tied with another orga-
nization with a large number of neighbors. Gulati and Gargiulo (1999) already found
evidence for this effect, particularly for the case of the automotive industry. This or-
ganizational pattern is associated with the Matthew Effect in social networks, positing
that the chance of getting a new tie is highly affected by the number of ties currently
held by an organization (Rivera et al., 2010; Merton, 1968). The implemented square
root lowers the importance of further access to highly connected organizations, if an
organization already has some (Ripley et al., 2014).
Exploring our hypotheses, the model contains some additional structural effects. For
an evolving multiplex tie between a pair of organizations within the innovation network,
the interaction subsidies effect indicates the presence or absence (1 or 0) of a former
collaborative R&D project (H1a). Equivalently, the interaction patent parameter de-
scribes the creation of a multiplex tie inside the R&D network, which is related to a
former collaborative innovation (H1b). Additionally, the effects of triadic closure sub-
sidies and triadic closure patents prove hypotheses H2a and H2b. If the creation of
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a new dyad within the innovation network would link a pair of organizations that have
formerly been connected indirectly by an intermediary inside the R&D network, the
triadic closure patents effect indicates the presence of a multiplex triad by signaling a 1
or a 0 otherwise (H2a). Again, the triadic closure subsidies effect equivalently demon-
strates the presence or absence of a multiplex tie formed within the R&D network by an
additional tie (H2b).
6. Results
The model results are shown in Table V.9 and Table V.10. Both models – the chem-
ical industry model as well as the automotive industry model – converged during the
simulation process, since all convergence values lie below the absolute value of 0.1. To
ensure the stability of our results, we estimated each model several times. The origi-
nally observed networks are well described by the networks simulated by the estimated
model. All tests regarding the dissimilarity of the observed networks and their simulated
equivalents can be rejected to the significance level of 0.1 (see Figure V.5 and Figure
V.6).
The estimates support hypotheses H1a and H1b. As shown by the model parameter
interaction patents, there is indeed a positive and significant, effect between having a
prior funded R&D project in the first place and having a collective innovation afterward,
supporting hypothesis H1a. In line with this, governmental subsidies significantly trig-
ger innovations if collaboration is an elementary aim of the project. The effect of the
variable interaction patents is quite strong compared to the rest of the model parame-
ters, with 0.59 for the chemical industry and 0.54 for the automotive industry. As the
parameter interaction subsidies is also positive and significant the same is true for the
opposite direction. If two organizations have had a collective innovation at an earlier
point in time, they are more likely to obtain a common R&D project. This finding
matches hypothesis H1b, that successfully innovating organizations attract the atten-
tion of governmental agencies, expecting a good public investment. Hypotheses H2a
and H2b are not supported, since the parameters of triadic closure innovation and
triadic closure R&D stay insignificant in both models.
Size matters within the R&D network, but surprisingly in diverged directions. The
positive-acting influence of the turnover encounters a negative impact of the employment
variable. If large organizations, in terms of their annual turnover, come together, a
collaboration between both becomes more likely; whereas a pair of organizations having
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Figure V.2.: Evolution of multiplex ties
model estimation
type effect convergence regressor error t-statistic sign.
su
b
si
d
y
n
e
tw
o
rk
rate constantt=1 -0.01 3.37 0.32 10.44 ***
rate constantt=2 0.08 2.35 0.22 10.72 ***
rate constantt=3 0.002 2.08 0.21 9.78 ***
rate bool research -0.06 -0.28 0.12 -2.33 **
rate bool university 0.06 1.59 0.16 9.82 ***
rate sum subsidies 0.03 0.28 0.04 7.99 ***
eval degree 0.01 -2.37 0.15 -16.14 ***
eval transitive triads 0.01 0.03 0.003 10.14 ***
eval degree of altersqrt -0.02 0.19 0.03 7.23 ***
eval isolate -0.003 3.21 0.47 6.83 ***
eval geo-proximityfix i,j 0.04 -0.08 0.01 -7.59 ***
eval inst-proximity research & businessfix 0.02 -0.02 0.19 -0.08
eval inst-proximity academic & businessfix -0.07 -0.19 0.22 -0.87
eval inst-proximity academic & researchfix -0.002 0.36 0.14 2.53 **
eval cognitive-proximitylpsys i,j 0.01 0.30 0.08 3.74 ***
eval sum employeesfix 0.003 -0.03 0.01 -3.25 ***
eval sum turnoverfix 0.02 0.05 0.01 4.84 ***
eval inst-proximity businesshomo fix -0.04 -0.25 0.14 -1.71 *
eval inst-proximity researchhomo fix -0.02 0.16 0.06 2.57 **
eval inst-proximity academichomo fix -0.01 -0.30 0.09 -3.21 ***
eval sum subsidiesi,j -0.001 0.77 0.06 12.28 ***
eval interaction patents 0.04 0.75 0.23 3.27 ***
eval triadic closure patents 0.03 0.07 0.11 0.63
p
a
te
n
t
n
e
tw
o
rk
rate constantt=1 0.03 1.84 0.28 6.48 ***
rate constantt=2 0.00 1.28 0.20 6.44 ***
rate constantt=3 -0.07 1.31 0.26 5.04 ***
rate bool research -0.02 0.10 0.26 0.38
rate bool university 0.03 0.64 0.28 2.32 *
rate sum patents -0.02 0.20 0.02 11.43 ***
eval degree 0.01 -2.64 0.25 -10.59 ***
eval transitive triads -0.02 -0.01 0.09 -0.09
eval degree of altersqrt -0.01 0.23 0.18 1.22
eval isolate 0.01 3.73 0.52 7.18 ***
eval geo-proximityfix i,j -0.03 -0.12 0.03 -4.15 ***
eval inst-proximity research & businesshetero fix 0.02 -0.16 0.46 -0.35
eval inst-proximity academic & businesshetero fix -0.05 0.01 0.63 0.02
eval inst-proximity academic & researchhetero fix -0.06 -0.38 0.44 -0.86
eval cognitive-proximityipc i,j -0.01 0.40 0.28 1.43
.
eval sum employeesfix 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.736
eval sum turnoverfix 0.03 -0.03 0.02 -1.50
.
eval inst-proximity businesshomo fix 0.01 0.04 0.23 0.17
eval inst-proximity researchhomo fix 0.02 -0.22 0.16 -1.36
.
eval inst-proximity academichomo fix 0.04 0.11 0.21 0.53
eval sum patsi,j 0.02 0.22 0.07 3.11 ***
eval interaction subsidies -0.01 0.59 0.19 3.18 ***
eval triadic closure subsidies -0.01 0.001 0.01 0.12
Significances of the parameter: *** 0.1%, ** 1%, * 5%, . 10%.
Table V.9.: Estimation results model - chemical industry
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Figure V.3.: Evolution of multiplex ties in time
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Test on unequality: p= 0.11
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Test on unequality: p= 0.64
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Figure V.5.: GOF – model chemical: degree distribution
142
6. Results
model estimation
type effect convergence regressor error t-statistic sign.
su
b
si
d
y
n
e
tw
o
rk
rate constantt=1 0.01 3.56 0.39 9.10 ***
rate constantt=2 -0.02 2.57 0.31 8.24 ***
rate constantt=3 0.05 2.24 0.28 7.99 ***
rate bool research -0.08 -0.54 0.14 -3.92 ***
rate bool university 0.03 1.32 0.13 9.94 ***
rate sum subsidies 0.03 0.32 0.05 6.41 ***
eval degree 0.05 -2.56 0.13 -19.95 ***
eval transitive triads -0.06 0.03 0.004 6.87 ***
eval degree of altersqrt -0.05 0.22 0.03 7.09 ***
eval isolate -0.02 3.16 0.69 4.59 ***
eval geo-proximityfix i,j -0.04 -0.08 0.01 -6.72 ***
eval inst-proximity research & businessfix 0.04 0.39 0.17 2.33 **
eval inst-proximity academic & businessfix 0.01 0.10 0.18 0.54
eval inst-proximity academic & researchfix -0.03 0.41 0.12 3.38 ***
eval cognitive-proximitylpsys i,j -0.02 0.28 0.08 3.48 ***
eval sum employeesfix -0.0003 -0.02 0.01 -2.36 **
eval sum turnoverfix 0.01 0.03 0.01 2.50 **
eval inst-proximity businesshomo fix -0.05 0.06 0.14 0.45
eval inst-proximity researchhomo fix 0.01 0.16 0.07 2.38 **
eval inst-proximity academichomo fix -0.004 -0.27 0.08 -3.45 ***
eval sum subsidiesi,j -0.03 0.64 0.08 8.42 ***
eval interaction patents 0.04 0.66 0.31 2.12 *
eval triadic closure patents 0.02 0.06 0.06 1.02
p
a
te
n
t
n
e
tw
o
rk
rate constantt=1 0.05 2.69 0.67 4.02 ***
rate constantt=2 0.05 1.95 0.47 4.18 ***
rate constantt=3 0.002 2.06 0.46 4.43 ***
rate bool research -0.06 -0.12 0.37 -0.33
rate bool university -0.04 -0.07 0.33 -0.21
rate sum patents 0.06 0.09 0.01 6.21 ***
eval degree 0.09 -2.54 0.22 -11.29 ***
eval transitive triads 0.05 0.09 0.06 1.57 .
eval degree of altersqrt 0.05 0.07 0.11 0.58
eval isolate -0.05 4.03 0.79 5.11 ***
eval geo-proximityfix i,j -0.08 -0.10 0.02 -4.17 ***
eval inst-proximity research & businesshetero fix -0.05 -0.49 0.34 -1.46
.
eval inst-proximity academic & businesshetero fix -0.01 -0.48 0.54 -0.88
eval inst-proximity academic & researchhetero fix -0.04 -0.16 0.49 -0.32
eval cognitive-proximityipc i,j 0.06 0.61 0.22 2.83 **
eval sum employeesfix 0.07 0.0001 0.02 0.004
eval sum turnoverfix 0.08 -0.01 0.02 -0.37
eval inst-proximity businesshomo fix 0.07 -0.04 0.13 -0.31
eval inst-proximity researchhomo fix 0.08 -0.13 0.15 -0.88
eval inst-proximity academichomo fix 0.07 0.15 0.24 0.60
eval sum patsi,j 0.06 0.22 0.07 3.20 ***
eval interaction subsidies 0.00 0.54 0.15 3.67 ***
eval triadic closure subsidies 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.80
Significances of the parameter: *** 0.1%, ** 1%, * 5%, . 10%.
Table V.10.: Estimation results model - automotive industry
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Test on unequality: p= 0.95
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Figure V.6.: GOF – model automotive industry: degree distribution
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6. Results
a large number of employees is less likely to cooperate. For the innovation network,
the effect of the annual turnover turns out to be negative in the case of the chemical
industry, but the significance of this effect is close to zero.
The variable geo-proximity meets our expectations and thus stays in line with prior
findings (Ter Wal, 2009). Organizations that are proximate in a geographic sense are
significantly more likely to become connected, which is reflected by the negative value
of the parameter geo-proximity for both models and networks.
In the case of institutional proximity, our findings differ for the observed networks and
industry sectors. For collaborations on the basis of patent applications, we identified
some institutional preference patterns that have been significant to the level of 0.1. In
the case of the chemical sector, we found a negative attraction if both organizations are
research centers. A second pattern is found inside the automotive sector. A collabora-
tion between a commercial firm and a research organization seems to be less likely than
other sectoral combinations. The overall low significance of the institutional proximity
parameters reflects that there is no special favor for institutional openness or closeness
when organizations could choose their cooperation partner freely, as inside the innova-
tion network. This result has most in common with Boschma (2005), who pleads for an
optimal mixture of institutional proximity in order to stimulate the innovational output
of a collaboration. If organizations act this way, we should not see any patterns – neither
homophilous nor heterophilous. In contrast to patent applications, R&D projects are
influenced by governmental policy, so that the institutional mixture could be prejudged
by administrative decisions, which is often the case of the R&D projects funded by the
German government. For the R&D network, we found serious homophilous patterns,
indicating that organizations coming from an academic background are less likely to
cooperate, while in contrast research centers have a positive probability. Moreover, we
found a positive and significant heterophilous effect across the sectors, which gives re-
search centers and universities a higher probability of collaborating. We can only assume
why those patterns emerge between both sectors. It seems to be the aim of the govern-
mental policy to connect research centers and universities through government-funded
projects, favoring the constellation of a limited number of universities and several re-
search centers in each of the projects. Interestingly, commercial firms from the chemical
and automotive sectors seem to have divergent interests. The significantly lower proba-
bility of chemical firms cooperating with each other maybe reflects strong competition
inside the sector, while firms inside the automotive sector have a preference for cooperat-
ing with research centers, which can be the consequence of a higher grade of technology
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insensitivity inside the automotive industry.
Cognitive proximity connects organizations with a similar technological base, which
leads to a significantly higher probability of becoming connected in our model. Simi-
larly to geographic proximity, cognitive proximity turns out to be a universal connector,
linking organizations within R&D and innovation networks and different industries.
Transitivity has a minor role for the innovation network. The transitive triads param-
eter reaches some significance for the automotive sector, increasing the chance of two
indirectly connected organizations becoming connected through social proximity, but the
overall relevance is constrained, since the parameter stays insignificant for the chemical
sector. The situation within the R&D network is entirely different, since the govern-
mental policy promotes transitivity. Due to collaborative projects normally involving
more than two organizations, the transitive triad parameter is highly significant. After
all, the isolate parameter points to the extreme case of social proximity, indicating the
lowest possible extent of social embeddedness. It is not surprising that the value of this
parameter is significantly positive, since the number of isolated organizations within our
network is diminishing.
For the R&D network, in both models, the reduction of the constant rate parameter
after each time step reflects a decline in the number of links being established in each
time period. Furthermore, the additional rate parameters seem to confirm that our
assumption of policy-caused differences between the sectors. Organizations with an
academic background (bool academia) tend to have a significantly higher probability of
sending the next tie to another organization, while research centers (bool research) have
a significantly lower probability of doing so. The innovation network does seem to be
affected in the same way, since the additional rate parameters related to the sectoral
affiliation remain insignificant. As suspected, prior project and innovation activities
have an influence on the likelihood of an organization receiving a tie during the next
time step, as both variables – sum subsidiest and sum patentst – are positive and highly
significant for the chemical and automotive industries.
Since the parameter value of the degree effect turns out to be negative and significant
for both networks and models, organizations find it costly to establish new links, irre-
spective of the other effects. This finding is typical for SIENA models, because otherwise
organizations would have as many cooperation partners as possible. Organizations favor
neighbors with a high social prestige, since the parameter of the effect degree of altersqrt
is positive and significant. Having a neighbor with many collaborations brings some
advantages, since such a neighbor acts as an intermediary for new partners, and social
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prestige can be seen as an indicator for trustworthiness.
7. Conclusion
The aim of the paper was to investigate the interrelationships between two kinds of
cooperation – research collaborations and cooperative innovations. Although there have
frequently been other studies analyzing research collaborations and cooperative innova-
tions, only a few authors were interested in the dependency of both. Each year, govern-
ments spend large budgets for the promotion of research joint ventures, but still less is
known concerning the success of stimulating cooperative innovations. To bring some light
to this discussion, this paper dealt with two kinds of networks. The funding network was
derived from the German funding scheme, which supports precompetitive research joint
ventures among various organizations. The innovation network was extracted from the
EPO PATSTAT database, whereby a conservative procedure was applied to construct
the innovation network from the patent data. Based upon theoretical thoughts, four hy-
potheses were formulated, expecting certain interdependencies between the evolutions of
both networks. Evaluating the theoretical presumptions, a SIENA model was estimated
to analyze the dynamics that shape the formation of two interrelated networks. For
the robustness of the results, two different sectors were analyzed – the chemical sector
and the automotive sector since both sectors are responsible for a large share of the
German innovative capacity. The results are derived from frequent simulations for both
sectors, whereby the network of the chemical sector includes 815 organizations and the
automotive industry includes 671 organizations.
Hypothesis H1a was broadly supported, explaining that it is possible to stimulate
collaborative innovations through government-funded research joint ventures. If a pair-
ing of organizations receives a collaborative project grant, it becomes much more likely
that both organizations will innovate together at a later time because of bilateral knowl-
edge flows, mutual trust, and resource pooling. In this vein, public cooperative subsidies
become an important policy tool for a government which aims to stimulate innovations.
The original intention of subsidies as a support to overcome the private underinvestment
in R&D is still valid, but beside this cooperative subsidies also act as a door-opener estab-
lishing long-term joint ventures for innovation between firms, universities and research
centers. Notwithstanding, further investigations are needed to assess whether a pub-
lic planning of cooperation outperforms the market mechanism. Hypothesis H1a was
broadly supported, explaining that it is possible to stimulate collaborative innovations
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through government-funded research joint ventures. If a pairing of organizations receives
a collaborative project grant, it becomes much more likely that both organizations will
innovate together at a later time because of bilateral knowledge flows, mutual trust, and
resource pooling. In this vein, public cooperative subsidies become an important pol-
icy tool for a government which aims to stimulate innovations. The original intention of
subsidies as a support to overcome the private underinvestment in R&D is still valid, but
beside this cooperative subsidies also act as a door opener establishing long-term joint
ventures for innovation between firms, universities and research centers. Notwithstand-
ing, further investigations are needed to assess whether a public planning of cooperation
outperforms the market mechanism.
Similar applies for the other direction of influence, since hypothesis H1b was also
verified. If two organizations have innovated together, it becomes more likely that both
will obtain a contribution for a bilateral research activity. The government seeks pub-
lic investment opportunities to close the gap of the firm’s underinvestment in R&D.
Since public funds are scarce and politicians require success to legitimize their policy,
governments may be influenced by the “picking the winner” strategy, positing that gov-
ernments tend to allocate funds to organizations which have already proven their ability
to innovate. Another possible explanation might be that organizations that have already
innovated together have a starting advantage compared to other organizations if it comes
to a project application, due to preexisting experiences in cooperating. This observation
contributes to the discussion concerning the rent–seeking activity of organizations. Hy-
pothesis H1a clarifies that cooperative subsidies can entail bilateral innovations, which
are additional, since previous relations did not exist among the partners; thus, it is very
likely that otherwise it would never have come to this innovation. On the other hand,
hypothesis H1b explains that research promotions are not always additional in terms
of bringing together new organizational pairings, since organizations have innovated to-
gether successfully prior to receiving a governmental contribution.
Moreover, governments have to be aware of the effects resulting from both hypotheses
when designing their innovation policies. If they largely support collaborative R&D ac-
tivities, the result indicates, that the formation of the innovation networks becomes heav-
ily influenced by the patterns that emerge within the funding network. This is alarming,
since we know that governmental innovation policies already allow the formation of core
structures within the funding network (Breschi and Cusmano, 2004; Roediger-Schluga
and Barber, 2006), which entails risks such as technological lock-ins and a reduction of
knowledge flows (Cowan and Jonard, 2004). In order to reduce an unintended market
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distortions the government should may check whether the funding award is additional to
preexisting collaborations, and if so reduce the financial contribution or install incentives
favoring collaborations that are non-additional.
Hypotheses H2a and H2b are rejected. Both investigated whether organizations are
more likely to carry out a bilateral R&D activity or innovation if both organizations are
connected through an intermediary, connecting the organizations indirectly. A possible
explanation is that there are less observations of this pattern within the data set to
gain significant results from the estimation. We strongly believe that organizations seek
advice from intermediary regarding whom to partner with, but no evidence was to found.
This paper addressed whether cooperative subsidies are effective in stimulating coop-
erative innovations. But the question about the efficiency disentangling the cost and
the benefit of the policy implementation remains unclear, so that further research in
needed. Since the empirical investigation was limited to the automotive and chemical
sector, as well as to the case of Germany, additional insights for other industrial sectors
and countries are also recommenced. Instead of organizations, further research could
focus on collaborating person that are embedded in research and innovation activities of
organizations.
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VI. Conclusions
Almost thirty years after their start, cooperative project grants have become the major
policy instrument supporting innovative activities through financial contributions. Since
1999, joint projects have displaced single projects as the top instrument in Germany,
and at the EU level other forms of contributions are quasi non-existent. The origin
for this impressive development comes from the competitive pressure of the 1980s and
Europe’s fear of falling behind Japan’s high-tech companies. The agenda at that time was
dominated by political actions and experiences rather than by academic thoughts, thus
most of the legitimization grounded in economic theory followed ex post. Progressive
political decisions were based on the best available knowledge at that time. However,
today’s economists have to look critically at the rapid implementation phase as newer
analyzes point to the possibility of unintended outcomes if the self-enforcing mechanism
of network dynamics is underestimated.
It was the central objective of this research project to investigate the interdependency
between government innovation policies and the dynamics of networks in view of orga-
nizational research joint ventures, with a special focus on network-related determinants
that render the formation of an innovation system. The setup for that purpose was a
theoretical framework in combination with a variety of empirical analyzes that applied
both standard statistical tools and techniques originating from social network analysis.
Since each of the preceding empirical chapters ends with a summary of the respective
results, this final section intends to describe the overall outcome of the research project
in a general perspective and outline further research questions.
1. Structure
The introductory part of this study complements the theoretical framework of the re-
spective subsequent analytical chapters. It discussed the genesis of innovations as the
outcome of a collective process of frequent players, and emphasized the functionality of
the innovation system approach to systematically analyze the innovative performance
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of an economy. Furthermore, it provided an overview regarding the development of
innovation policies in several industrialized countries, and specifically their support of
collaborative research activities among independent actors. A closer look was given to
the structure of the German and European innovation policies, since both were chosen as
use-cases for the analytical parts of this study. Each respective use-case concludes with
further research questions gained from the results, theoretical thoughts, and preceding
empirical studies.
Two empirical chapters pertain to the German innovation policy, while the third
discusses the European case. The first empirical chapter evaluated the allocation process
of a project grant for the case of the European FP. Due to unique dataset containing
the score values of the Commission’s proposal prioritization, it was possible estimate
the impact of the network architecture on the project allocation. The second empirical
chapter presented a detailed analysis regarding the particular steps of the allocation
process in Germany, and gives a broad statistical overview concerning the dynamic of the
funding system. Furthermore, it used statistical approach of Markov chains to investigate
whether the dynamic of the system is driven by the formation of the network or by other
organizational characteristics. The last empirical chapter untangled the interrelationship
between promoted research joint ventures and cooperative patent applications, in order
to measure whether or not the German policy design stimulates cooperative innovations.
2. Results
The research results can be concentrated into two major findings. First, the organi-
zation’s network position, and thereby the configuration of the overall network, affects
the probability of a single organization or a group to obtain a project grant from the
government. Secondly, a collaborative research promotion stimulates the likelihood of
a cooperative innovation, and vice versa; thus, it is not unusual to find a cooperative
innovation is later awarded with a cooperative project grant.
A closer look into the details of the allocation process reveals that the outcomes
differ with regards to the particular position occupied by the respective organization or
consortium. It is revealed in the German case that if an organization wants to receive its
first promotion, it is useful to have had previous relationships with other organizations.
Additionally, access to heterogeneous knowledge was identified as an important asset of
an organization in acquiring projects. Moreover, it is important, from the beginning, to
partner with the best connected organizations in the overall network, as it is the quality
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of the connections that decides further governmental promotions rather than the sheer
number of partners. The results for the European policy support this finding, since the
quality indicators had a strong and significant impact on obtaining a project grant. The
mere quantity of connections was found to have a negative impact to the Commission’s
prioritization. A similar result for the German case was that having only participated in
a research joint venture can entail a negative impact if an organization does not obtain
various new partners or a central network position. A brokerage position in the network
was unimportant. Overall, research networks show a high degree of clustering, which
means that bridging intermediaries are irrelevant for the connectivity of the network.
Further insights contributed to the discussion concerning the emergence of oligopolis-
tic structures within the research network. The investigation showed that subsequent
funding rounds are influenced by extant organizational partnerships. These starting
differences potentially accumulate over time, triggered by the self-enforcing mechanism
of networks. This last finding becomes even more relevant due to the observation that
both the innovation network as well as the R&D network are directly interrelated to
each other. This demonstrates the possibility that if the core-periphery structure is
once introduced to the R&D network, it has the potential to automatically transfer into
the innovation network. This introduces the same risks into another network, which is
invisible to the policy-maker at first glance.
For policy–makers, it is important to be aware of the bidirectional nature of their
funding policy. Through allocating project grants to organizations policy makers are
shaping the structure of the R&D network, as every additional awarded project grant
leads to a reconfiguration of the current network. What makes the situation bidirectional
is the fact that the policy makers’ decision is affected by the current configuration of the
network. Since well-connected organizations, in terms of centrality, connectedness, and
access to heterogeneous knowledge are much more likely to receive additional project
grants compared to other organizations. Ultimately, this demonstrated cycle induces
a self-enforcing mechanism to the allocation process of project grants, with the conse-
quence that central organizations within the policy induced R&D network are very likely
to maintain or even consolidate their central position within the network.
Since the allocation process mostly relies on formal legislations, there are some op-
tions to avoid a growing impact of the self-enforcing mechanism. Policy makers should
consider changes to the current funding rules. Equivalently to requirements of the EU
that at least 30 percent of a consortium’s total funding has to be allocated to SMEs, it is
worth thinking about implementing the same mechanism for less-central organizations.
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Such an additional requirement for less-connected organizations would ensure that the
core and periphery of the network stop drifting apart and start becoming better con-
nected again. Beside the traditional way, an alternative way to allocate project grants
should be considered. Instead of requesting proposals for specific projects with prede-
fined technologies, the government could invite initiative applications from organizations
which would otherwise have no chance, as they are less connected than the average orga-
nization. Alternatively, policy–makers could request applications from numerous single
organizations instead of a preexisting consortia and then start to establish consortia ran-
domly. Using this approach, governments could ensure that a consortium includes several
organizations with different degrees of centrality, which would deactivate the selection
mechanism that is usually carried out by both the group of organizations prior to the
application process, and the government through the allocation mechanism. However,
this approach would be radical as it limits the freedom of choice of the organizations to
decide whom to partner with.
For the planning of further funding programs, it is crucial for policy makers to be
consider the preexisting network configuration. Supporting the emergence of collabo-
rations and therefore network structures has become a political mantra, meaning more
cooperation is always better. But, this helps to maintain the self-enforcing mechanism of
the allocation process. To prevent unintended distortions, like technological lock-in, gov-
ernments should be interested in whether they always support the same organizations,
which means the same network structures, or if they might concentrate on organizations
which are less central but induce new knowledge into the core region of the network.
Project grants are an effective instrument to support the creation of new innova-
tions. However, the link between the policy induced R&D network and the innovation
network, the network of interconnected innovation processes, also implies that network
structures are able to transit between both networks. This might open Pandora’s box
if the oligopolistic network structure is also able to affect a network with unintended
distortions; governments must be aware of this situation. If the evolution of the policy
induced network remains uncontrolled and the number of awarded project grants grows
steadily, the more likely unintended distortions to the innovation network will be.
To prevent policy failures, a regular monitoring of already existing network formations
is highly recommended. Detailed information about the current network configuration
would ease the possibility to design an R&D policy which fits to the actual needs. Before
a government decides to support the emergence of network structures, the government
should be aware of the already existing network structure. Without regular monitoring,
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it becomes highly likely that already existing relationships within the core can benefit
from additional funding instead unconnected organizations in the outer periphery of the
network.
3. Outline of further research questions
Contrary to the growing awareness of imperfect policy implementation, it remains un-
clear which new policy instruments are required, or how the existing ones have to be
modified, to prevent unintended distortions in the foreseeable future. Some possible pol-
icy changes have been discussed here (for example, the implementation of a threshold to
ensure that a certain amount of the government budget is allocated to weakly connected
organizations to link them with central actors in the network), but practical recommen-
dations of how to identify the most promising organizations or those contributing most
to the overall connectivity of network are still lacking. Such a policy approach would
require additional controlling instruments that continuously evaluate the evolution of
the policy and draw attention to the network structure evolving in the wrong direction.
Moreover, it is unclear to what extend the structure is able to transit between different
kinds of networks. Indications of the dependency between policy-induced research and
an innovation network were found, but the degree of the interrelationship between both
types of network remain less explored. Further research has to put forward the question
of whether only single relationships, or even entire substructures of the network, are able
to transit instantaneously.
Another theoretical, but also very interesting, question would be how the alternative
network would look without the influence of the network-related determinants to the
allocation process. Researchers can investigate this question by describing the allocation
process of project grants with statistical models, in which they have to eliminate the
influence that results from the previous network structure. Thus, this could contribute
to the question of which situation would be a possible alternative to the current policy.
The empirical investigations were restricted to the manufacturing, chemical, automo-
tive, and biotechnology sectors, but it should be clarified whether the results are also
valid for other industries. Furthermore, the evaluation has proven that the promotion of
cooperative R&D activities stimulates cooperative innovations. Hence, the instrument
seems to be effective in accomplishing its objective, but the efficiency is still unclear.
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